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SUMMARY
A better understanding of the psychological mechanisms underpinning addiction willfacilitate its remediation. Some evidence suggests that the emotional properties of drug-paired stimuli themselves drive drug-procurement, while other evidence indicates that theexpectation of reward elicited by the stimuli is sufficient to control drug-seeking. Thecurrent series of experiments aimed to explicate these seemingly contradictory data, bycharacterising the roles played in reward seeking by conditioned-stimulus-elicitedemotion and expectation in non-dependent samples, before assessing their contribution insmokers. Further data suggest a role of personality in addictive behaviours, thuspersonality was assessed as a moderator of reward-seeking. Variations of a Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer design, which tests the ability of reward-associated stimuli tomodulate reward seeking, together with questionnaires of personality were applied. It wasshown that outcome expectation was consistently necessary for cue-potentiatedmonetary-reward seeking, and similarly in smokers, cigarette outcome expectation wassufficient for cue-potentiated cigarette-reward seeking. Tentative evidence for the role ofconditioned-stimulus emotional value in monetary-reward seeking was found, althoughthis latter result requires scrutiny through additional research. Moderating influences ofExtraversion and Neuroticism were found for cue-elicited emotion and outcomeexpectation, respectively. It is therefore proposed that reward expectancy is necessary forconditioned stimuli to control behaviour. The emotional properties of reward-predictivestimuli may be important for reward seeking in the absence of addiction, but whenaddiction to reward is present, control of reward seeking can occur via reward expectationonly. Data from the role of personality, in moderating the effects of stimulus-elicitedemotion or outcome expectation on reward-seeking behaviour, suggest that the control ofbehaviour by emotion may be facilitated by Extraversion, due to its propensity towardsemotional processes, whereas control by expectation may be facilitated by Neuroticism,due to its inclination towards predictive learning.
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1 General introduction
1.1 List of abbreviations and glossaryA AgreeablenessC ConscientiousnessCC Counter-conditioningCS Conditioned stimulus. Refers to a percept predictive of a reward encountered in aPavlovian contextCS+ CS predictive of 50pCS- CS predictive of winning nothingCS± CS non-predictiveCS50 CS predictive of 50pCS10 CS predictive of 10pCS10/50 CS non-predictiveCS discrimination Difference between predictive cues (e.g. CS+ - CS-)Cue-potentiation Difference between predictive and non-predictive cues (e.g. CS+ - S±)E ExtraversionHA Harm-AvoidanceLiCl Lithium-ChlorideN NeuroticismNEO NEO-Personality Inventory-RevisedNS Novelty-SeekingO OpennessO (an) Outcome. Refers to a reward encountered in an instrumental context.P PersistencePIT Pavlovian-to-instrumental transferR Response. An instrumental responseRD Reward-DependenceRI Response initiation. Percentage of trials where a response was madeRR Response rate. Number of responses per secondS Stimulus. Refers to a percept encountered in an instrumental contextS± Non-predictive grey square from instrumental trainingTCI Temperament & Character InventoryUS Unconditioned stimulus. Refers to a reward encountered in a Pavlovian context
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1.2 Theories of reward-seeking behaviourAddiction is associated with substantial negative effects (World Health Organisation, 2004,2009), yet current therapy remains only partially effective (Agboola, McNeill, Coleman, &Bee, 2010; Knapp, Soares, Farrel, & Lima, 2007; Rosner et al., 2010), necessitating thattreatment for this disease is improved. In order to establish effective protocols for theprevention and cure of addiction it will be necessary to understand the psychologicalmechanisms underpinning the disease. But in order to recognise which processes havebecome pathological it will be necessary to characterise these same processes prior to thedevelopment of dysfunction (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth, Balleine, Corbit, &Killcross, 2013). Thus an understanding of ‘normal’ behaviour directed at obtaining non-drug rewards will provide a model with which to calibrate ‘pathological’ behaviourdirected at obtaining drug-rewards. Once such calibration and comparison has taken placeit will be possible to identify and target any aberrant functions, making treatment moreeffective, efficient, and extensive.
1.2.1 Foundations of contemporary learning theoriesThe psychological study of learned behaviour began (Berridge, 2000) with the intuitivelyappealing notion that animals behave as they do because they are either satisfied or
annoyed with the result (Thorndike, 1898). Subsequent theories founded themselves incomparatively objective terms, due to the rising scepticism of the scientific rigour ofsubjective measurement (Fancher, 1996), describing behaviour in terms of a directassociation between environmental stimulus and response (Thorndike, 1911; Watson,1913). Later formulations of this concept attempted to explain behaviour, rather thansimply describe it, by positing that the association between stimulus and response (S→R)was reinforced by the ability of the result of an action to reduce drive (Hull, 1943). Forexample, a food stimulus elicits an eating response because the resultant calories reducehunger, thereby reinforcing the food→eating association.
However, drive reduction theories could only account for a subset of an organism'sbehavioural repertoire, especially those where no explicit reinforcement had beenexperienced, thus later associative accounts returned to a mediating role of positivesubjective states in explaining stimulus-elicited responses. Parallel theories developed,espousing the importance of either the hedonic (Bindra, 1974) or predictive (Bolles, 1972)psychological processes recruited by reward-paired stimuli, with a later formulationstating the co-occurrence of these two systems (Toates, 1986). While contemporary
3
learning theories of behaviour have offered more detailed frameworks (de Wit &Dickinson, 2009; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Hommel, Masseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001;Robinson & Berridge, 1993), they all build on the foundations laid by these earlier works(Berridge, 2000).
1.2.2 Negative reinforcement is not necessary for instrumental behaviourAlthough the explanatory power of associative theories remains (de Wit & Dickinson,2009; Everitt & Robbins, 2005), the idea that associations are reinforced by drive
reduction, or negative reinforcement, has held less favour (Glautier, 2004). A number ofexperimental manipulations have dissociated negative reinforcement from the propensityto seek reward. For example, Miller, Kessen, and colleagues (Berkun, Kessen, & Miller,1952; Miller & Kessen, 1952) compared the behaviour of hungry rats who were rewardedeither with the ability to drink milk normally, or with infusions of milk directly into theirstomachs. The authors found that those allowed to drink normally ate less in a subsequentconsumption test, and learned the location of the reward faster, than those given milkdirectly. Both groups experienced the same dose of milk, thus the hunger-reducingcomponent was balanced, yet those able to taste the milk exhibited a greater degree ofreinforcement. Thus negative reinforcement appeared insufficient to explain the results,though it may still have been necessary, as the rats able to taste the milk also experiencedits hunger-reducing properties.
However, an experiment showing the reverse dissociation, where rats were allowed totaste food but not experience its nutritional content, suggests that negative reinforcementis neither necessary nor sufficient to influence behaviour. Bedard & Weingarten (1989)used a sham feeding procedure where hungry rats were able to consume sucrose, yet notretain it in their stomachs. Thus they experienced the appetitive taste of sucrose, but notits aversive state reducing capacity. Despite this lack of negative reinforcement, the rats'cumulative consumption continued to rise over the session, thus physiological hunger-reduction was not necessary to sustain feeding behaviour.
Although these studies attest to the lack of effect of negative reinforcement in naturalisticbehaviours, such as feeding and foraging, whether they retain their significance whenapplied to instrumental behaviours, i.e. those that have to be explicitly trained, requiresfurther evidence. Such evidence is provided by the serendipitous finding by Olds andMilner (1954) of areas of the brain that, when stimulated electrically, would maintain anovel behaviour. The pair implanted electrodes into the septal area of rats before allowing
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them free access to a lever that, when pressed, would result in electrode stimulation at theimplantation site. Olds and Milner observed high rates of pressing, with one rat amassingnearly 2000 presses in one hour, which appeared unrelated to the reduction of anyaversive state. The rats were given free access to food and water, and appeared non-distressed by the experimental procedure, leading the researchers to conclude that thesite of activation was responsible for the bringing of pleasure, rather than the removal ofpain. Thus this experiment lends further support to the notion that learned behaviour, notjust instinctive behaviour, can be supported by its ability to experience reward, ratherthan escape punishment.
Though these collective findings do not contradict the role of negative reinforcement in alllearned behaviour, they do at least reduce its domination of learning theory, and lendsupport to the idea that many behaviours are elicited because they are instrumental ingaining something appetitive, not avoiding something aversive. But while this line ofevidence attests to the consequences of action, more work is needed to clarify the causes.
1.2.3 Conditioned-stimuli are necessary for instrumental behaviourA common thread throughout contemporary learning theory is the involvement ofenvironmental events that have been paired with reward, referred to as conditioned
stimuli (CSs). Even the overly reductionist theories of Thorndike, Watson, and Hull (Hull,1943; Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1913) had at their core the notion that responses wereelicited by CSs. However, where those early explanations concerned themselves simplywith observable S→R associations, and the role of rewards as reinforcers thereof, thesesimplistic accounts could not capture the gamut of experimental evidence. Thus while CSswere necessary for something, exactly what required further exploration.
Bolles (1972) argued that CSs were necessary for behaviour because they activated an
expectation of their associated reward, which in a syllogistic manner then activated itsassociated instrumental response. Such a hypothesis was predicated on a number ofobservations that defied explanation in pure reinforcement terms. For example, Tolman(1948) reported that rats allowed to explore a maze initially did so in a non-directedmanner, characterised by numerous excursions down dead-ends. However, immediatelyafter finding food in the maze the rats became noticeably more purposive, navigatingstraight to the food with few errors. Such behaviour appeared far sooner than would beexpected by simply S→R explanation, leading Tolman to suggest that the rats haddeveloped a cognitive representation of the maze and its food location.
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While Tolman's findings suggested that rats could represent their surroundings, andexpect reward in a particular location, whether such expectation was elicited by aparticular CS required additional data. Bolles (1972) reported a number of behaviouralstudies that attested to the role of reward expectation in behaviour, at the expense ofreinforcement, that were directly associated with CSs. Such behaviours were broadlyreferred to as 'autoshaped' due to the apparent self-reinforcement of responding. Suchautoshaping was manifested in animals who would interact with a CS, such as a light thatwas paired with food delivery, despite food delivery being non-contingent on any suchinteraction. Furthermore, Jenkins & Moore (1973) showed that such interactions weretailored to the available reward, in that when the reward was food animals woulddemonstrate eating behaviour, whereas when it was water they would engage in drinkingpatterns. Thus autoshaping was elicited by the CS, and was specific to the US (reward),which Bolles interpreted as indicating that the CS had activated an expectation of itsassociated reward, which in turn initiated an appropriate response.
But contemporaries of Bolles, for example Bindra (1974), questioned the sufficiency ofreward expectation in provoking instrumental responding. It had previously beensuggested by Konorski (1967) that CS→US associations recruited parallel processes, onecognitive the other emotive, which represented a given reward in terms of its sensoryidentity and hedonic value, respectively. While Bolles had concentrated on the sensoryaspect giving rise to expectancy, Bindra proposed that both forms of representation werenecessary, with the value division preparing an organism to respond, and the identitydivision specifying the form of response. But Bindra went further, arguing that the CSusurped these dissociable properties of the US such that it was attributed with them itself,to the extent that it became a target of consummatory behaviour. Thus the autoshapingresults described above occurred not because the animal simply expected reward, butconsidered the CS as reward. Such predictions find favour in the results of sign-trackingexperiments (Flagel, Akil, & Robinson, 2009), where animals will interact with a cuepredictive of reward, even at the expense of consuming the reward itself.
However, Bindra's essay implied that the hedonic property of the CS was locked to itshistory with the US. Thus if the initial CS→US association had formed when the organismvalued the US, e.g. if they were hungry and it were food, then the CS would be imbued withan intransigently high hedonic value which should elicit later reward-seeking even if theUS were no longer valued, e.g. if they were full. Evidence refuting this intransigence claim
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led Toates (1986) to reformulate Bindra's ideas to take into account the changing value ofthe CS. Such reformulation led from a series of experiments by Cabanac (1979; Cabanac &Lafrance, 1990) that investigated the effects of food satiety on taste reactivity. Cabanacshowed that the appetitiveness of sucrose taste, i.e. a CS for calorific reward, was reducedafter participants became increasingly sated by an intra-venous dose of sucrose. Thus asthe value of the US changed, so did the value of the CS, a process termed alliesthesia. Thereverse had also been demonstrated, with pleasantness reactions to salt taste beingincreased by salt deprivation (Berridge, Flynn, Schulkin, & Grill, 1984). This latter studyalso reported that the change in reaction to oral salt infusion occurred on the first trial oftaste reactivity, thus any change in its hedonic value could not be attributed to re-learningthe CS→US association. These data therefore suggested to Toates that the hedonic value ofa CS could change, in line with the hedonic value of its US, but independent of directexperience with the US.
1.2.4 CS hedonic value may be necessary for instrumental behaviour
1.2.4.1 Manipulating CS hedonic value influences reward-seekingWhile the changing value of CSs appears to be a consistent result, the influence of CS valueon behaviour appears less consistent. Potential support came from a series of experimentsdescribed by Holland (1990) who manipulated the hedonic value of a CS predictive of foodreward. Rats were given access to sucrose containing one of two flavours (US1 and US2),before these two flavours were paired with two tones (CS1 and CS2), respectively. US2 wasthen devalued by pairing it with lithium chloride (LiCl) induced illness, before behaviouraltests involving the two CSs were conducted. Holland reported that appetitive tastereactions to unflavoured sucrose were reduced in the presence of CS2 compared to CS1, inkeeping with the taste reactivity studies of Cabanac (1979; Cabanac & Lafrance, 1990) andBerridge (Berridge et al., 1984) above, but went further to describe that consumption ofsucrose was also reduced by CS2. Such an effect was not due to an aversion to US2 itself,because the unique flavour of US2 was absent in the consumption test, thus it appearedthat the reduced hedonic value of CS2 was responsible for the reduced feeding behaviour.
Support for the translation of this interpretation into humans comes from similar resultsfrom Van Gucht and colleagues (Van Gucht, Baeyens, Hermans, & Beckers, 2013; VanGucht, Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Beckers, 2010). These authors paired one oftwo visual CSs (a red or white tray; CS+ and CS-) with either eating or not eating achocolate US. They found that this initial acquisition stage developed differential hedonic
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reactions to the two CSs, with participants rating the CS+ as more pleasant than the CS-.Van Gucht and colleagues then targeted a devaluation procedure at the CS+ itself, cruciallyin the absence of the chocolate US, by pairing it with a bitter solution. This led to thereversal of pleasantness ratings such that the CS+ was now rated less pleasant than the CS-. When chocolate was reintroduced to the scenario, participants exposed to thisdevaluation procedure ate less in the presence of the CS+ compared to participants whohad undergone the same procedure but without experiencing the bitter solution. Thus thechanging value of the CS, distinct from that of the US, was concordant with a change inbehaviour.
However, the above studies concentrated on conditioned behaviours, i.e. those thatresemble a natural response to a US, thus potentially limiting their generalisation. Butexpansion of the range of behaviours, from conditioned to instrumental, potentiallyinfluenced by CS hedonic value comes from an experiment by Tunstall and colleagues(Tunstall, Verendeev, & Kearns, 2012). The researchers trained rats that pressing a leverin the presence of either a light or tone (CS1 or CS2) would deliver cocaine. CS1 was thendevalued, in the absence of cocaine, by pairing it with footshock. Subsequent respondingon the lever, again in the absence of cocaine, was reduced in the presence of CS1 comparedto CS2. Although Tunstall et al did not include measures of CS hedonic value, incombination with the data of Holland (1990) and Van Gucht & colleagues (Van Gucht et al.,2013; Van Gucht et al., 2010), their results indicate that the changing value of a CS ismatched by changes in instrumental responding.
1.2.4.2 Reward identity influences reward-seekingBut while these data suggest that CS hedonic value may be necessary for instrumentalbehaviour, they cannot claim that it is necessary, because they cannot rule out the role ofexpectancy. The use of rat participants, as with Holland (1990) and Tunstall et al (2012),renders measures of expectancy difficult, and the study of human participants, as with VanGucht et al (2013; 2010), confirms that changes in CS hedonic reactions are confounded bychanges in US expectancy. Thus while this confound does not itself rule out CS hedonicvalue as a necessary criterion for instrumental behaviour, Bolles (1972) prediction thatreward expectation is sufficient to enable behaviour remains.
Indeed, the sufficiency status of reward expectancy in mediating the causal link betweenCSs and instrumental responses holds favour with contemporary theory and research oflearned behaviour. But the essence of exactly what is expected remains unclear. Ideomotor
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accounts propose, as their class name may suggest, that the idea of an action’sconsequence is sufficient to generate that action (Hommel et al., 2001). Such aconsequence representation may take purely perceptual form, such that the mere sight,sound, or smell of response outcome may prime its associated response (Ansorge, 2002;Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Fedoroff, Polivy, & Herman, 1997). For example, Elsner &Hommel (2001) trained participants that pressing the left key of a response box elicited alow tone, whereas pressing the right key elicited a high tone. The authors then playedeither tone during a free response-choice test phase, finding that either tone biasedresponding towards its associated response.
But this result does not necessarily rely on an expectation of an outcome, merely an
experience of an outcome. However, CSs have been shown to have a similar response-priming effect (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki, & Duka,2007; Prévost, Liljeholm, Tyszka, & O'Doherty, 2012), in keeping with their ability toproduce reward expectation as predicted by Bolles (1972). For instance, a study byHogarth and colleagues (Hogarth et al., 2007) involved participants learning to expect tworewarding outcomes (money or cigarettes) after presentation of two visual cues (twodifferent shapes), respectively, before learning two instrumental responses (pressing ‘D’or ‘H’) to obtain the same outcomes. In a test phase containing the cues and responses, yetnot outcomes, each cue selectively biased response choice towards that associated withthe common outcome. The fact that no outcome was present during the test phase, i.e. thetest was conducted in extinction, necessitated that any behavioural effect was due to anexpectation of reward, rather than an experience of reward.
Furthermore, a later study by Hogarth (2012) confirmed that this biasing effect was due toa sensory expectation, by showing that each cue continued to bias responding despite oneof the outcomes being devalued by satiety. In a similar experimental setup, participantslearned the same keypress responses, this time for chocolate or cigarettes, beforeconsuming one of the outcomes to satiety. This satiety-driven devaluation treatment wasfollowed by a test phase where pictures of either outcome, serving as CSs, were presentedwhile participants emitted instrumental responses, again in the absence of the actualoutcomes. Despite the devaluation procedure, both pictures were equally able to biasresponding towards seeking their depicted outcome. Although Hogarth only measured thehedonic value of the chocolate or cigarette rewards, rather than their pictorial CSs, if it istaken that the process of alliesthesia (Cabanac, 1979) caused CS value to dropconcomitantly with reward value, then Hogarth's results can be interpreted as showing
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that CS hedonic value was not necessary to control instrumental responding, rathersensory expectancy of reward was sufficient.
Such a chain of events can be represented as an S→O→R process (de Wit & Dickinson,2009), where a stimulus (S; perception of a CS) activates the sensory representation of itsoutcome (O; expectation of a reward), which in turn activates its response (R;instrumental reward-seeking). Such an S→O→R process has been shown to depend on thesensory representation of an outcome, but be autonomous from the value representation,by multiple studies akin to that by Hogarth (2012) described above (Colwill & Rescorla,1990; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004). Yet Dickinson and colleagues (de Wit &Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994) propose an alternative route by whichenvironmental stimuli may affect instrumental responding that is sensitive to rewardvalue.
1.2.4.3 Reward hedonic value influences reward-seekingInstead of a stimulus gaining direct access to an outcome representation as in the S→O→Rmodel, Dickinson and colleagues suggest that the stimulus activates thoughts of potentialresponse options, which in turn activate thoughts of their respective outcomes, whichthemselves feed back to elicit an instrumental response. Thus the model is represented byan S→R→O chain. As well as changing the order of mental events compared to theS→O→R model, Dickinson and colleagues add that the feedback from outcomerepresentation to instrumental response elicitation is governed by the expected value ofthe outcome. This has the effect of facilitating a response when its associated outcome isvalued, e.g. responding for food when hungry, while inhibiting a response when itsassociated outcome is not valued, e.g. responding for food when full. Such value-sensitiveS→R→O behaviour is referred to by Dickinson and colleagues as goal-directed, while itsvalue-insensitive S→O→R counterpart is referred to as autonomous.
The contention that the R→O portion of the model is goal-directed is well supported(Adams & Dickinson, 1981; Colwill & Rescorla, 1985; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Hogarth,2012). For example, in a test of R→O goal-directedness, Colwill & Rescorla (1985) trainedrats to lever press or chain pull for either sucrose or food pellets, respectively. One orother outcome was then devalued by pairing it with nausea, before a test of instrumentalresponding was conducted in extinction. Goal-directed behaviour was confirmed by therats' selective reduction of the response that was trained with the now devalued outcome;the response trained with the non-devalued outcome was unaffected. Thus rats' change in
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behaviour was sensitive to an expectancy of the identity as well as the value of theoutcome.
However, the form of this value expectation is suggested to be more cognitive thanemotional (Berridge, 2000; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009), and appears to rely on directexperience with the newly valued outcome rather than automatic update after valuemanipulations. This reliance on experience is illustrated by a paradigm deployed byDickinson colleagues (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994, 1995; Dickinson, Balleine, Watt,Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995) which measured instrumental responding after manipulatingthe level of experience rats had with a reward. Hungry rats were first trained on a singlelever-press response to receive food pellets, establishing a high value for food. One groupwas then given free access to a maintenance diet, whereas the other group remained food-deprived, before both were re-exposed to the pellets previously earned by lever-pressing.Thus the non-deprived group experienced the new low value of pellets, whereas thedeprived group continued to experience a high value. All animals were then given accessto their maintenance diet, before instrumental responding was tested in extinction.Despite the physiological value of pellets being low for all animals, only those givenexperience of this low value during re-exposure demonstrated a reduction in lever-pressing. The authors interpret these data as suggesting that goal-directed responding,although controlled by some representation of outcome value, is controlled by a cognitiverepresentation of the value, based on prior experience, rather than an emotiverepresentation, based on current physiological state.
1.2.4.4 CS hedonic value augments reward-seekingYet evidence for the activation of such goal-directed behaviour by conditioned stimuli, i.e.those directly predictive of rewarding outcomes rather than rewarded responses, remainstentative (Corbit, Janak, & Balleine, 2007; Dickinson & Dawson, 1987; Holland, 2004).Instead, evidence for goal-directed behaviour following a CS may be better explained by amodel denoted S[R→O]. In this S[R→O] architecture the S (a conditioned stimulus forreward) does not have direct access to the R, and so cannot prime a response, but rathermay augment an already initiated response. The level of this CS-induced augmentation ispredicted to track O value (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Toates, 1986), but, in contrast tothe reliance on experience of a reward's value demonstrated under isolated R→Oconditions (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994, 1995; Dickinson et al., 1995), may be immediatelysensitive to changes in reward value via the process of alliesthesia (Cabanac, 1979).
11
Showing support for S[R→O] sensitivity to current reward value, Dickinson & Dawson(Dickinson & Dawson, 1987) trained hungry rats to associate a clicker or a light CS withpellets or liquid sucrose reward, respectively. In a separate training session the ratslearned to make a single lever-pressing response to receive both pellets and liquidsucrose. Rats were then switched from a state of hunger to thirst, thus switching therelative balance of value from pellets to liquid sucrose, but were not re-exposed to therewards in this new state. In support of value sensitivity, when tested in extinction thethirsty rats pressed at a higher rate when presented with the sucrose cue than with thepellet cue. An S→O→R explanation, i.e. behaviour mediated by an expectation of theoutcome, is precluded because each cue was equally predictive of its reward. An S→R→Oexplanation is also ruled out, because rats were able to alter their behaviour without re-learning the value of each reward. Thus an S[R→O] explanation appears mostparsimonious, with behaviour augmented by the increased value of the liquid sucrose cueover the pellet cue.
However, the fact that CS and response shared an outcome in the Dickinson & Dawsonpaper precludes comment on the ability of a CS to have a general effect on a response viaan S[R→O] process. It may have been that any response augmentation was specific to thatwhich obtained the outcome predicted by the stimulus. But if all that is required of the CSis for it to possess hedonic value (Toates, 1986) then it should influence an ongoingresponse regardless of whether CS and response share an outcome (Corbit & Balleine,2005; Corbit et al., 2007).
Such a general effect of CS hedonic value is demonstrated by Corbit and colleagues (Corbitet al., 2007) using a method that removes the possibility of a CS augmenting a specificinstrumental response. The authors trained free-feeding rats to associate three CSs (S1-3;tone, white noise, clicker) with three rewards (O1-3; sucrose, polycose, pellets),respectively, in one phase, then trained the rats to make two instrumental responses(R1&2; left/right lever press) to gain two of the rewards (e.g. sucrose, polycose), in asecond phase. Thus S3 was associated with O3, but had no corresponding R3, and so couldnot have a specific response-augmentation effect. Rats were then tested in extinction ontheir rate of R1&2 pressing in the presence of S1-3, under conditions of continued satietyand then conditions of hunger. Under satiety, response augmentation was specific, i.e. S1augmented R1, and S2 augmented R2, but S3 had no effect. However, under hunger, wherethe hedonic value of the outcome had been increased, S3 enacted an augmentation of bothR1&2 indiscriminately, thus demonstrating a general energisation of instrumental
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responding. Furthermore, this general energisation was sensitive to changes in outcomevalue, brought about by physiological state changes, without requiring direct experience ofthe outcome’s value in that new state.
Corbit and colleagues’ data are therefore suggestive of the effects of conditioned-stimulushedonic value on instrumental reward-seeking proposed by Bindra (1974) and Toates(1986), in that it would be predicted that the increase in S3 hedonic value would be in linewith the increase in O3 hedonic value (Cabanac, 1979). But such a prediction is notverified by Corbit and colleagues’ method, because the authors did not measure thehedonic value of the CS directly, thus their results should be more cautiously interpretedas showing a behavioural sensitivity to reward value rather than CS value.
Yet a series of experiments by Holland (2004) provide converging evidence that Corbitand colleagues’ (Corbit et al., 2007) result may not be directly dependent on reward value,leaving open the possibility of behavioural control by CS value. Holland investigated theeffects of extended instrumental training on the ability of CSs to control responding, whenanimals had experienced either one or two rewards. Rats in the single reward groupexperienced a tone CS paired with a pellet reward, before learning a lever-press responseto receive pellets. Rats in the dual reward group experienced a tone and a white-noise CSpaired with pellets and sucrose, respectively, before learning a lever-press and a chain-pull response to receive pellets and sucrose, respectively. Half of the animals in each groupreceived minimal instrumental training, whereas the other half received extendedinstrumental training. Following training, all rats received a reward devaluationmanipulation whereby one or other outcome was repeatedly paired with nausea. Theywere then tested in extinction for the effects of the CSs on responding.
Results showed a dissociation between the single and dual reward groups. Extendedtraining facilitated the response augmentation of the CS in the single reward group, thoughhad little effect on CS augmentation in the dual reward group, who showed anaugmentation only when CS and response had a common reward. Furthermore, extendedtraining reduced the devaluation sensitivity of rats in the single group, though had less ofan effect on devaluation sensitivity in the dual group.
Holland’s (2004) data may be interpreted, albeit tentatively, as indicating that thebehaviour of animals in the single reward group was more amenable to CS augmentationof general responding than animals in the dual reward group, who displayed more CS
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augmentation of specific responding. The differential effect of extended training on the twogroups highlights the different process recruited by the single and dual reward conditions.The dual condition, due to its demonstration of a response-specific effect, may have reliedon an S→O→R process, whereas the single condition, if dissociated from the dualcondition and therefore not S→O→R, may have relied more heavily on S[R→O]. Moreover,if the single reward condition, characterised by S[R→O] responding, became increasinglyless sensitive to current outcome value, yet became increasingly more sensitive to CS
presentation, as training was extended, it may have been that these shifts in performancewere underpinned by the increasing control of CS hedonic value.
While such a conclusion requires direct evidence, it finds favour with theories ofmaladaptive reward seeking (Hogarth et al., 2013; Robinson & Berridge, 1993), such asaddiction, and so may provide a viable model with which to compare reward-seeking fornatural rewards with seeking of addictive rewards.
1.2.5 Theories of addictionJust as CSs are argued to play a pivotal role in natural reward-seeking (Bindra, 1974;Bolles, 1972; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Toates, 1986), so too are they theorised to controlbehaviour in addiction. However, whereas natural reward-seeking is amenable to thechecks and balances offered by the multiple routes of CS-elicited behaviour outlinedabove, addiction is characterised by a loss of control of behaviour such that itsconsequences, e.g. job loss, relationship breakdown, health deterioration, appear to havelittle influence. Instead, it is argued that drug-paired stimuli exert a powerful influence onbehaviour, to the extent that natural-reward-seeking processes become usurped in favourof drug procurement (Altman et al., 1996; American Psychiatric Association, 2000;Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Stewart, de Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984).
Similar to the early theories of natural reward-seeking, early accounts of addiction offeredexplanations involving aberrant negative reinforcement (Koob & Moal, 1997; Wikler,1973). But these also failed to account for the available data, primarily the finding thatsmall doses of a drug could elicit drug seeking (Stewart et al., 1984). Such doses, and otherCSs associated with subsequent drug effects, are subjectively rated by users as pleasurable(Geier, Pauli, & Mucha, 2000), thus questioning the necessity of negative states in initiatingdrug seeking.
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1.2.5.1 Habit theoryThus positive reinforcement theories now dominate the addiction literature (Berridge,2000; Glautier, 2004; Stewart et al., 1984). One such theory, taking its lead from theapparent loss of outcome value representation in addicts, explains addiction as apathological reliance on habitual behaviours, with the hedonic value of addictive drugscausing especially potent reinforcement of S→R associations (Everitt & Robbins, 2005).Thus responding is directly initiated by drug-paired stimuli, with no influence of outcomerepresentations. Such a hypothesis is supported by data indicating that drugs such asalcohol and cocaine can facilitate the development of habitual responding (Dickinson,Wood, & Smith, 2002; Miles, Everitt, & Dickinson, 2003). For instance, Dickinson andcolleagues (Dickinson et al., 2002) trained rats to press two levers to receive eitherethanol or pellets. One of the outcomes was then devalued by LiCl pairing, before ratswere returned to instrumental responding conditions in extinction. Rats devalued onpellets demonstrated goal-directed behaviour by reducing their press-rate on the pelletlever, but rats devalued on ethanol demonstrated autonomous responding by continuingto press for ethanol as they had done during training. Similar data is provided wherecocaine or amphetamine was used in place of ethanol (Miles et al., 2003; Nordquist et al.,2007), thus attesting to the propensity of addictive drugs to encourage habit processes.
However, although S→R processes may dominate under some conditions, the case forhabit formation in human addicts remains to be proven (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009;Hogarth & Chase, 2011). For example, although smokers report a tendency for habitualcigarette use which correlates with their level of nicotine dependence (Russell, Peto, &Patel, 1974), laboratory tests suggest that smoking can be goal-directed (Hogarth & Chase,2011; Hogarth, Dickinson, & Duka, 2010). In a paradigm analogous to the ethanol study ofDickinson and colleagues (Dickinson et al., 2002) above, Hogarth & Chase (2011) trainedhumans smokers to perform two novel instrumental responses (keyboard presses) foreither cigarettes or chocolate, before devaluing one or other reward via satiety. In thesubsequent extinction test, participants reduced responding for the devalued outcome,regardless of whether it was cigarettes or chocolate. Similarly, in a more naturalisticsetting, Hogarth and colleagues (Hogarth et al., 2010) allowed smokers to inhale normallywhile reporting their craving to smoke before each puff. The authors found that as thesession progressed the rate of inhalation subsided, with the number of puffs consumedacross the session predicted by subjective craving for nicotine. Thus using both novel andnatural instrumental smoking responses demonstrates a sensitivity to the value ofnicotine, evidenced by the shift in choice following devaluation, the reduction in puffing
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across time, and the correlation with craving (a subjective proxy for outcome value(Tiffany, 1990)).
1.2.5.2 Expectancy theoryNevertheless, while the human smoking studies of Hogarth and colleagues (Hogarth &Chase, 2011; Hogarth et al., 2010) attest to the goal-directed nature of smoking under freechoice conditions, the presentation of a cigarette-paired CS was still able to augmentnicotine-seeking, even after devaluation, in these experiments. But rather than lendsupport to S→R theory, these results instead lend support to expectancy theory (Brandon,Herzog, Irvin, & Gwaltney, 2004; Goldman, 1999; Hogarth & Duka, 2006), in that onlyparticipants who reported an expectation of receiving reward displayed an influence of aCS on responding. A series of studies from Hogarth and colleagues (Hogarth et al., 2007;Hogarth & Duka, 2006) attests to the necessity of reward expectation in CS controlledcigarette-seeking, with a review by Hogarth & Duka (2006) extending the requirement ofexpectation from instrumental responding to conditioned responding, such as the ratingsof pleasure, craving, and arousal, attributed to smoking cues.
Although these quasi-experimental investigations of expectancy are merely indicative ofits necessary status, experimental manipulation of expectancy confirms its importance indrug-seeking (B. L. Carter & Tiffany, 2001; Hogarth et al., 2014; Juliano & Brandon, 1998).Providing information about cigarette availability influences the magnitude of cigarettecraving and seeking. Smokers report increased urges to smoke, and reduced latencies toreach for a cigarette, when verbally instructed that smoking is allowed (B. L. Carter &Tiffany, 2001; Juliano & Brandon, 1998). Additionally, providing availability information inthe form of drug CSs also alters instrumental responding for drugs. Hogarth et al (2014)demonstrated that a drug-predictive cue would increase drug-seeking behaviour, but thatdegrading the relationship between cue and drug abolished its control over drug seeking.Thus, to the extent that availability cues and instructions increase expectancies, targetedmanipulation of expectancy bears a causal effect on drug-related responses.
Furthermore, the nature of expectancy is alluded to by the differential success of Pavlovian
versus instrumental extinction used by Hogarth et al (2014). Whereas degrading the S→O relationship had little effect on subsequent instrumental responding controlled by the S,
degrading an S→R→O relationship reduced S control of a subsequent R. Thus the conclusion from these availability experiments may be that ‘expectancy’ refers to an
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increased likelihood of response utility, rather than simply an increased likelihood ofoutcome existence.
But these data on expectancy may be more broadly relevant to reward learning in general ,rather than specifically explaining a unique component of addiction. However, adjuncttheories of addiction propose that the expectancies generated in addicts by drug-pairedcues are distinct from those generated in non-addicts, thus suggesting a pivotal role ofexpectancy in addiction. For example, Marlatt and colleagues’ cognitive-behavioural modelof relapse prevention ascribes particular importance to combating ‘positive outcomeexpectancies’ (Hendershot, Witkiewitz, George, & Marlatt, 2011; Witkiewitz & Marlatt,2004). These positive expectancies are argued to mediate the relationship between ‘highrisk situations’, i.e. environments paired with drugs, and subsequent relapse. Moreover,empirical evidence suggests that chronic drug use amplifies these positive expectancies,more potently than natural rewards, thus indicating a pathological process specific toaddiction (Kirchner & Sayette, 2007; Lopez-Vergara et al., 2012; Martens & Gilbert, 2008;Wardell, Read, Colder, & Merrill, 2012).
However, any amplification of positive expectancies by abused drugs may target the
positive aspect differentially to the expectancy aspect. While the positivity of outcomerepresentations may increase (Kirchner & Sayette, 2007), the awareness of outcomerepresentations may in fact decrease (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Tiffany, 1990). Thus‘expectancy’ may not be an explicit, conscious, representation of either drug availability orresponse utility, but instead be an implicit network of Pavlovian associations and motorprogrammes. Therefore, although initial reward-seeking may be under conscious control,the development of addiction may coincide with a progressive increase in positiveoutcome representations, yet a concomitant decrease in awareness of theserepresentations. Indeed, Lamb and colleagues (1991) report that low doses of morphineare sufficient to sustain instrumental responding but do not produce subjective effectsdifferent from placebo. Thus their participants continued to seek morphine despite notknowing whether they would receive drug or placebo.
1.2.5.3 Incentive-sensitisation theorySuch a result has therefore led other researchers in the addiction field (Robinson &Berridge, 1993; Tiffany, 1990) to propose that addiction-related behaviours can occur inthe absence of conscious knowledge of their consequences. Yet rather than support theassertion of habit theory (Everitt & Robbins, 2005) that addiction is characterised by a loss
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of outcome representation, Robinson & Berridge (1993) propose that addiction is betterexplained by the gaining of a hyper-valued outcome representation. Moreover, the pairargue that this hyper-valuation is transferred to drug CSs, via the process of alliesthesia(Cabanac, 1979), such that CSs are able to control behaviour independent of a consciousrepresentation of the value of the drug itself (Berridge & Robinson, 1995). But in contrastto theories of natural reward, which emphasise the hedonic component of value, Robinson& Berridge suggest that drugs sensitise the motivational component of value. Thus theyargue that pathological drug-seeking occurs because CSs activate a 'wanting' for the drug,rather than a 'liking' of the drug. Although during the initial stages of drug use the hedonicand motivational components of reward may be equally represented (Drevets et al., 2001),after chronic exposure the motivational component begins to dominate via a process ofincentive-sensitisation, such that hedonic processes become decoupled from drug seeking.
Such a claim is supported by experiments from Wyvell & Berridge (2000, 2001) whoshowed that chronic amphetamine treatment was able to potentiate motivated respondingwithout influencing hedonic reactions. Rats were trained to press a lever to receivesucrose, before associating a tone CS with sucrose in the absence of lever-pressing. Theywere then given six days of amphetamine exposure, before being given an extinction testof lever pressing in the presence of the CS. Compared to control rats who received salineinstead of amphetamine, the experimental rats showed increased pressing in the presenceof the CS, but not in the absence of the CS. They also showed no differences in a test ofsucrose taste reactivity designed to measure hedonic responses. Rats were tested in adrug-free state, thus any effects were due to chronic administration rather than acutesubstance effects. Furthermore, increased responding was concentrated only in periodswhen the CS was present, thus the behavioural effect was attributable to the CS and notdue to general locomotor activity. Additionally, the hedonic taste reactivity test showed nodifferences between amphetamine- and saline-treated animals, thus the differentialinstrumental response effect was not due to differences in hedonic value attributed tosucrose.
However, although Wyvell & Berridge (2000, 2001) argue that CSs gain control ofbehaviour through motivational processes, and that drugs do not directly influencehedonic reactions to reward, they did not measure the hedonic reaction to the CS itself.Moreover, although the data from Lamb et al (1991), that addicts will work for morphinedespite lack of subjective response to the drug, suggest that expectancy is not necessaryfor instrumental responding, it does not address whether expectancy is necessary for CS-
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potentiated responding. The supporting data for Robinson & Berridge's (1993) theory isbased largely on non-human studies, and so cannot adequately assess the role ofexpectancy in CS-elicited drug-seeking either.
Thus there remains a lack of conclusive evidence for the relative roles of hedonic,motivational, or expectancy responses in mediating CS-elicited reward-seeking and drugaddiction. One explanation for this lack of consensus may be that each theory coexists (deWit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth et al., 2013), yet presides over a specific situationdepending on the unique dispositions of the organism under test (Cloninger, 1987).Indeed, individual differences in personality have been shown to influence addiction(Cloninger, Przybeck, Svrakic, & Wetzel, 1994; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and natural rewardprocess (Avila, Parcet, Ortet, & Ibáñez-Ribes, 1999; Corr, Pickering, & Gray, 1995; Most,Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005), and so present a viable target for explaining variation inexperimental results.
1.3 Individual differences in addiction and learning
1.3.1 Personality predictors of addictionTwo broad-ranging questionnaires of personality, that have been widely used withinaddiction research, are the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI, Cloninger et al.,1994) and the NEO-Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO, Costa & McCrae, 1992). While theTCI’s theoretical background stems from genetic analysis of phenotypic traits (Cloninger,1987; Stallings, Hewitt, Cloninger, Heath, & Eaves, 1996), the NEO was developed throughfactor analysis of phenotypic traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Thus the two provide subtlydifferent targets for addiction research, yet despite their differing developmentalstrategies both have provided promising avenues for future investigation (Piedmont,2001; Pomerleau, Pomerleau, Flessland, & Basson, 1992; Ruiz, Pincus, & Dickinson, 2003).The TCI comprises four higher-order temperament domains of Novelty-Seeking, Harm-Avoidance, Reward-Dependence, and Persistence. The TCI's authors predict that Novelty-Seeking represents a biological system involved in approach of reward, whereas Harm-Avoidance is a proxy for a system dedicated to avoidance of punishment. Reward-Dependence manifests an organism's sensitivity to social reward, with Persistencemeasuring the ability of an individual to maintain a response despite a lack of immediatereward. In contrast, the NEO's claims of its five higher-order factors are made in moresocial terms than the TCI's behavioural conception. Neuroticism reflects a propensity toexperience and display negative emotion, contrasted with Extraversion which concerns
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itself with positive emotions. Openness reflects an individual's interest in novelexperience, with Agreeableness primarily a dimension recording interpersonaldispositions. Finally Conscientiousness maps a person's ability to adhere to societalconvention.
When administering the TCI to addict samples, a consistent finding is an elevated Novelty-Seeking score, relative to normative data from the manual, reported in smokers(Pomerleau et al., 1992; Wills, Vaccaro, & McNamara, 1994), alcoholics (Cannon, Clark,Leeka, & Keefe, 1993; Cloninger, 1987) and polysubstance abusers (Conway, Kane, Ball,Poling, & Rounsaville, 2003). This trait appears to relate to the initiation of drug takingmore than the development of addiction, with Pomerleau et al (1992) finding a group-level elevation of Novelty-Seeking in smokers, but no correlation between Novelty-Seekingand dependence severity. Moreover, Conrod & colleagues (2008) report that interventionsaimed at sensation-seeking, a moderately correlated trait (Giancola, Zeichner, Newbolt, &Stennett, 1994), reduced the alcohol intake of binge-drinking adolescents at twelve monthfollow up. While the NEO does not group novelty-seeking traits under a single factor, itcontains a lower-order excitement-seeking facet within the Extraversion factor. Thisexcitement-seeking facet was found to correlate with drinking frequency but not drinking
problems in a student sample (2003), and was found to be higher in recreational andpathological gamblers, relative to non-gambling controls (Bagby et al., 2007). Thus thedata support the notion that novelty-seeking traits mediate an initial gate leading toaddiction, but not addiction severity itself.
More pertinent to addiction itself, there is further overlap between the two questionnairesalong their anxiety-related dimensions of Harm-Avoidance for the TCI, and Neuroticismfor the NEO. The two factors are highly correlated (.7, Cloninger et al., 1994), withconvergent findings from multiple researchers reporting significantly higher Harm-Avoidance and Neuroticism in addicted samples compared to controls (Bagby et al., 2007;Le Bon et al., 2004; Piedmont & Ciarrocchi, 1999; Pomerleau et al., 1992). Unlike Novelty-Seeking, this relationship appears more strongly related to addiction severity than theinitiation of substance use. For example, Pomerleau and colleagues (1992) found thatgroup-differences between smokers and controls were smaller for Harm-Avoidance,compared to Novelty-Seeking, but that Harm-Avoidance was the only factor to correlatewith dependence severity. Moreover, Piedmont & Ciarrocchi (1999) report that opioid-dependent out-patients receiving cognitive therapy for their addiction exhibitedreductions in Neuroticism over the course of treatment, with change in Neuroticism
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correlated with treatment efficacy. Additionally, Ruiz and colleagues (2003) report agreater correlation between Neuroticism and alcohol related problems than Neuroticismand drinking frequency in a student sample.
The suggestion that negative-affective traits engender addiction, rather than initiation ofdrug use, is further supported by the significant comorbidity found between drugaddiction and obsessive-compulsive disorder, which is characterised by a similarlyintractable pattern of behaviour (Trull, Waudby, & Sher, 2004). Notable overlap occursbetween their personality profiles, with OCD sufferers also exhibiting higher N than thegeneral population (Tackett, Quilty, Sellbom, Rector, & Bagby, 2008), as well ascorrelations between Harm-Avoidance and symptom severity measures (Ball, Tennen,Poling, Kranzler, & Rounsaville, 1997; Svrakic, Whitehead, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 1993).
Thus traits related to sensation-seeking may predict likelihood of initial drug exposure,whereas traits related to anxiety may be of greatest relevance to addiction severity. Butwhile these epidemiological studies provide a description of drug addiction ascharacterised by negative-affect, they do not provide an explanation of why such arelationship between anxiety and addiction should occur.
1.3.2 Personality predictors of reward learningAdding a deeper level of understanding of the involvement of personality in addiction-relevant behaviours are studies investigating the mediating roles of various traits onassociative learning tasks. Their general synopsis has been that positive-affective traitsfacilitate appetitive elements of a task, whereas negative-affective traits facilitate aversiveelements of a task (Avila et al., 1999; Corr et al., 1995). Such a summary accords withCloninger and colleagues' (Cloninger, 1987; Cloninger et al., 1994) assertions that Novelty-Seeking and Harm-Avoidance represent systems of reward approach and punishmentavoidance, respectively.
In support of Cloninger’s assertions, Corr and colleagues (Corr et al., 1995) testedparticipants on a classical conditioning task where two different colour CSs (blue orpurple) predicted two different monetary USs (winning or losing, respectively). Afterviewing the CS, participants were asked which of the ensuing USs they expected. Theauthors found that Reward-Dependence predicted the number of correct 'win'expectancies, whereas Harm-Avoidance predicted the number of correct 'lose'expectancies. Subtle differences were found in an instrumental task, where participants
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were instructed to follow a moving target on a computer screen with their finger, whilethe CSs from the conditioning task were intermittently presented. Participants wererewarded with money for following the target quickly on appetitive CS trials, or moreslowly on aversive CS trials. Trait anxiety, as measured by the State-Trait AnxietyInventory (Spielberger, 1983), predicted increases in reaction time on appetitive trials,whereas impulsivity, measured by the Eysenck Personality Scales (Eysenck & Eysenck,1991), predicted decreases in reaction time on aversive trials. Trait anxiety correlateswith Harm-Avoidance, whereas trait impulsivity correlates with Novelty-Seeking(Cloninger et al., 1994). Thus Corr & colleagues' results suggest that TCI traits show intra-valence facilitation of classical tasks, e.g. positive traits enhance positive outcome learning,yet inter-valence inhibition of instrumental tasks, e.g. negative traits suppress positiveoutcome seeking.
Similarly, Avila & colleagues (Avila et al., 1999) report that those with higher anxiety, asdefined by the Sensitivity to Punishment Scale (Torrubia, Ávila, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001),had greater difficulty in learning to respond for a smaller immediate punishment in orderto receive a larger delayed reward, compared to their lower anxiety peers. Measures ofbehavioural impulsivity and tolerance to delay were unrelated to performance, thus theauthors concluded that trait anxiety reduced participants' ability to form an appetitiveassociation, in accord with Corr & colleagues (Corr et al., 1995).
As well as moderating task learning, further investigations suggest personality alsomoderates hedonic value experience. Higher self-reports of benzodiazepine withdrawalsymptoms are reported for those higher on Harm-Avoidance, whereas physiologicalmeasures of benzodiazepine reward, e.g. slowing of saccadic eye movements, correlatepositively with Novelty-Seeking (Schweizer, Rickels, De Martinis, Case, & Garcia-Espana,1998). Similarly, sensation-seeking correlates both with physiological (heart rate) andsubjective (pleasantness) responses to acute alcohol intoxication (Brunelle et al., 2004).
Moreover, these results are extended from the experience of the reward itself to the CSsassociated with it, in a study conducted by Most and colleagues (Most et al., 2005). Theauthors presented a rapid stream of images, each of 100ms duration, depicting affectively-neutral landscapes, and instructed participants to respond when they saw a rotatedlandscape. Interspersed in the visual steam were unpleasant images of, for example,violent crime, which participants were not informed of. Individuals scoring more highly onHarm-Avoidance showed a greater attentional bias for these aversive images, manifested
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in a slowing of reaction time to the target (rotated) images. Other measures of attentionalbias have shown that increased CS gaze duration is associated with increased subjectiveCS aversiveness (Austin & Duka, 2010), thus the results of Most and colleagues (Most et al.,2005) may suggest increased negative value attribution to CSs from those higher in Harm-Avoidance. A related pattern of results is also demonstrated for NEO factors, with fMRIdata showing a correlation between amygdala activity and Extraversion when viewingaffectively positive images, in contrast to a correlation between middle temporal gyrusactivity and Neuroticism when viewing affectively negative images (Canli et al., 2001).
Thus predispositions to positive affect, measured through e.g. Novelty-Seeking orExtraversion, have been shown to facilitate learning of appetitive tasks, as well as facilitatehedonic value attribution of appetitive CSs. Conversely, predispositions to negative affect,measured through e.g. Harm-Avoidance or Neuroticism, have been shown to facilitatelearning of aversive tasks, as well as facilitate [negative] hedonic value attribution ofaversive CSs. However, these data implicate personality in aspects of propositionallearning, emotional processing, and instrumental responding, in comparative isolation toeach other, thus the role of personality in tasks that engender a combination of learning,emotion, and responding requires further scrutiny.
1.4 Experimental protocols for the study of stimulus-elicited behaviour
1.4.1 Pavlovian-to-instrumental-transfer designsOne such experimental protocol that has been used extensively in the study of cue-potentiated behaviour is the Pavlovian-to-instrumental-transfer (PIT) design (e.g. Colwill& Rescorla, 1988, 1990; Corbit et al., 2007; Estes, 1943; Hogarth et al., 2007). The primaryimportance of the PIT paradigm is that it precludes an explanation for behaviour in termsof direct S→R performance (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009). This is achieved by separatephases of Pavlovian and instrumental training, such that stimulus and response never co-occur in the presence of reward, thus ensuring that no explicit S→R reinforcement processtakes place. The PIT design is exemplified in a study conducted by Wyvell & Berridge(2001). The authors trained rats in a Pavlovian phase to associate the sound of a clicker(CS+) with delivery of sucrose, and to associate the sound of a tone (CS-) with receivingnothing. In the instrumental phase, conducted in the absence of the CSs, the rats weretrained to press a lever to receive sucrose. The test phase, where animals were presentedwith either CS and had the opportunity to press the lever, was conducted in extinction, i.e.without delivery of sucrose. The variable of interest in the test, or transfer, phase was the
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number of presses made during periods of CS+, compared to CS- or inter-stimulus-interval(ISI), i.e. the PIT effect. In the case of Wyvell & Berridge this was a positive PIT effect, inthat the CS+ elicited more responses than either ISI or CS-.
The importance of the PIT procedure is that it narrows the number of associativemechanisms able to explain responding during the transfer phase. The extinctioncondition ensures, firstly, that no learning can occur during the test phase, thus preventingS→R reinforcement explaining behaviour. Secondly, it ensures that any influence of a CSon behaviour occurs via an outcome representation. Thus a PIT effect may occur via anS→O→R process, detailed in section 1.2.4.2 above, or an S[R→O] process, explained insection 1.2.4.4 above. PIT has been separated into specific and general forms, that maymap onto S→O→R and S[R→O], respectively, which confer subtly different patterns ofbehaviour. The specific form appears to bias response selection, with CSs facilitatingresponses which gain the specific outcome predicted by the CS, whereas the general formappears to augment responding, with CSs facilitating responses regardless of outcomecongruency.
In an example of specific PIT, Hogarth & colleagues (2007) trained participants toassociate one geometric shape with winning cigarettes, and another shape with winningmoney. In the instrumental phase participants learned to press one key for cigarettes, andanother key for money. Then in the transfer phase participants' response selection wastested in the presence of either cue. A specific transfer effect was found, in that thecigarette cue selectively increased the cigarette response, while decreasing the moneyresponse, with the opposite pattern shown for the money cue.
However, studies using a specific PIT paradigm have so far shown it to encourageinsensitivity to reward hedonic value. These studies have demonstrated that inserting adevaluation phase after Pavlovian and instrumental training has no effect on thesubsequent transfer phase, with the ability of CSs to bias responding towards their specificoutcomes undampened (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Hogarth, 2012; Holland, 2004). Yet themethodological details responsible for this devaluation insensitivity remain to beexplicated. One possibility, offered by Holland (2004), is that using rewards that influencedifferent sensory modalities, such as cigarettes versus money, may bias responseprocesses towards those directed by sensory activation, modelled by an S→O→R chain.
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In contrast, the general form of PIT may be more amenable to hedonic value, with a selectnumber of studies demonstrating sensitivity to devaluation procedures, suggesting theinvolvement of an S[R→O] mechanism (Corbit et al., 2007; Dickinson & Dawson, 1987).For instance, Corbit & colleagues (2007) used a modified PIT design that ostensiblycombined both specific and general forms. In their Pavlovian phase rats associated threedifferent auditory CSs (CS1-3) with three different food rewards (O1-3), respectively. Inthe instrumental phase rats learned two lever-press responses (R1-2) to earn two of thesame food rewards (O1-2), respectively. Thus the third food reward (O3) had noassociated response. The authors claimed that such a protocol would allow specifictransfer to occur in the presence of CS1-2, yet only allow general transfer in CS3, becauseit could not cue a specific response. After a satiety devaluation procedure designed toreduce the value of all three foods, the transfer phase recorded specific transfer in thepresence of CS1-2, yet no transfer in CS3. Rats that had not experienced devaluationshowed augmentation of responding, compared to ISI, in the presence of all three CSs, withCS3 elevating both Rs equally. Thus specific transfer was insensitive to devaluation, whilegeneral transfer occurred only when rewards were valued.
Yet the precise situations that govern whether PIT is displayed require further explanation(Crombag, Galarce, & Holland, 2008; Holland, 2004; Lovibond, 1981, 1983). One aspect ofrelevance is the ability of the Pavlovian phase to endow CSs with differential hedonicvalue. Specific PIT studies, such as that of Hogarth & colleagues (2007), have used rewardsof equal hedonic value, e.g. one cigarette versus its monetary equivalent, precluding thedemonstration of differential responding on the grounds of differential CS value. GeneralPIT studies, such as that of Corbit & colleagues (2007), may have shown an effect of CSvalue, but did not measure CS value, and so require further investigation.
1.4.2 Evaluative conditioningSuch investigation into CS hedonic value will involve procedures that encourage thedisplacement of hedonic value of the US onto the CS. Bindra (1974) argued that this was acorollary of a pairing procedure, but scrutiny of the process of evaluative conditioning(Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010), where a CS is endowed withthe hedonic qualities of its US, suggests certain criteria need to be met. Early reports ofevaluative conditioning confirmed that CSs could acquire affective valence relatively easily(Baeyens, Eelen, van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1989). Baeyens & colleagues (1989) askedparticipants to sort a set of faces into liked, neutral, and disliked groups. Neutral faceswere then paired by the researchers with either liked or disliked faces. After exposure to
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ten such pairs of neutral with liked or disliked faces, participants reported an increasedpleasantness rating for initially neutral pictures paired with liked faces, yet a decreasedpleasantness rating for neutral pictures paired with disliked faces. Thus the neutral faceCSs had acquired the hedonic value of their valenced face USs. Participants later reportedlittle understanding of the pairings, or the purpose of the experiment, leading Baeyens &colleagues to conclude that the process of evaluative conditioning had occurred outside ofconscious awareness.
Yet such a claim of evaluative conditioning outside of awareness was later questioned in areview of the extant literature by Lovibond & Shanks (2002). The pair questioned thesensitivity of Baeyens & colleagues' awareness assessment on the grounds that post-experiment interviews were confounded by memory influences. While Lovibond & Shanksprovided additional studies that had made similar claims of evaluative conditioningoutside of awareness, all were described as containing insensitive measures of awareness.Thus although participants may have been unaware of any associations at the time of
awareness assessment, they may have been aware at the time of evaluative assessment. Inthe context of nicotine conditioning, a review by Hogarth & Duka (2006) came to similarconclusions as Lovibond & Shanks, finding that only participants who expected a nicotineUS after experiencing its CS showed an evaluative response. Thus it was concluded thatexpectancy awareness, i.e. the ability to expect a US after presentation of its CS, was anecessary criterion in the display of evaluative conditioning.
Yet these conclusions have been questioned more recently by a meta-analysis conductedby Hofmann & colleagues (2010). This analysis revealed that although evaluativeconditioning was facilitated by propositional knowledge of CS-US pairings, i.e. consciousawareness of the relationship between the two, propositional knowledge was not
necessary. Rather, reports of unaware evaluative conditioning were verified, with thestrength of effect increasing with the number of CS-US pairings, and decreasing with thetime delay between CS and US. Thus evaluative conditioning can occur in the absence ofawareness, yet is more reliably found when participants have some degree of knowledgeof the predictive properties of the CS. Such a conclusion may therefore allow for the studyof CS hedonic value in participants who possess varying degrees of US expectancy.
The implications of the investigations into evaluative conditioning for future PIT designsare that, firstly, Pavlovian phases will elicit stronger evaluative conditioning effects withan increasing number of trials. Secondly, evaluative conditioning will be stronger if the
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delay between CS and US is reduced as much as is feasible. The most pertinent data fromprevious PIT research for future PIT designs are that, firstly, using rewards thatincreasingly share sensory properties may increase the influence of CS-hedonic value onany PIT effect. Secondly, any influence of CS-hedonic value may require rewardexpectation in order to influence a PIT effect.
1.5 Aims of the current seriesThe extant literature makes competing claims for the relative importance of emotionversus expectation in the control of human drug-seeking by conditioned stimuli. But inorder to understand the pathological processes that are involved in addiction, it will firstbe necessary to characterise the same processes under non-addiction conditions. On theone hand, a growing literature indicates that emotional responses to reward-associatedstimuli can occur in the absence of expectancy (Hofmann et al., 2010), and that suchemotional responses may be able to influence reward-seeking (Corbit et al., 2007;Dickinson & Dawson, 1987). On the other, multiple PIT studies have shown a transfereffect only in participants who expect a reward (Bray, Rangel, Shimojo, Balleine, &O'Doherty, 2008; Hogarth et al., 2007; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2008).Furthermore, personality research suggests that the ability of individuals to demonstrateemotional versus propositional responses to reward-associated stimuli is dependent ontheir propensity to experience negative or positive affect (Canli et al., 2001; Corr et al.,1995).
In light of this research, and the gaps that appear within it, the current body of work wasdesigned to investigate four aspects of reward-seeking that require greater clarity:1. The ability of the hedonic value of reward-paired cues to influence reward-seeking2. The involvement of reward expectation in the effects of reward-paired cues onreward-seeking3. The moderating role of personality in the influence of cue-elicited emotion or outcomeexpectation on reward-seeking.4. The potential changes to reward-seeking processes that occur as a result of addiction.
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2 General methods
2.1 MethodMethodological details common to all experiments of the current series are detailed here.Any differences between methods of an individual experiment and General Methods arespecified at each experimental chapter; where no method information exists in a givenchapter, details can be assumed to be the same as specified here.
2.1.1 ParticipantsParticipants were University of Sussex students. They were recruited via an onlineparticipant database and were compensated for their time financially or with coursecredit. Recruitment continued until data had been collected from 32 participants (16male) displaying awareness of the Pavlovian phase contingencies (see Statistical analysesbelow for the operational definition of ‘awareness’ used in the current body of work).Inclusion criteria were that English was their first language, and that they were in a stateof good health, whereas exclusion criteria were that they were currently takingprescription medication (excluding the contraceptive pill), currently receiving treatmentfor a mental illness, or had a gambling problem. Participants gave written consent beforebeginning the study, with ethical approval granted by the University of Sussex LifeSciences ethics committee.
2.1.2 Materials
2.1.2.1 Behavioural tasksThe PIT task was run on a PC using E Prime v1.2 software, and displayed on a 50cm LCDscreen. The display background during the task was always grey. CSs (see Figure2.1.2.1[left]) were presented at a size of 10.2 cm2 at a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels.Screen text was black Times New Roman font presented at point size 25. During Pavloviantraining responses were recorded using a standard QWERTY keyboard. Duringinstrumental training and transfer the keyboard was replaced by a five button serialresponse box, oriented such that the buttons were aligned along the sagittal axis. Only thebutton nearest the participant was active, and was coloured blue to highlight it.Throughout the experiment to the left and right of the response manipulandi was a metalbox (height 23 mm, width 190 mm, depth 90mm) with its lid open. Inside the left box were64 fifty pence coins. The right box was initially empty, but was labelled with “Your 50pbox” (see Figure 2.1.2.1[right] for a schematic of the apparatus layout).
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Figure 2.1.2.1. Left panel: stimuli (not to scale) used in Pavlovian and transfer phases of the
experiment, roles counterbalanced. Right panel: layout of apparatus within cubicle, aerial
view. 1 = LCD screen; 2 = keyboard; 3 = response box; 4 = participant; 5 = 50p coin box; 6 =
participant’s 50p winnings box. Note that 2 and 3 were both placed in the location of 2 - 2
during Pavlovian training, 3 during instrumental training and transfer.
2.1.2.2 Questionnaires
2.1.2.2.1 PersonalityTwo personality questionnaires were used – the NEO (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the TCI(Cloninger et al., 1994). Each contains 240 self-report questions that measure multiplehigher-order domains comprising lower-order facets. Both were administered oncomputer with responses given via a standard keyboard. The NEO comprises 5 factors -Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, each comprising6 facets. Each question is answered on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "stronglyagree" through "neutral" to "strongly disagree". Participants responded by pressing anumber key from 1 – 5 that corresponded with the five Likert anchors. The TCI comprises7 domains – 4 temperament domains of Novelty-Seeking, Harm-Avoidance, Reward-Dependence and Persistence; and 3 character domains of Self-Directedness,Cooperativeness, and Self-Transcendence. Each domain, except Persistence, comprisesmultiple facets. Only scores on the temperament domains and facets were used in thecurrent study. Each question is answered as "true" or "false"; participants respondedaccordingly by pressing the 'T' or 'F' key. See Table 2.1.2.1 for a list of the factors andfacets for each questionnaire used in the current studies, along with a representativequestion for each.
1
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Table 2.1.2.1. List of factors and their respective facets from each questionnaire, with an
example question for each. Questions that are reverse-coded have had their wording changed
in this table only for illustrative purposes, e.g. original question "I am rarely sad" reversed to "I
am often sad".Questionnaire Factor Facet QuestionNEO Neuroticism Anxiety I often feel tense and jittery.Angry-hostility I am known as hot-blooded andquick-tempered.Depression I am [often] sad or depressed.Self-consciousness I [often] feel self-conscious when I'maround people.Impulsiveness I have trouble resisting my cravings.Vulnerability I [fail to] keep a cool head in emergencies.Extraversion Warmth I'm known as a warm and friendly person.Gregariousness I like to have a lot of people around me.Assertiveness I am dominant, forceful, and assertive.Activity My life is fast-paced.Excitement-seeking I love the excitement of roller coasters.Positive-emotions I am a cheerful, high-spirited person.Openness Fantasy I have a very active imagination.Aesthetics Aesthetic and artistic concerns aren't veryimportant to me.Feelings I [often] pay attention to my feelings ofthe moment.Actions I'm pretty set in my ways.Ideas I have a lot of intellectual curiosity.Values I consider myself broad-minded andtolerant of other people's lifestyles.Agreeableness Trust I believe that most people are basicallywell-intentioned.Straightforward I couldn't deceive anyone even if I wantedto.Altruism I think of myself as a charitable person.Compliance I'm hard-headed and stubborn.Modesty I try to be humble.Tender-minded I would rather be known as "merciful"than as "just".Conscientiousness Competence I am efficient and effective at my work.Order I tend to be somewhat fastidious or
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exacting.Dutifulness I try to perform all the tasks assigned tome conscientiously.Achievement-striving I'm something of a "workaholic".Self-discipline I am a productive person who alwaysgets the job done.Deliberation I think things through before coming to adecision.TCI Novelty-Seeking Exploratory-excitability I like to explore new ways to do things.Impulsiveness I usually think about all the facts in detailbefore I make a decision.Extravagance I prefer spending money rather thansaving money.Disorderliness I often break rules and regulations whenI think I can get away with it.Harm-Avoidance Anticipatory-worry I think I will have very good luck in thefuture.Fear ofuncertainty I often feel tense and worried inunfamiliar situations.Shyness I often avoid meeting strangers because Ilack confidence with people I do not know.Fatigability I have less energy and get tired morequickly than most people.Reward-dependence Sentimentality I am more likely to cry at a sad movie thanmost people.Attachment I like to discuss my experiences andfeelings openly with friends instead ofkeeping them to myself.Dependence I usually do things my own way - ratherthan giving in to the wishes of other people.Persistence I am usually so determined that I continueto work long after other people have givenup.
2.1.2.2.2 Substance useParticipants’ drinking behaviour was measured using a version of the Alcohol UseQuestionnaire (AUQ, Mehrabian & Russell, 1978) modified for use with British students.The AUQ gives a Units score, summing units (10ml ethanol) drunk across an average week,a Binge score, comprising questions assessing speed of consumption and frequency ofdrunkenness, and a Total score, calculated by summing Units and Binge scores. Resultsinvolving the AUQ were non-significant throughout the ensuing experiments, and so willnot be discussed further.
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2.1.3 Design & Procedure
2.1.3.1 Health screeningUpon arrival participants completed a general health questionnaire to ensure that theywere eligible for the study.
2.1.3.2 Personality questionnairesThe NEO and TCI were completed immediately before and after the PIT task, respectively;order of questionnaire was counterbalanced.
2.1.3.3 Pavlovian training.The PIT task comprised three phases. First was a Pavlovian conditioning phase that used atrace conditioning procedure to associate a CS+ with winning 50p, and a CS- with winningnothing. Money was used as the reward, rather than a primary reward such as food, toensure its general appeal to participants. Participants first read the instructions below:
The following task is made up of trials where you can win 50 pence. Each trial will begin with afixation cross (+) in the centre of the screen, which you should look at. Then two pictures willappear. Immediately afterwards you will be asked to rate how likely you think you are to win50p, by pressing a number key between 1 and 9. Whether you win is dependent upon whichpictures were shown on the screen. Press the spacebar to begin.
After 16 trials the experimenter re-iterated these instructions verbally, to ensure taskcomprehension, before leaving the participant to complete the remaining trials alone.There were 128 trials in total, 64 winning trials and 64 non-winning trials, divided into 8blocks of 16. After each block participants were shown a screen that detailed their totalwinnings for that block (always £4.00), and were instructed to move the amount from theleft hand box into the right hand box. Trials began with a black fixation cross in the centreof the screen of duration 1s. This was then replaced by a CS pair aligned horizontally for3s. An outcome expectancy question then appeared (“How likely are you to win 50p? 1 =Not at all likely 5 = Don't know 9 = Extremely likely”) to which participants respondedusing the horizontal number keys of the main keyboard section. Upon response a greyscreen of duration 1s appeared followed by the trial outcome (O) for duration 2s. Os weretext reading “You win 50p” or "You win nothing" and were contingent solely upon the CSdisplayed (and so not dependent on a correct response to the expectancy question). SeeFigure 2.1.3.1 for a diagram of participants’ experience of the PIT task.
Figure 2.1.3.1. Simplified schematic of PIT procedure.The four CSs (see Figureacross participants, denoted hereafter CS50p, CS- with winning nothing, and bothwinning. CS+ and CS- were associated with their respective O with 100% contingency. BothCS± occurred with 50% contingency with each O, and so were non(Robert A. Rescorla, 1967)Therefore no trial contained bothHorizontal position (left or right) of CS was counterbalanced within participants, order ofpresentation was random.
2.1.3.4 Emotional evaluationsImmediately after the final block of Pavlovian conditioning participants were asked to ratheir subjective emotional evaluations of each CS. This rating session began with theonscreen instruction:have seen." Each of the four CSs was presented individually at the central topwith a single rating question and response scale below it. CSs were presented twice, oncewith the question “How pleasant do you find this picture?" and once with “How anxiousdoes this picture make you feel?"keys, and were instructed to "of your feeling, 1 = not at allresponse was made, at whichbetween 2-2.5s before the next CS and question was presented.
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2.1.2.1[left]) were assigned to one of four roles, counterbalanced
+, CS-, CS±a, CS±b. CS+ was paired with winningCS± were paired equally with winning and non
. Each trial presented CS+ or CS-, combined withCS+ and CS- together, or CS
"You will now be asked some questions about the
Participants responded using the horizontalPress a number key between 1 and 9 to indicate the strength, 9 = extremely”. Each CS remained on the screen until apoint a blank grey screen appeared for a random duration ofOrder of
-
-predictive of eitherCS±a or CS±b.
±a and CS±b together.
te
four pictures youof the screen
number
CS and question
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was randomised such that questions pertaining to the same CS were not necessarilyconsecutive.
2.1.3.5 Instrumental trainingHaving given their emotional evaluations participants took a five minute break, while theexperimenter replaced the keyboard with the response box, before they read theinstruction: "In this session, by pressing the blue button a number of times, you willsometimes win 50 pence". The experimenter re-iterated the instructions verbally, thistime after 10 trials, to ensure task comprehension, before leaving the participant tocomplete the task alone.
There were 40 trials in total, divided into 4 blocks of 10. Each block ended with a screendisplaying participants’ winnings for that block (in this phase the amount was response-contingent), and asked them to move the specified amount into their winnings box. Trialsbegan with a 1s fixation cross positioned centrally. Then a horizontally aligned pair ofidentical dark grey squares (distinguishable from the lighter background) appeared for 2s.This was followed by a 10s screen asking participants to “Press the button?”; if a responsewas made within 10s then this question was terminated and a blank screen of duration18.5s ensued. Response-positive trials then ended with a 2s reinforcement screen statingthat “You win 50p” or “You win nothing”; response-negative trials followed the 10sresponse prompt with a 2s blank screen before the next trial began. Figure 2.1.3.2presents a timeline of this instrumental trial sequence.
Figure 2.1.3.2. Instrumental training event sequence, indicating screen durations for response
positive and response-
18.5s blank screen.Reinforcement was contingent upon avariable interval (VI) schedules.upon a VR2 schedule, such that participants had theThis ensured that the grey squares (hereafter Sreinforcement and so would create a 'baseline' condition for the ensuing transfer phase. Inthis context 'baseline' was defined as a situation allowing behaviour that wasthe current psychological value of the O, i.e. RFurthermore, within
procurement was contingent upon a customised VI10participants were required to press at least twice within a 1s window of variable onset(minimum 1.5s) during the 18.5s blank screenrepresentation of VI schedulethe reinforcement window, tparticipants pressed multiple times, rather than simply pressing oneach trial.
2.1.3.6 TransferThe transfer phase was integrated with the instrumental training phase so as to appear asa continuation of the same task. It therefore began immediately after the final trial ofinstrumental training with the fo
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negative trials, and response requirements for VI10 schedule during
novel combination of variable ratio (VR) andAcross trials, reinforcement availability
opportunity to win on 50% of
±) were non
→O rather than Sthe 50% of trials where reinforcement was available,schedule. To
(see Figure). Because participants had no way of predicting the onset ofhis alteration to the traditional VI setup ensured that
llowing instructions:
-
was contingenttrials.-discriminative of
informed by
→R behaviour.reinforcer
receive reinforcement
2.1.3.2 for pictorial
ce towards the end of
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Now you will continue to earn money as before, but you will only be told how much at the endof the session. Sometimes the pictures you saw earlier will be presented. Press the blue buttonto continue.
Transfer proceeded in much the same way as instrumental training. However, the 2sreinforcement screen was replaced by a 1s blank screen. Thus conditions of nominalextinction were evoked, in that participants were led to believe that they were stillwinning money, but no reinforcement was provided. This ensured that no new learningoccurred in this phase where instrumental responding could be expressed in the presenceof the CSs. Furthermore, in place of the S±, in 1/3 of trials the CS+ was presented alongsideeither CS±, in another 1/3 the CS- was presented with either CS±, with the remaining 1/3presenting the S± alone. As with Pavlovian training, position of CS (left/right) wascounterbalanced, with presentation order random. There were 96 trials in total, split into2 blocks of 48. Thus each CS was presented 16 times per block. Blocks were separated by ascreen announcing “Halfway. Press the blue button to resume the task.” the duration ofwhich was participant controlled.
2.1.3.7 Post-transfer outcome-expectancyUpon completion of the transfer phase participants were asked to retrospectively ratetheir estimated probability of winning 50p during different trial-types (e.g. CS+, S±). Theywere instructed on screen to get the experimenter who provided them with a sheet of A4paper with instructions and 5 visual-analogue scales (VASs). Instructions on the paperread:
What did you think your chances of winning 50p were, when you had the opportunity to pressthe blue button, when different pictures were presented? Please start at the top of the pageand work your way down as each picture is presented on the screen. Make your answer bydrawing a vertical line (I) in the appropriate position on the scale. Press the top button of theresponse box to continue.
Each VAS comprised a black horizontal line of length 160mm anchored with "Low chance"at the left extreme and "High chance" at the right extreme. After participants had pressedthe button a blank screen of randomly defined duration within a range of 1.5-2s ensuedbefore the first CS was presented. Each of the four CSs and the S± was presentedindividually, in random order, positioned in the central top of the screen. Below it was thequestion:
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What did you think your chances of winning 50p were, when you had the opportunity to pressthe blue button, when you saw this picture? Mark your answer on the paper provided. Pressthe top button to continue.
After the final CS had been presented the end of the task was signalled. The entire PITprocedure took approximately 90mins to complete - 30mins for Pavlovian training,60mins for the instrumental and transfer phases combined.
2.1.3.8 Alcohol useAfter the PIT task participants completed the second personality questionnaire followedby the AUQ, before being debriefed.
2.1.4 Statistical analyses
2.1.4.1 Sample sizeTo ensure at least one participant in each cell of the full counterbalance matrix (Gender xQuestionnaire order x CS counterbalance) 16 participants were required. This wasincreased to 32 to increase the validity of the regression analyses (Maxwell, 2000).
2.1.4.2 PIT variables
2.1.4.2.1 AwarenessParticipants were categorised as either 'aware' or 'unaware' of the CS-US associationsbased on their expectancy ratings in the final block of Pavlovian training, using criteriabased on Hogarth et al (2007). ‘Aware’ participants were those whose mean ratingfollowing each trial was significantly [p < .05] different from 5 (i.e. ‘don’t know’) and in thecorrect direction (i.e. CS+ rating > 5 > CS- rating). ‘Unaware’ participants were thosewhose rating for each CS was either not significantly [p > .10] different from 5, or was notin a veridical position relative to 5. Participants falling outside either category (e.g. correctexpectancy ratings for only one CS, or ratings marginally [.05 < p < .10] different from 5)were excluded from further analysis. These criteria ensured the specificity ofcategorisation – aware participants possessed absolute awareness of the predictiveproperties of each CS, rather than relative awareness of one compared to the other, andunaware participants demonstrated no consistent understanding of the meaning of eitherCS.
Awareness was treated as a categorical variable within ANOVAs. But as well as expressingawareness qualitatively it was also analysed quantitatively for correlational purposes.
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Whereas an awareness categorisation was based on the final block of Pavlovian training,'Expectancy discrimination' was calculated as the difference in mean rating for each CS(CS+ - CS-) across all blocks. Higher values would indicate greater differentiation of the twostimuli. A difference score was computed, as opposed to CS-specific values being used, tocontrol for response bias towards higher or lower numbers, e.g. participants pressing '9'by default would have an artificially inflated score for the CS+. Thus using a differencescore allowed for more reliable quantification of participants' ability to differentiate theCSs.
2.1.4.2.2 Evaluative conditioningThe two non-predictive CSs were rated as non-significantly different throughout thecurrent research, and so a single CS± score was calculated from their mean. ANOVAs ofemotion ratings used means of each CS. Correlational analyses involving emotion ratingswere conducted using the difference between each predictive CS, hereafter 'evaluativediscrimination'. This gave a measure of evaluative conditioning attributable solely to eachCS's association with reward by controlling for mere exposure (Murphy, Monahan, &Zajonc, 1995) or response bias.
In exploratory analyses of the effects of evaluative discrimination on PIT, an‘EvaluativeSplit’ dichotomous variable was created, based on a median split ofparticipants’ evaluative discrimination scores. However, this variable did not significantlyaffect PIT in any of the experimental chapters, as evidenced by the lack of main effects orinteractions involving EvaluativeSplit in any behavioural measure of transfer [Fs < 1.99, ps> .143].
2.1.4.2.3 Response measurementResponses were divided into two aspects – initiation and rate – with each calculatedseparately for each type of trial, e.g. CS+, S±. Response initiation (RI) was defined as thepercentage of trials where at least one response was made. Thus the maximum for each ofthe three transfer trial-types would be 100%, indicating that a response had been made onevery trial of that category. Response rate (RR) was calculated by taking only those trialswhere a response had been made, calculating the mean number of presses, then dividingby the response window (18.5s) to give a per-second measure. These computationsensured the orthogonality of each variable. While response latency was also recorded, dueto a number of participants not pressing at all on certain trials, e.g. CS- trials, missing datacaused the effects of this variable to be unreliable and so will not be reported.
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Similar to the discrimination scores calculated for awareness and EC, 'transferdiscrimination' was calculated for both RI and RR as CS+ - CS-, to be used in correlationalanalyses. A 'transfer effect' score was also computed by subtracting S± from either CS+ orCS- responding, as per Hogarth et al (2010). This transfer effect would quantify thefacilitation (or suppression) of responding attributable to the inherent cognitive oremotional properties of the CS itself, independent of the current value of the outcomewhich would be represented by S± response patterns.
2.1.4.2.4 Transfer expectancyPreliminary ANOVAs comparing expectancy ratings for the three non-predictive stimuli(CS±a & b, S±) showed no significant effects through each study, confirming that they wereviewed as equally [un]informative. The two CSs± were therefore dropped from transferexpectancy analyses due to there being no specific CS± trials in transfer.
2.1.4.3 Personality questionnairesPersonality trait raw scores were standardised into T-scores (mean = 50, SD = 10) usingnormative data from university-age samples of mixed gender provided in eachquestionnaire handbook. For the NEO its five factors were computed using the factorloadings of each of the 30 facets. These factor scores are more orthogonal and have highervalidities than their equivalent domain scores, which are calculated simply by summingthe relevant facets (McCrae & Costa, 1989). For the TCI it was not possible to computefactor scores, due to a lack of sufficient information in the handbook, and so domain scoreswere used instead.
2.1.4.4 General statistical proceduresData were analysed using SPSS 17.0. ANOVAs were conducted where categorical variableswere involved. Greenhouse-Geisser method was used to correct for non-sphericity inwithin-subjects analyses where appropriate. Bonferroni method was used to control fortype I error inflation when conducting multiple post-hoc comparisons. Regressionanalyses used the enter method to assess the unique contribution of each predictorvariable whilst controlling for all others included in the model. Simple correlations usedPearson's product-moment. All regression analyses were concentrated on the moderatingrole of personality on associate learning data. Regressions were also performed within thecontinuous experimental variables, e.g. awareness discrimination on evaluative
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discrimination, but are not reported as their results were in line with the equivalentANOVAs.
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3 Specific PIT with two monetary outcomesAn edited version of this chapter is under review at the journal Addiction.
3.1 Abstract
Background - Human Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer research suggests that outcomeexpectancy is sufficient to elicit reward-seeking, yet the methods used may haveprevented emotional processes from playing a role.
Aim - Thus the aim of this first experiment was to investigate the ability of cue-elicitedemotion to influence reward-seeking in a PIT design.
Methods – 55 participants completed the PIT task. The Pavlovian phase associated twovisual CSs with winning either 10 pence or 50 pence, respectively; the instrumental phasetrained participants to make two different button-pressing responses to win either 10p or50p, respectively; the transfer phase tested the change in instrumental responding afterpresentation of either CS.
Results – 32 participants developed expectancy awareness, whereas 13 displayed acomplete lack of awareness, after Pavlovian training. Despite this difference in awareness,both groups rated the 50p CS as more pleasant than the 10p CS. Both groups respondedsimilarly during instrumental training, but only the aware group demonstrated PIT in thetransfer phase. Furthermore, only specific PIT was demonstrated, with each CS selectivelyenhancing the response with which it shared an outcome. Neuroticism positivelypredicted the rate at which aware participants developed propositional knowledge of thePavlovian contingencies, whereas Extraversion positively predicted the degree to whichall participants discriminated the hedonic properties of each CS.
Conclusion – Expectancy awareness is further supported as sufficient to display specificPIT, but the lack of a general PIT effect may suggest that the methods used were notappropriate for the study of cue-induced emotion in reward-seeking. Subsequent studiesshould therefore simplify the PIT design to include only one reward and response.
3.2 IntroductionHuman PIT research to date either confirms that transfer only occurs in participants whoexpect a specific O after encountering its associated S (Hogarth et al., 2010; Hogarth et al.,2007; Talmi et al., 2008; Trick, Hogarth, & Duka, 2011), or is unable to falsify suchexpectancy as sufficient (Bray et al., 2008; Nadler, Delgado, & Delamater, 2011; Prévost etal., 2012). While evaluative responses to an S often accompany O expectancy responses the
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two have not been unequivocally dissociated. Therefore the role of S emotional propertiesin PIT requires further scrutiny.
Assertions of general PIT have relied on the demonstration of increased production of anR in the presence of an S paired with an O not obtainable by the available R (Corbit &Balleine, 2005; Nadler et al., 2011; Prévost et al., 2012). Such a paradigm wasoperationalised by Corbit & Balleine (2005), who associated Ss 1-3 with Os 1-3,respectively, yet associated only Rs 1 & 2 with Os 1 & 2, respectively. Thus S3 wasassociated with O3, but O3 was not associated with a corresponding R3. It is argued thatany influence of S3 on Rs 1 & 2 can be explained only through its general emotionalproperties, as there is no associative basis for an expectation of O3 to influence Rs 1 & 2.
However, any influence of S3 may be due to a process of generalisation (McLaren &Mackintosh, 2002), rather than general emotion. Participants may have responded to S3because it shared stimulus dimensions with Ss 1 or 2 (Milton & Wills, 2004), and sogenerated an expectation of Os 1 or 2. Therefore any transfer of S3 onto Rs 1 or 2 mayoccur via an expectancy representation rather than an emotional representation. Such aconfound may be exacerbated by making inferences about the rate of S3 responding basedon comparisons with explicitly unpaired S trials, as was the case with Nadler et al andPrévost et al (2011; 2012). Such a comparison would contain elements of both emotionand expectation, and so could not dissociate the effects of either.
Demonstration of general PIT therefore requires a method of balancing generalisation andexpectation across S conditions while retaining differential emotion. The specific-PITparadigm of Hogarth et al (2007) goes some way to creating such conditions. Theseauthors compared the effects of two novel Ss, paired explicitly with cigarettes and money,respectively, on Rs reinforced with cigarettes and money, respectively. The two Ss wereequally generalisable, i.e. they possessed similar sensory properties, and generatedexpectancies of equal magnitude of their respective Os, thus balancing generalisation andexpectancy. However, participants also rated each S as equally emotionally salient, likelydue to their association with Os balanced for biological salience, thus precluding anyexplanation of their behavioural effects in terms of emotion.
Therefore the current experiment built on the paradigm of Hogarth et al (2007), butadapted it to encourage emotional discrimination of the two Ss. Whereas Hogarth et al hadused Os of different sensory identity but similar hedonic value, the current paradigm used
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Os of similar identity but different value. Money was chosen as the outcome, rather thancigarettes, to ensure that the outcome would be considered rewarding by all participants.10p and 50p were associated with two Ss, before reinforcing two Rs. A general-PIT effectwould be evidenced by increased responding in the presence of the S predicting 50p,relative to the S predicting 10p, regardless of R. Alternatively, a specific-PIT effect wouldbe evidenced by increased responding in the presence of the S predicting one O, relative tothe S predicting the other O, but only on the R reinforced with the corresponding O.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 ParticipantsParticipants were 55 University of Sussex students (24 males and 31 females) with a meanage of 21.3 years (range 19-36). Other participant details were as General Methods.
3.3.2 MaterialsDetails were as General Methods, save for the fact that the there were two tins to theparticipant's left, one containing 64 10p coins, the other containing 64 50p coins, and sotwo tins to the participant's right, one labelled 'Your 10p box', the other labelled 'Your 50pbox'. There were also two active buttons on the instrumental response box, the nearestand farthest, highlighted blue and with arrows pointing either towards or away from theparticipant.
3.3.3 Design & Procedure
3.3.3.1 Pavlovian trainingRather than contrast USs of nothing versus 50p, this first experiment contrasted winning50p with winning 10p, rather than nothing. Therefore CSs are referred to as CS10 and CS50.Details were otherwise the same as General Methods, save for the mention of 10p in placeof 'nothing'. Therefore the initial instruction screen read:
The following task is made up of trials where you can win 10 pence and 50 pence. Each trialwill begin with a fixation cross (+) in the centre of the screen, which you should look at. Thentwo pictures will appear. Immediately afterwards you will be asked to rate how likely youthink you are to win 10p or 50p. You will then be prompted to press the spacebar to find outhow much you have won. The amount you win is dependent upon which pictures were shownon the screen. Press the spacebar to begin.
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The US expectancy question asked “How likely are you to win 10p or 50p? 1 = 10p 5 =don't know 9 = 50p”, to which participants responded using the horizontal number keys ofthe main keyboard section. Upon response a grey screen of duration 1s appeared, followedby an instruction to “Press the spacebar to find out how much you have won”. This greyscreen and spacebar press was used to reduce the possibility of participants beingreinforced for pressing specific number keys, and so forming differential instrumentalresponses for different Os prior to the forthcoming instrumental phase of PIT. Because ofthe inclusion of 10p trials, total winnings for each block were always £4.80.
3.3.3.2 Instrumental trainingDue to the inclusion of a second response and outcome, instrumental training in thisexperiment departed from that described in General Methods. Having given theiremotional evaluations participants took a five minute break, while the experimenterreplaced the keyboard with the response box, before they read the instructions below:
In this session, by pressing the up or the down button on the response box, you will be able towin either 10 pence or 50 pence. Pressing one button wins 10p, pressing the other wins 50p.Sometimes you will win the money, sometimes you will win nothing. Trials will start with afixation cross (+), which you should look at. The cross will then be replaced by two squares.Following this you will be asked to press one of the buttons. You will only win if you pressrepeatedly while the prompt appears on the screen, and only press one button within eachtrial. Press either button to begin.
The experimenter re-iterated the instructions verbally, this time after 20 trials, to ensuretask comprehension, before leaving the participant to complete the task alone. There were100 trials in total, divided into 5 blocks of 20. Each block ended with a screen displayingparticipants’ winnings for that block (in this phase the amount was response-contingent),and asked them to move the specified amount into their winnings boxes. Trials began witha 1s fixation cross positioned centrally. Then a horizontally aligned pair of identical darkgrey squares (distinguishable from the lighter background) appeared for 2s. Because thesegrey squares were associated equally with 10p and 50p, and were therefore non-predictive, they are referred to hereafter as S10/50. This was followed by a 4s screeninstructing participants to “Press the up or down button”. Unlike the instrumental trainingdescribed in General Methods section 2.1.3.5, this response prompt was phrased as astatement, rather than a question, and remained on screen throughout responding. Theprompt was followed immediately by a 2s reinforcement screen stating that e.g. “You win50p” or “You win nothing”. Within each trial, reinforcement was contingent upon a similar
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VI schedule to that described in General Methods, although in this experiment a VI2.75schedule operated, due to the response window being only 4s long. This VI setup wasbased on the method of Trick et al (2011). Furthermore, across trials, presses on the 10pbutton (R10) were reinforced with a 50% contingency, while presses on the 50p button(R50) carried a 10% contingency. This ensured that the utility of each button was identicaland so discouraged a bias towards one response or the other. Response-outcomeassociation was counterbalanced.
3.3.3.3 TransferTransfer was identical to that of General Methods, except that the 18.5s response windowwas reduced to 4s, in line with the participants' experience of instrumental training.
The entire PIT procedure took approximately 60mins to complete - 30mins for Pavloviantraining, 30mins for the instrumental and transfer phases combined.
3.3.4 Statistical analysesBecause the 4s response window did not take into account participants' response time toinitiate pressing, the RR measure was calculated by dividing mean number of presses bythe duration of actual response (i.e. 4s – response latency). This technique ensured that RRwas unbiased by reaction time.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Group-level analyses
3.4.1.1 Expectancy awareness32 (58%) participants were classified as aware (16 males and females, mean age 21.75,range 19-37), 13 (24%) unaware (3 males and 10 females, mean age 20.38, range 18-22),with 10 (18%) showing partial awareness. These 10 partially aware participants wereexcluded from further analysis. Aware and unaware groups did not differ significantly interms of age [t(43) = 1.22, p = .231] or gender [χ2(1) = 2.75, p = .182].
Due to this individual-level selection criteria, in the final block of Pavlovian training theaware group correctly predicted the occurrence of each US after the presentation of itsrespective CS, whereas the unaware group was unable to predict the occurrence of eitherUS, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.1.1[left].
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Figure 3.4.1.1. [left] Mean expectancy rating of winning either 10p or 50p after presentation of
its respective CS for aware and unaware groups in the final block of the Pavlovian phase.
Line at 5 indicates rating of 'don't know'; * CS10/CS50 ≠ 5 [p < .001]. 
[right] Mean pleasantness rating of Pavlovian stimuli following Pavlovian training for aware
and unaware groups.
^ CS50 > CS10/50 > CS10 [ps < .029]; CS10, stimulus predictive of 10p; CS50, stimulus predictive of
50p; CS10/50, stimulus non-predictive; error bars represent 95%CI.A mixed ANOVA of final block expectancy ratings, with CS and Awareness as factorsrevealed main effects of CS and Awareness [Fs(1,43) > 5.72, ps < .025], qualified by asignificant interaction between CS and Awareness [F(1,43) = 694, p < .001]. Subsequentsimple effects analyses confirmed that the aware group’s mean expectancy rating for eachCS was significantly different from 5 [ts(31) > 56.6, ps < .001], whereas the unawaregroup’s ratings were either not in the correct direction (for CS10) or did not differsignificantly from 5 (for CS50) [p = .389].
3.4.1.2 Evaluative conditioningIn contrast to the expectancy ratings, a mixed ANOVA of pleasantness ratings, with CS(CS10, CS50, CS10/50) and Awareness as factors found that there was no dissociation betweenthe aware versus unaware group's emotional evaluations of each CS. See Figure3.4.1.1[right] for mean pleasantness ratings. There was a significant main effect of CS[F(2,86) = 16.2, p < .001], but no significant effect of Awareness, nor a significantinteraction [Fs < 1]. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the three CSs differed significantlyfrom each other in a sequential manner (CS50 > CS10/50 > CS10) [ps < .029]. There were nosignificant effects of either CS or Awareness on anxiety ratings [Fs < 1] (data not shown forbrevity).
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3.4.1.3 Instrumental trainingDuring instrumental training all participants acquired declarative knowledge of therelationship between each button and their respective monetary outcomes, as assessed bypost experiment interview. Figure 3.4.1.2 - Figure 3.4.1.4 present mean RI and RR for eachAwareness group on each Button during each Block, as well as the total number ofreinforced trials expressed as a percentage of the total possible.
Figure 3.4.1.2. Mean response initiation during instrumental training for aware and unaware
groups on either the 10p or 50p winning button during blocks 1-5.
* R10 ≠ R50 [ps < .030]; ^ Aware > Unaware [p = .009]; error bars represent 95%CI.A mixed ANOVA of RI with Button (R10, R50) and Block (1-5) as within-subjects factors, andAwareness as the between subjects factor, showed main effects of Block and Awarenessand a significant three-way interaction [Fs > 3.21, ps < .029]. The interaction wasinvestigated with separate RM ANOVAs for each awareness group, which found asignificant Block*Button interaction for the aware group [F(4,124) = 6.63, p < .001], butnon-significant effects in the unaware group [Fs < 1.33, ps > .271]. The aware groupinteraction was followed with a series of t-tests comparing RI on each button at eachblock; they revealed significant differences at blocks 1 and 4 [ts(31) > 2.98, ps < .030,corrected].
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Figure 3.4.1.3. Mean response initiation during instrumental training for aware and unaware
groups on either the 10p or 50p winning button during blocks 1-5.
* block 2 > blocks 1/3/5 [ps < .047]; error bars represent 95%CI.The ANOVA of RR revealed a significant main of Block only [F(2.44,105) = 5.88, p = .002].Post-hoc comparisons showed this effect to be due to block 2 RR being significantly higherthan blocks 1/3/5 [ps < .047].
Figure 3.4.1.4. Mean number of reinforcements won during instrumental training, expressed
as a percentage of the maximum possible (R10 max = 50, R50 max = 10).
Error bars represent 95%CI.
There were no significant effects involving Awareness or Button on the total percentage ofreinforced trials [Fs < 1].
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3.4.1.4.1 Response initiationA PIT effect on RI was seen only in aware participants, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.1.5. Amixed ANOVA of these RI data, with Stimulus (CS10, CS50, S10/50), Button, Block (1,2), andAwareness as factors yielded a main effect of Awareness, qualified byStimulus*Button*Awareness, and Stimulus*Button interactions [Fs > 7.79, ps < .008]. TheAwareness interaction was investigated with separate ANOVAs for each awareness group,with Stimulus and Button as factors. For the aware group this revealed a significantStimulus*Button interaction [F(1.63,50.5) = 121, p < .001], with further RM ANOVAs foreach button revealing significant effects of Stimulus [Fs(1.63,50.5) > 120, ps < .001],located through post-hoc comparisons as being between all levels [ps < .001]. Effects inunaware participants were non-significant [Fs < 1.50, ps > .244].
Figure 3.4.1.5. Mean response initiation across transfer phase on each button after
presentation of Pavlovian or instrumental stimuli for aware and unaware groups.
* R10: CS10 > S10/50 > CS50, R50: CS50 > S10/50 > CS10 [ps < .001]; ^ Aware > Unaware [p = .008]; CS10,
Pavlovian CS predictive of 10p; CS50, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S10/50, grey squares from
instrumental training; R10, 10p button; R50, 50p button; error bars represent 95% CI.
3.4.1.4.2 Response rateSimilar to the RI analysis, a PIT effect on RR was seen only in aware participants (seeFigure 3.4.1.6). A mixed ANOVA with Stimulus, Button, Block and Awareness as factorsshowed a main effect of Awareness [F(1,43) = 4.50, p = .040] and interactions betweenStimulus*Awareness, Stimulus*Button, and Stimulus*Awareness*Button [Fs(2,86) > 9.73,
ps < .001]. To investigate these interactions RM ANOVAs with Stimulus and Button asfactors were run separately for aware and unaware groups, collapsing Block due to itsnon-significant effects. In the aware group these revealed a main effect of Stimulus and asignificant Stimulus*Button interaction [Fs(2,62) > 19.7, ps < .001], with post-hoccomparisons of Stimulus finding CS10 = CS50 < S10/50 [ps < .001]. Finally, post-hoc
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comparisons within the aware group, split by Button, confirmed linear effects of Stimuluson pressing, with CS10 > S10/50 > CS50 on R10, and CS50 > S10/50 > CS10 on R50 [ps < .03]. Withinthe unaware group no effects were significant [Fs < 3.05, ps > .11].
Figure 3.4.1.6. Mean response rate during transfer phase on each button after presentation of
Pavlovian or instrumental stimuli for aware and unaware groups.
* CS10 ≠ CS50 ≠ S10/50 [ps < .03]; ^ CS10 = CS50 < S10/50 [ps < .001]; £ Aware < Unaware [p = .040];
CS10, Pavlovian CS predictive of 10p; CS50, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S10/50, grey squares
from instrumental training; R10, 10p button; R50, 50p button; error bars represent 95% CI.
3.4.2 Role of personality in PIT
3.4.2.1 Awareness classificationTo investigate whether awareness status could be predicted by stable personality traits,logistic regression analyses were conducted separately for the NEO and TCI, using theirrespective factors as predictors of awareness classification. For the NEO the model wasnon-significant [χ2(5) = 4.53, p = .44]. For the TCI, the initial model was also non-significant. However, after removal of two outliers (standardised residuals > 2) theomnibus test was significant [χ2(4) = 13.3, p = .010], correctly classifying 94% and 46% ofaware and unaware participants, respectively, with HA the only significant contributor[Exp(B) = 0.83, p = .005]. Table 3.4.2.1 displays coefficients for each TCI predictor.
Table 3.4.2.1. Logistic regression coefficients of TCI domains predictive of awareness
classification.Predictor B Exp(B) pNovelty-Seeking -0.03 0.97(0.12) .622Harm-Avoidance* -0.19 0.83(0.12) .005
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Reward-Dependence 0.07 1.08(0.10) .101Persistence -0.08 0.92(0.11) .156Constant 12.8 .050
Note: R2 (Hosmer Jr & Lemeshow, 2004) = .27, model χ2(4) = 13.3, p = .010; * p < .05; awareness
coded higher.
3.4.2.2 Expectancy discriminationAs well as predicting awareness classification, personality traits were also assessed fortheir ability to predict the strength of expectancy discrimination in participants achievingawareness. Multiple-regression analyses were run separately for the NEO and TCI, withtheir respective factors as predictors and expectancy discrimination index (meanPavlovian CS50 – CS10 expectancy score) as the outcome. The initial model for the NEO wasnon-significant [F(2,26) = 2.01, p = .110]. However, removing one outlier (standardisedresidual > 2) led to a significant model [R2 = .42, F(5,25) = 3.57, p = .014], with N the onlysignificant predictor [β = .47, p = .021] (see Table 3.4.2.2 for factor coefficients). Theequivalent model for the TCI was non-significant [F < 1].
Table 3.4.2.2. Linear regression coefficients of NEO factors predicting expectancy
discrimination in aware participants.Predictor B β p Neuroticism* 0.07(0.06) .47 .021Extraversion 0.01(0.05) .09 .584Openness -0.04(0.04) -.33 .063Agreeableness 0.03(0.05) .28 .180Conscientiousness 0.04(0.06) .25 .190Constant 0.62(6.35) .843
Note: R2 = .65, p = .014; * p < .05; expectancy discrimination = mean CS50 – CS10 expectancy
rating; numbers in parentheses are 95%CI.
3.4.2.3 Evaluative conditioningSimilar to expectancy discrimination, the utility of personality traits in predictingemotional discrimination was tested with separate regression analyses for the NEO andTCI. Aware and unaware groups were combined due to their non-significant groupdifferences in CS pleasantness ratings (see section 3.4.1.2 above). CS pleasantnessdiscrimination (CS50 – CS10) was the outcome, with the domains from either NEO or TCI aspredictors. The NEO model was significant [R2 = .26, F(5,39) = 2.73, p = .033], though noneof its five factors was an individually significant predictor [ps > .066]. The removal of twooutliers (standardised residuals > 2) retained a significant overall model [R2 = .39, F(5,37)= 4.70, p = .002], and showed N and E to be significant predictors [βs = -.34 and .31,
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respectively, ps < .036]. The TCI model was initially non-significant [F(4,40) = 1.52, p =.22], however the removal of one outlier (standardised residual > 3) resulted in asignificant model [R2 = .22, F(4,39) = 2.72, p = .043] comprising HA as the only significantpredictor [β = -.46, p = .004]. To compare the relative contributions of the NEO and TCI inpredicting emotional discrimination their significant domains from the above analyseswere entered into a further regression analysis. This resulted in a significant model [R2 =.22, F(3,41) = 3.78, p = .017], although no one predictor was significant [ps > .112]. Theremoval of one outlier (std res > 3) improved the model in that it retained overallsignificance [R2 = .28, F(3,40) = 5.18, p = .004] and revealed N to be its sole significantpredictor [β = -.44, p = .044].Table 3.4.2.3 displays coefficients for this final model.
Table 3.4.2.3. Regression coefficients of personality traits predictive of CS pleasantness
discrimination.Predictor B β p Neuroticism* -0.12(0.12) -0.44 .044Extraversion 0.02(0.09) 0.08 .594Harm-Avoidance -.0.02(0.14) -0.06 .781Constant 8.36(7.66) .033
Note: R2 = .28, p = .004; * p < .05; CS pleasantness discrimination = CS50 – CS10.Because of the recurrent relationship between N and both expectancy and pleasantnessdiscrimination, these latter two variables were correlated to assess the potentialmediating role of N; neither correlations involving the whole sample, nor awareparticipants alone, were significant [rs > -.13, ps > .49].
3.4.2.4 Transfer effectTo explore the moderating influence of personality on transfer behaviour, regressionanalyses were run, separately for the two personality questionnaires, separately for RI andRR, and separately for aware and unaware participants (due to their quantitativedifferences in transfer performance). Two outcome variables were considered – thespecific- and the general-transfer index (see section 3.3.4 above for detail). No model wassignificant [Fs < 1.93, ps > .135].
3.5 DiscussionThe aims of the current experiment were twofold. The first was to test whetherdifferential subjective emotional responses elicited by cues predictive of differentiallyvalued rewards could transfer control onto separately trained reward-seeking behaviours,
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irrespective of the identity of the reward. The second was to investigate the moderatingrole of individual differences in personality on emotional and behavioural discriminationof the cues. The first test was not supported - participants who developed differentialemotional responses to stimuli predictive of either 10p or 50p, regardless of explicitknowledge of these predictive relationships, did not display greater responding in thetransfer task on CS50 than on CS10 trials. Instead, each stimulus selectively enhanced theresponse with which it shared an outcome, an effect seen only in the aware group. Thesecondary investigation of individual differences revealed that scores on negative-affecttraits predicted awareness classification, the ability to associate each stimulus with itsrespective outcome, and the magnitude of differential emotional reaction to the cues.
The present behavioural results are in accord with previous studies that have supportedthe role of expectancy awareness in mediating PIT (Hogarth et al., 2007; Talmi et al., 2008;Trick et al., 2011). The current study strengthens this extant literature by finding that theemotional conditioned responses (ECRs) that accompany expectancy awareness do not bythemselves elicit transfer. Thus knowledge of reward availability is a necessary criterionin the control of reward-seeking by separately trained Ss. Indeed, the magnitude of ECRwas indistinguishable in aware and unaware cohorts, thus any differences in behaviourcannot be attributed to differences in emotional reactivity. Moreover, both groups pressedat a similar overall rate in the instrumental and transfer phases; the distinction lay in theirallocation of pressing to each button in the presence of each S. Thus the lack of transfer inthe unaware group was not due to floor or ceiling effects constraining their behaviour.
While the current data is supportive of the role of awareness in specific-PIT it is lesssupportive of the role of emotion in general-PIT. The specific version is argued to rely onthe S activating the specific sensory features of the O, which in turn biases choice of Rtowards that which procures the same O (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; de Wit & Dickinson,2009; Estes, 1943). The general version is suggested to occur through the S activating thegeneral emotional features of the O, which in turn augments any concurrent R, regardlessof whether S and R share an O (Dickinson & Dawson, 1987). The current experiment foundno general augmentation of R in the presence of the higher-reward CS50 compared to thelower-reward CS10.
Yet results from Nadler et al and Prévost et al (2011; 2012) provide a possibledemonstration of general transfer in humans, and so are at odds with the present study. Asstated in the introduction, these experiments used a modified specific-PIT paradigm,
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where an S3 was paired with an O3 that had no corresponding R3, arguing that thisprecluded any specific transfer effect. Despite the apparent prevention of specific transferthese studies still demonstrated an augmentation of general responding on Rs 1&2 in thepresence of S3. However, this reputed general transfer may have come from participants
generalising across Ss or Os (McLaren & Mackintosh, 2002; Milton & Wills, 2004) and soselecting an R based on which brought about the O most comparable to that predicted bythe unattached S. Thus any augmentation of responding when comparing pre-stimulus tostimulus conditions, as was the case with Nadler et al and Prévost et al, may containelements of expectancy and so be a demonstration of specific, not general, PIT. To furthertest this suggestion it would be informative to assess the role of awareness in the reputedgeneral transfer effect – if participants unaware of the S→O relationships still demonstratePIT then a 'generalisation' explanation can be refuted, and an emotional explanationsupported.
Although the development of evaluative conditioning (EC) in the absence of expectancyawareness was not the focus of the present investigation, the data provide support for theargument that emotional appreciation of a CS can occur in the absence of knowledge of itsassociated US (Hofmann et al., 2010). While it is difficult to confirm the absence ofawareness, Lovibond and Shanks (2002) provide criteria for a robust study of awarenessthat the current procedure adhere to. CSs were abstract shapes that participants had notexperienced before, therefore reducing external sources of emotion; a range of CSs wereused and their relationship to either US was counterbalanced, therefore precluding theconfound that any one CS was intrinsically more emotional; expectancy awareness wastested during learning, rather than during debriefing, thus reducing memory demands onthe display of awareness.
Further information on the determinants of awareness and ECR was gleaned fromexploration of the relationship between these variables and personality. The TCI's HAafforded a reduced likelihood of awareness classification, which accords with previousreports of a detrimental effect of negative-affect traits on task learning (Avila et al., 1999;Corr et al., 1995; Grillon, 2002; McLaughlin & Eysenck, 1967). Moreover, the NEO's N, ahighly correlated construct (Cloninger et al., 1994), was negatively related to pleasantnessdiscrimination, which again accords with extant literature asserting that the trait isinvolved in negative emotion processing (Canli et al., 2001; Costa & McCrae, 1992), and somay inhibit positive emotion processing. However, at odds with such findings is that Npositively predicted expectancy discrimination. Furthermore, expectancy and emotion
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were unrelated themselves, suggesting independent effects of personality on each. Such apattern of data will need to be replicated in subsequent studies before being scrutinisedfurther.
The lack of an effect of CS emotional value in PIT shown here also requires furtherscrutiny. While the human literature to date has been unable to unequivocallydemonstrate general PIT, results from rodent studies suggest a viable course for analternative paradigm that may facilitate such an effect. Holland (2004) argues that transferparadigms involving multiple Rs and Os bias the participating organism to adopt a transferapproach based on the sensory properties of the specific O predicted by its respective S, atthe expense of the emotional properties afforded by the S. In contrast, paradigms involvinga single R and O may allow greater modulation of the R by the emotional properties of theS. However, any increase in R elicited by a reward-paired S would be confounded byexpectancy of the O in participants aware of the S→O contingency; on the other hand, ifunaware participants demonstrate a transfer effect it should be due solely to theemotional properties of the S. Thus further studies should incorporate a single R and O tofacilitate a general transfer effect, and include unaware participants to assess the effects ofdissociated emotional aspects of reward-predictive Ss.
In conclusion, the current experiment demonstrated an enhancement of responding in thepresence of a reward-paired cue, but such enhancement was specific to the response thatgained the reward predicted by the cue; the magnitude of this enhancement wasunaffected by the emotional value of the cue. Moreover, this specific-transfer effect wasseen only in participants with knowledge of the cue-reward association; a group ofparticipants who developed an emotional response to the cue in the absence of suchknowledge showed no behavioural effects. Negative-affect traits predicted this knowledgeacquisition, as well as the emotional response to the cue, but did not directly predicttransfer performance. Further studies should incorporate a single response and reward tofacilitate the effects of cue-elicited emotion on behaviour.
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4 Single-response PIT
4.1 Abstract
Background – The results from the previous experiment suggested that outcomeexpectancy is sufficient to elicit reward-seeking. However, comparative research indicatesthat simplifying the PIT design to include only one reward and instrumental response mayfacilitate the influence of emotional processes on PIT.
Aims - Thus the aim of this second experiment was to investigate whether the ability ofcue-elicited emotion to influence reward-seeking could be expressed using a single-outcome PIT paradigm. It also sought to measure the consistency of the effects ofNeuroticism and Extraversion on propositional and emotional processes.
Methods – 62 participants completed the PIT task. The Pavlovian phase associated twovisual CSs with either winning nothing or 50 pence, respectively; the instrumental phasetrained participants to make a single button-pressing response to win 50p; the transferphase tested the change in instrumental responding after presentation of either CS.
Results – 32 participants developed expectancy awareness, whereas 18 displayed acomplete lack of awareness, after Pavlovian training. Despite this difference in awareness,both groups rated the 50p CS as more pleasant than the non-winning CS. Both groupsresponded similarly during instrumental training, but only the aware group demonstratedPIT in the transfer phase. This PIT effect was limited, however, to a reduction in responserate on non-winning CS trials. Neuroticism positively predicted the rate at which awareparticipants developed expectancy knowledge of the Pavlovian contingencies, but nopersonality domain predicted hedonic reactions to either CS.
Conclusions – Expectancy awareness is shown to be necessary for PIT, but the lack of afacilitatory effect of the 50p CS may have precluded the effect of appetitive emotionalprocesses on responding. Subsequent studies should therefore manipulate theinstrumental training schedule to encourage increases in responding in the presence of areward-predictive cue.
4.2 IntroductionThe previous experiment found no evidence that differential emotional responses elicitedby two cues predictive of reward could influence two separately trained instrumentalresponses, i.e. no evidence of general PIT. However, PIT studies using non-human animalsindicate that a simplified design including only one instrumental response may provide asituation in which general PIT can be expressed (Dickinson & Dawson, 1987; Holland,2004). Such a possibility requires investigation by translating these non-human paradigms
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into one suitable for human participants, which will allow for better scrutiny of therelative contributions of propositional versus emotional responses to stimuli in purportedexamples of general PIT.
In a series of experiments, Holland (2004) demonstrated that the transfer effect of an Swas facilitated by extended training of the R, but only when a single R was used. Extendedtraining had little effect when two Rs were introduced. The effect of extended training wasnot due to stronger learning of the R, evidenced by comparable response-rates acrosstraining conditions, nor was it due to heightened O expectancy or valuation, evidenced bysimilar rates of O approach and consumption following transfer. This leaves open thepossibility that the effect was due to an increase in the control of behaviour by emotionalprocesses elicited by the S, though such a mechanism was not directly investigated byHolland.
A similar paradigm devised by Dickinson & Dawson (1987) supports the involvement ofemotional processes in PIT using a single R. The pair trained rats to associated twodifferent Ss with either pellets or sucrose, before reinforcing a single R with both pelletsand sucrose. One or other O was then revalued through deprivation, before the effects ofeach S on the R were tested under extinction conditions. During test, transfer was shownonly in the presence of the S predictive of the revalued O, which the authors interpreted asa general PIT effect. While this experimental manipulation was directed at the value of theO, rather than that of the S, emotional reactions to Ss have been shown to track O value (M.Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004). Thus, in concert, the paradigms of Holland (2004) andDickinson & Dawson (1987) indicate a viable method for measuring general PIT.
Where both could be made more appropriate for the current experiment's purpose isthrough the addition of explicit falsification of the role of propositional learning. Such anend may be achieved by incorporating human participants who can be confidentlyclassified as unaware of the S→O association, yet still demonstrate an emotional responseto the S, as was the case in Experiment 1. Early reports of such unaware evaluativeconditioning (EC) relied on using faces as both CS and US (Baeyens, Eelen, & van denBergh, 1990), but were refuted on the grounds that any effect was more reliant onperceptual similarity of CS and US than genuine non-propositional learning (A. P. Field &Davey, 1999). However, more recent demonstration of unaware EC has successfullycircumvented this and other flaws (Hofmann et al., 2010), through the use of novel CSs,
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counterbalanced CS-US pairings, and concurrent measures of awareness, design aspectsargued to be necessary for the valid assessment of awareness (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).
The Pavlovian phase from Experiment 1 already incorporated these necessary features forunaware EC, and so was relatively unchanged in the current study. The PIT procedure wasamended, however, to ally it with the single R method of Holland (2004), such that the 10pO was replaced with a no-win O, and the 10p R removed entirely, such that theinstrumental and transfer phases contained only one R. Here a general-PIT effect would bemanifested as differential responding in the presence of either cue, though only inunaware participants. Any effect in aware participants would be confounded bydifferential expectancy of reward.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 ParticipantsParticipants were 62 University of Sussex students (28 males and 34 females) with a meanage of 21.3 years (range 19-36). Other participant details were as General methods.
4.3.2 Design & Procedure
4.3.2.1 Instrumental trainingParticipants' experience of instrumental training was similar to that described in GeneralMethods, save for the following details. The response window was 4s, as it had been inExperiment 1, rather than 18.5s. Thus reinforcement operated on the modified VI2.75schedule rather than VI10. The "Press the button" prompt remained on screen for the full4s, rather than being replaced by a blank screen, and omitted the question mark. Theprompt was therefore written as an instruction rather than a choice. All other details wereas General methods.
4.3.2.2 TransferAs with Experiment 1, transfer conditions were in keeping with instrumental training.Thus the response window was maintained at 4s, rather than the 18.5s window describedin General Methods. All other details were as General Methods.
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4.3.3 Statistical analysesRR was calculated using the same method as Experiment 1, removing the confound ofresponse latency by dividing mean number of responses by response duration (4s –response latency). All other details were as General Methods.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Group-level analyses
4.4.1.1 Expectancy awareness32 (52%) participants were classified as aware (16 males and females, mean age 21.0,range 19-26), 18 (29%) unaware (6 males and 12 females, mean age 22.3, range 19-36),with 12 (19%) showing partial awareness. These 12 partially aware participants wereexcluded from further analysis. Aware and unaware groups did not differ significantly interms of age [t(48) = 1.56, p = .126] or gender [χ2(1) = 1.30, p = .365].
In the final block of Pavlovian training the aware group correctly predicted thepresence/absence of 50p after presentation of either CS, whereas the unaware group wasunable to do so. Figure 4.4.1.1[left] presents each group's mean expectancy rating afterseeing each predictive CS.
Figure 4.4.1.1. Mean expectancy [left] or pleasantness [right] rating from Pavlovian training
for aware and unaware groups after presentation of each CS.
Line at 5 marks rating of 'don't know'; ^ CS+ > 5 > CS- [ps < .001], ** CS+ > CS± > CS- [ps < .002], *
CS+ > CS± = CS- [ps < .009]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; CS±, Pavlovian CS non-predictive;
CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent 95% CI.A mixed ANOVA of final block expectancy ratings with CS and Awareness as factorsshowed a significant main effect of CS qualified by a significant interaction between
12
34
56
78
9
Aware^ Unaware
Expect
ancyra
ting
CS+ CS-
12
34
56
78
9
Aware** Unaware*
Pleasan
tnessr
ating
CS+ CS± CS-
59
CS*Awareness [Fs(1,48) > 392, ps < .001]. Exploration of the interaction using one-samplet-tests verified that the aware group's expectancy ratings for both CSs were in the correctdirection and significantly different from 5 [ts(31) > 31.5, ps < .001], whereas the unawaregroup's ratings were non-significantly different from 5 [ts(17) < 1.04, ps > .324].
4.4.1.2 Evaluative conditioningDespite these differences in expectancy ratings both aware and unaware participants gavea similar pattern of pleasantness ratings for the various CSs (see Figure 4.4.1.1[right] formean pleasantness ratings). A mixed ANOVA of pleasantness ratings with CS andAwareness as factors revealed a main effect of CS and a CS*Awareness interaction[Fs(2,96) > 3.69, ps < .027]. The interaction was investigated by separate RM ANOVAs foreach awareness group. The main effect of CS was present in both groups [Fs > 12.8, ps <.002], but post-hoc comparisons explained the above interaction as being due to the awaregroup's ratings for each CS being significantly different from each other (CS+ > CS± > CS-)[ps < .002], whereas the unaware group showed significant differences for CS+comparisons only (CS+ > CS± = CS-) [ps < .009].
For anxiety ratings, a mixed ANOVA as per pleasantness ratings found a significant maineffect of CS [F(2,96) = 4.19, p = .023], with post-hoc comparisons showing the CS+ to evokesignificantly less anxiety than the CS- [p = .038]. Table 4.4.1.1 presents the mean anxietyrating of each CS for each group.
Table 4.4.1.1. Mean (95%CI) anxiety ratings of each CS for each awareness group.CS+* CS± CS-Aware 2.88 (.87) 2.75 (.65) 3.84 (.94)Unaware 2.17 (1.16) 3.28 (.86) 3.28 (1.25)
Note: * CS+ < CS- [p = .038]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; CS±, Pavlovian CS non-predictive;
CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing
4.4.1.3 Instrumental trainingAll participants learned to press at a rate sufficient to receive reinforcement within thefirst block of instrumental training. A series of mixed ANOVAs was conducted to comparethe various behavioural indices of aware and unaware groups at each block ofinstrumental training. Results were non-significant [Fs < 1]. Table 4.4.1.2 contains meansfor the three behavioural indices displayed separately for each awareness group, withblock collapsed due to its non-significant effects.
60
Table 4.4.1.2. Mean (95% CI) of each of the three behavioural measures taken during
instrumental training, separated by awareness, averaged across blocks.Behavioural measureRI RR ReinforcementsAware 98.5 (.93) 5.21 (.71) 9.14 (.48)Unaware 98.1 (1.24) 5.05 (.95) 8.63 (.64)
Note: RI, response initiation; RR, response rate; Reinforcements, number of times 50p won.
4.4.1.4 TransferOnly aware participants displayed an effect of CS on behaviour, specifically RR, in thetransfer phase.RI was not significantly affected by CS (see Figure 4.4.1.2 for mean RI). A mixed ANOVAwith Stimulus (CS+, S±, CS-) and Block as within-groups factors, and Awareness as thebetween-groups factor, revealed only an interaction between Block and Awareness[F(1,48) = 4.14, p = .047]. However, subsequent t-tests comparing mean RI during eachblock, separated by Awareness, showed a non-significant effect of Block for the two groups[ts < 1.45, ps > .161].
Figure 4.4.1.2. Mean response initiation for aware [left] and unaware [right] groups during
blocks 1 and 2 of the transfer phase.
CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey squares from instrumental training; CS-, Pavlovian
CS predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent 95% CI.A similar pattern of data were found for RR (Figure 4.4.1.3 shows mean RR for each groupafter each Stimulus). The mixed ANOVA showed a significant Stimulus main effect andStimulus*Awareness interaction [Fs > 3.95, ps > .030]. The Stimulus*Awarenessinteraction was investigated by re-running the ANOVA separately for each awareness
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group. These second analyses revealed only a significant main effect of Stimulus in awareparticipants [F(1.37,42.6) = 8.38, p = .003], with post-hoc comparisons specifying thiseffect as being due to a higher RR for CS+ and S± trials than CS- trials (ps < .014).
Figure 4.4.1.3. Mean response rate for aware and unaware groups at each level of Stimulus,
Block collapsed.
^ CS+ = S± > CS- [ps < .014]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey squares from
instrumental training; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent
95% CI.
4.4.1.5 Transfer expectancyExpectancy ratings pertaining to transfer were not obtained from 4 aware and 1 unawareparticipants due to technical malfunction. Data obtained from the remaining participantswas in keeping with their earlier expectancy ratings taken during the Pavlovian phase. Amixed ANOVA with Stimulus and Awareness as factors found a significant main effect ofStimulus and a significant Stimulus*Awareness interaction [Fs(2,86) > 16.6, ps < .001]. Theinteraction was explored by further RM ANOVAs for each awareness group which foundsignificant and marginal main effects of Stimulus in the aware and unaware groups,respectively [Fs > 3.16, ps < .056]. However, post-hoc comparisons explained the previousinteraction as being due to the aware group showing significant differences for allcomparisons (thus CS+ > S± > CS-; ps < .001), whereas unaware participants showed non-significant differences throughout [ps > .126]. SeeTable 4.4.1.3 for mean transfer expectancy ratings.
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Table 4.4.1.3. Mean (95%CI) ratings for expectancy of winning during transfer phase after
presentation of each stimulus (scale range 0-100).CS+ S± CS-Aware* 84.1 (6.90) 52.9 (7.00) 13.6 (7.58)Unaware 62.4 (8.86) 51.4 (8.98) 40.1 (9.72)
Note: * CS+ > S± > CS- [ps < .001]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey squares from
instrumental training; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent
95% CI.
4.4.2 Role of personality in PIT
4.4.2.1 Awareness classificationSeparate logistic regressions were conducted with the domains of either the NEO or TCI aspredictors of awareness categorisation. Neither model was significant [χ2s < 6.99, ps > .22].
4.4.2.2 Expectancy discriminationAlthough personality traits were not able to classify participants as aware or unaware,NEO factors predicted the magnitude of expectancy discrimination in participantsultimately defined as aware. Separate linear regression analyses were employed for theNEO and TCI, using their respective factors as predictors. The initial NEO model was non-significant [F = 1.80, p = .15], but the removal of one outlier (std res > 2) led to a significantmodel [R2 = .43, F(5,25) = 3.79, p = .011] comprising N and O as significant predictors [β =.57, p = .004; β = -.44, p = .026, respectively] (see Table 4.4.2.1 for full model coefficients).The equivalent model for the TCI was non-significant [F = 2.62, p = .057].
Table 4.4.2.1. Linear regression coefficients of NEO factors predicting expectancy
discrimination in aware participants.Predictor B β p Neuroticism* 0.12(0.08) .57 .004Extraversion -0.00(0.08) -.02 .916Openness* -0.09(0.08) -.44 .026Agreeableness 0.03(0.05) .21 .233Conscientiousness 0.03(0.06) .22 .280Constant 1.75(6.98) .610
Note: R2 = .43, p = .011; * p < .05; expectancy discrimination = mean CS+ – CS- expectancy rating;
numbers in parentheses are 95%CI.
4.4.2.3 Evaluative conditioning
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Regression analyses using the domains of either the NEO or TCI as predictors of CSpleasantness discrimination were non-significant [Fs < 1.32, ps > .28]. Due to thesignificant difference between anxiety ratings of the CS+ and CS-, analyses were alsoconducted with CS anxiety discrimination as the outcome; neither was significant [Fs < 1].
4.4.2.4 Transfer discriminationRegression analyses were run for each permutation of questionnaire, awareness group,and response variable (RI, RR) with the respective domains of each questionnaire aspredictors of transfer discrimination (CS+ - CS-). None were significant [Fs < 1.85, ps > .15].
4.5 DiscussionThe current experiment was designed to test whether a PIT paradigm with a singleinstrumental response would allow the emotional responses elicited by Pavlovian stimulito transfer control onto the separately trained behavioural response. No evidence wasfound in favour of this process. Participants rated the reward-presence cue as morepleasant, and the reward-absence cue as more anxious, regardless of propositionalknowledge of the cue-outcome association, yet only those participants who correctlyexpected either outcome after viewing its cue displayed a transfer effect. Thus dissociatedemotional responses to stimuli did not elicit general PIT. Additionally, the degree to whichaware participants' expectancy ratings discriminated between either stimulus waspredicted by their level of trait Neuroticism and Openness.
The necessary status of propositional knowledge in mediating a PIT effect here is inaccordance with the previous experiment, as well as studies from other researchers(Hogarth et al., 2007; Talmi et al., 2008; Trick et al., 2011). The lack of general PIT in agroup of participants who displayed isolated emotional responses to Ss is again at oddswith the assertions of Nadler et al and Prévost et al (2011; 2012), who argue that such aresponse is sufficient to elicit transfer. As the paradigm used by those researchers cannotrule out the role of propositional knowledge in their general transfer effect, themechanism by which a general transfer effect occurs may instead require an S to activateboth propositional and emotional processes. Indeed, the investigations of Dickinson &Dawson and Holland (1987; 2004) suggest that emotional responses to Ss can play somerole, but the current data add to their results by finding that activation of a propositionalmechanism may be necessary for such ECRs to influence behavioural Rs.
64
However, whereas these published claims of general PIT have been predicated on a
facilitation of R above some baseline level, the current study shows only inhibition. Thetransfer effect was limited to a reduction in RR under CS- conditions, compared to S±,rather than an increase under CS+ conditions. Thus it is possible that detection of a generalPIT effect in unaware participants was hampered by a ceiling effect, with participantsunable to increase their RR above baseline due to motoric, rather than motivational,constraints. In support of this possibility, Lovibond (1983) reported that a facilitatoryeffect of a CS+ on performing rabbits was only demonstrated when baseline response ratewas low. Moreover, Nadler et al and Prévost et al (2011; 2012) used VR5 and VR10reinforcement schedules, respectively, thus higher than the VR2 used here, withconcomitant response rates of 2 and 3Hz, respectively, thus lower than the 5Hz displayedhere.
Moreover, the “Press the button” prompt that remained on screen while participantsresponded may have been interpreted as a mandatory instruction, rather than a reminderof possible options. This may have artificially elevated RI, due to participants wishing tocomply with instructions, rather than seek reward of their own volition. Subsequentinvestigation should, therefore, employ instrumental schedules that produce acomparatively low level of baseline responding. Additionally, instructions shouldemphasise that participants may [not] initiate a response depending on their own freewill. These methodological alterations will provide more suitable conditions within whichto allow for an increase in RR and RI upon CS+ presentation.
Regardless of the direction of transfer effect, any demonstration of PIT in the unawaregroup of the current study could be questioned on the grounds that they showed a degreeof re-consolidation of CS→US knowledge (Alberini, 2005). Although no unawareparticipant was consistently able to predict the occurrence of each US after presentation ofits CS by the end of the Pavlovian phase, their expectancy ratings showed a marginal effectat the end of transfer. However, such post-hoc assessments of awareness have been shownto be unreliable (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), introducing confounding factors such asretrospective justification of behaviour (Festinger, 1962), and so should not be used toundermine the case for unaware EC shown here. Evaluative ratings were takenimmediately after Pavlovian conditioning, thus giving little time for delayed consolidationto influence awareness.
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As well as replicating the unaware EC effect of the first study, the current experiment alsoreplicated the facilitatory effect of Neuroticism on propositional learning. While consistentwithin the current series, such a replication presents a potential contradiction to extantfindings of an inhibitory effect of negative-affect traits on task learning (Avila et al., 1999;Corr et al., 1995; Grillon, 2002; McLaughlin & Eysenck, 1967). However, these publishedreports did not use N as defined in the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), rather traitscorrelated with N. Thus one explanation for this discordant finding is that a facet unique toN may explain its influence on learning better than its membership of the nebulousconstruct of negative-affect. Alternatively, the failure to replicate the negative relationshipbetween N and pleasantness discrimination implies a tenuous relationships betweenpersonality and learning, thus conclusions on the role of N in propositional learningshould be withheld until further replication is obtained.
In summary, a group of participants who developed an emotional response to reward-predictive cues, despite an absence of awareness of the cue-reward association, did notdisplay any influence of the cues on a separately trained instrumental response. Onlyparticipants who correctly expected to receive reward after presentation of the cuedemonstrated a transfer effect. However, this effect was confined to an inhibitoryinfluence of a reward-absence cue, leaving open the possibility that a lack of transfer in theunaware group was due to response-rate ceiling effects. Such a possibility should beexplored using a task that reduces baseline levels of responding. Trait Neuroticismpositively predicted propositional learning, thus the consistency of this association shouldbe tested further.
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5 Single-response PIT with VI10 schedule
5.1 Abstract
Background – The results from experiment two further supported the notion that outcomeexpectancy is sufficient to elicit reward-seeking. However, any facilitatory effect of CShedonic value on responding may have been impeded by high baseline responding.
Aims - The aim of this third experiment was to develop instrumental training conditionsthat would provide a lower level of baseline responding, in order to allow for an increasein the presence of a CS paired with reward.
Methods – 75 participants completed a PIT task. The Pavlovian phase associated two visualCSs with either winning nothing or 50 pence, respectively, as per the previous study. Theinstrumental phase used a button-pressing response to win 50p, and introduced a variableinterval 10 reinforcement schedule. Additionally, half of participants won or lost 50pduring instrumental training, whereas the other half won 50p or won nothing. Thetransfer phase presented participants with the Pavlovian CSs, while they pressed thebutton in extinction.
Results – 29 participants were classified as aware, whereas 23 were classified as unaware,after Pavlovian training. Both aware and unaware groups showed an increase in 50p CSliking from pre- to post-Pavlovian emotional rating sessions. Both awareness groupsresponded similarly during instrumental training, but groups experiencing monetary lossshowed a reduction in response rate compared to groups not experiencing loss. Intransfer, a facilitatory effect of the 50p CS was manifest in response initiation, but only aninhibitory effect was seen in response rate. Furthermore, any transfer effect was limited togroups demonstrating expectancy awareness. Personality data suggested thatExtraversion was related to CS hedonic discrimination in unaware participants.
Conclusions – The VI10 schedule was successful in allowing for cue-potentiation ofinstrumental responding during the transfer phase, but the aversive training manipulationserved to depress responding regardless of cue. Expectancy awareness was confirmed asnecessary for PIT, but further study should investigate its sufficiency by manipulating cue-elicited hedonic value.
5.2 IntroductionExperiment 2 found that only a group of participants who correctly expected an O afterviewing its associated S displayed PIT. While this group also rated the S as moreemotionally salient, the direct influence of S-induced emotionality could not be dissociatedfrom S-induced expectancy, as a group of participants without O expectancies did not
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display PIT. However, the PIT effect demonstrated by the aware group was solely aninhibitory one – their responding was reduced after a reward-absence cue, but notincreased after a reward-presence cue. Thus the lack of transfer in the unaware group mayhave been because the task did not allow for any increase in responding that an isolatedemotional response to an appetitive cue may otherwise have brought.
Indeed, a series of experiments by Lovibond (1981, 1983) showed that the presentation ofan S interfered with the ongoing R to the extent that response rates were reduced, andincreased only when baseline levels were especially low. Similarly, on closer inspection ofthe data used to support the demonstration of general PIT by Dickinson & Dawson (1987),where facilitation of responding to an appetitive S was claimed, suppression of respondingto a non-appetitive S was in fact more apparent. Moreover, Wyvell and Berridge (2000,2001) showed only marginally significant appetitive PIT effects in control rats, withreliable response elevation only coming after experience with amphetamine. Thus anappetitive PIT effect may be less likely to occur in non-clinical samples without suitablemethodology designed to reduce baseline response rates.
Methodological precedents for achieving such ends have been set in two forms. The first isthe use of effortful instrumental schedules, under which the number of responses requiredto receive reinforcement is high. Such a technique has been used to successfullydemonstrate facilitatory PIT in multiple studies (Corbit & Balleine, 2005; Nadler et al.,2011; Prévost et al., 2012), with a ratio of responses to reinforcements no lower than 5:1.However, PIT has been shown to be less stable when using ratio schedules compared tointerval schedules (Lovibond, 1981, 1983), potentially explained by the greater ability ofinterval schedules to engender habitual responding (Yin & Knowlton, 2006), and thegreater ability of habitual responding to show PIT (Holland, 2004). Thus the second, moreeffective, precedent is the use of long instrumental schedules, under which the duration ofresponse required to receive reinforcement is high. Such interval schedules have alsoshown facilitatory PIT (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988, 1990; Talmi et al., 2008; Trick et al.,2011), with a ratio of interval to response no lower than 5:1. A third technique to lowerbaseline responding may be to introduce intermittent aversive consequences toinstrumental performance. This holds face-validity when investigating addictiveprocesses, in that drug-seeking may occasionally be punished through negative healtheffects, arrests, social disapproval, but the effects of such a manipulation on PITperformance in humans is not known.
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Along with alterations to the instrumental schedule to facilitate PIT, the previousexperiment may also be improved through changes to the measurement of EC. Althoughthe current method of associating novel CSs with appetitive USs in a counterbalancedmanner accords with criteria for valid assessment (Hofmann et al., 2010; Lovibond &Shanks, 2002), demonstrating a change in rating across time, from pre- to post-conditioning, would provide strong evidence that any EC was genuinely associative innature, rather than being an artefact of stimulus pairings.
Thus the current study was devised to test whether reducing baseline response rates, viaincreased response duration or partial punishment, would allow an increase in respondingin the presence of a separately trained appetitive stimulus. It was also designed toscrutinise the associative basis of the evaluative conditioning effects seen in the previoustwo studies.
5.3 Method
5.3.1 ParticipantsParticipants were 75 University of Sussex students (36 males and 39 females) with a meanage of 20.61 years (range 18-30). Other participant details were as General Methods.
5.3.2 Design & Procedure
5.3.2.1 Emotional evaluations – pre-PavlovianA baseline CS emotional ratings session was inserted prior to Pavlovian training, in orderto measure the change in rating across conditioning. This pre-Pavlovian session wasintroduced with the phrase: "You will first be asked some questions about a set ofpictures." All other details were as General Methods.
5.3.2.2 Instrumental trainingThe change of instrumental training conditions introduced for this experiment waspredicated on a pilot study conducted to ascertain appropriate reinforcement schedulesfor the purposes of reducing baseline responding. Details of this pilot study can be foundin Appendices, section 10.1.1 below.
Prior to instrumental training participants were allocated to either an appetitive or anaversive version of the task. The appetitive version was as described in General Methods.The aversive version was similar except that the VR2 schedule was modified such that
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participants would either win 50p or lose 50p with 50% contingency, rather than winning50p or nothing. Thus successful pressing under the VI10 schedule was met with either"You win 50p" or "You lose 50p". Unsuccessful pressing was still signalled by "You winnothing", and no response at all was still signalled by a blank screen.
5.3.3 Statistical analysesAlthough data were collected until 32 participants displayed expectancy awareness,analysis of the full 75 participants' instrumental training data found that 7 failed to receivepositive reinforcement. These 7 participants were excluded from all analyses. Allparticipants completing the aversive version experienced punishment.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Group-level analyses
5.4.1.1 Expectancy awarenessOf the remaining 68 participants, 29 (43%) participants were classified as aware (14males, 15 females), 23 (34%) unaware (11 males and 12 females), with 16 (23%) fallingoutside either category. These 16 non-classified participants were excluded from furtheranalysis, leaving 52. Aware and unaware groups did not differ significantly in terms of age[t(50) < 1] or gender [χ2(1) = .001, p = .974].
The aware group was able to correctly identify the predictive validity of both CSs in thefinal block of Pavlovian training; unaware participants were, as per their classification,unaware of either CS-US relationship. The two groups' mean expectancy rating for each CSin the final block of the Pavlovian phase is depicted in Figure 5.4.1.1.
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Figure 5.4.1.1. Mean expectancy rating of winning 50p after presentation of each CS for aware
and unaware groups.
Line at 5 indicates rating of 'don't know'; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; CS±, Pavlovian CS
non-predictive; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent 95%CI.A mixed ANOVA of expectancy ratings, with CS and Awareness as factors, revealed a maineffect of CS and a CS*Awareness interaction [Fs(1,50) > 356, ps < .001]. The interactionwas investigated using one-tailed t-tests comparing each CS rating from each group to 5;the aware group’s ratings for each CS differed significantly from 5 [ts(28) > 39.0, ps <.001], whereas the unaware group’s ratings did not differ from 5 [ts < 1].
5.4.1.2 Evaluative conditioningPleasantness ratings at the start of Pavlovian training were similar across CSs andawareness groups, but after association with reward the CS+ was rated more pleasant, andthe CS- less pleasant, than the CS± in the aware group (see Figure 5.4.1.2 for meanpleasantness rating of each CS before and after Pavlovian training in aware and unawaregroups).
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Figure 5.4.1.2. Mean pleasantness rating for each CS pre- and post-Pavlovian conditioning for
each awareness group.
* = CS+ > CS± > CS- [ps < .008]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; CS±, Pavlovian CS non-
predictive; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent 95% CI.A mixed ANOVA with CS, Time (pre- vs post-conditioning) and Awareness as factorsrevealed significant main effects of CS and Time [Fs > 6.11, ps < .006], and significantinteractions for CS*Time and CS*Time*Awareness [Fs > 5.55, ps < .008]. The three-wayinteraction was followed by RM ANOVAs split by Awareness and Time, which found non-significant effects of CS pre-conditioning [Fs < 1], but a significant effect post-conditioningin the aware group [F(1.38,38.6) = 21.3, p < .001]. Post-hoc comparisons located this effectas being between all three levels of CS (CS+ > CS± > CS-) [ps < .008].
Although the main analysis found no differential effect of CS on pleasantness rating in theunaware group, exploratory analysis found an increase in CS+ rating over time. Student’st-tests comparing the unaware group’s pleasantness ratings before vs after conditioningshowed a significant increase for the CS+ [t(22) = 2.22, p = .037, uncorrected], yet non-significant changes for the other two CSs [ts < 1].
As with pleasantness ratings, anxiety ratings were similar across CSs and groups beforePavlovian training, but after conditioning the CS- generated more anxiety than the otherCSs in both groups.
Table 5.4.1.1 presents mean anxiety ratings at each time-point for each CS separately foraware and unaware groups.
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Table 5.4.1.1. Mean (95%CI) anxiety ratings of each CS pre- and post-Pavlovian conditioning
for aware and unaware groups.Pre-conditioning Post-conditioningCS+ CS± CS- CS+ CS± CS-*Aware 2.21(.58) 1.85(.44) 1.90(.42) 1.86(.70) 2.12(.53) 4.14(.99)Unaware 1.78(.66) 1.59(.49) 1.52(.48) 2.78(.79) 2.52(.60) 3.52(1.11)
Note: * = CS- > CS+ = CS± [ps < .001]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; CS±, Pavlovian CS non-
predictive; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent 95% CI.A mixed ANOVA with CS, Time and Awareness as factors revealed significant main effectsof CS and Time [Fs < 8.20, ps < .001], and a significant interaction of CS*Time [F(1,100) =13.3, p < .001]. The interaction was investigated using separate RM ANOVAs at each time-point, with CS as the only factor. These confirmed that there were non-significantdifferences between CSs pre-conditioning [F(1.68,85.6) = 1.72, p = .189], but significantdifferences post-conditioning [F(1.68,85.6) = 14.3, p < .001]. Post-hoc comparisonsrevealed this post-conditioning CS effect to be due to a higher anxiety rating for the CS-compared to CS+ or CS± [ps < .001].
5.4.1.3 Instrumental trainingAfter removing the 7 participants who failed to receive positive reinforcement during theinstrumental phase the appetitive and aversive versions of the task contained 14 and 15aware participants, respectively, with 15 and 8 unaware participants, respectively. Thesedifferences in frequencies were non-significant [χ2(1) = 1.49, p = .222]. All participantscompleting the aversive version experienced punishment.
To investigate the relative number of reinforcements received by aware and unawareparticipants in each version of training, separate analyses were run for the appetitive andaversive tasks due to there necessarily being zero punishments in the appetitive version. At-test of positive reinforcements revealed a non-significant effect of Awareness in theappetitive task [t(27) = 1.60, p = .120]. Similarly, a mixed ANOVA with Reinforcement type(positive, punishment) as the within-subjects factor and Awareness as the between-subjects factor found no significant effects [Fs(1,21) < 1]. Figure 5.4.1.3 - Figure 5.4.1.5display reinforcements, RI, and RR separated by awareness and training groups.
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Figure 5.4.1.3. Number of reinforcements experienced by aware and unaware groups given
appetitive or aversive instrumental training.
Error bars represent 95%CI.A series of mixed ANOVAs were run for each of the two remaining behavioural variableswith Training (appetitive, aversive) and Awareness as between-subjects factors, and Block(1-4) as the within-subjects factor. For RI these revealed non-significant effects [Fs < 3.32,
ps > .075].
Figure 5.4.1.4. Response initiation for aware and unaware groups given appetitive or aversive
instrumental training.
Error bars represent 95%CI.For RR there were main effects of Block and Training [Fs > 9.10, ps < .004]; post-hoccomparisons explained the Block effect as being due to lower rates for block 1 comparedto all others [ps < .001].
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Figure 5.4.1.5. Response rate for aware and unaware groups during each block of
instrumental training under appetitive or aversive conditions.
^ appetitive > aversive [p = .004]; * block 1 < blocks 2-4 [ps < .001]; error bars represent
95%CI.
5.4.1.4 TransferAware participants demonstrated transfer regardless of instrumental version. Despite notdeveloping differential outcome expectancies in the Pavlovian phase, unawareparticipants experiencing aversive instrumental conditions also displayed transfer,although to a lesser extent than their aware counterparts.
5.4.1.4.1 Response initiationSeparate mixed ANOVAs were run for each of the two behavioural variables (RI, RR) withStimulus (CS+, S±, CS-) and Block (1,2) as within-subjects factors, and Awareness andTraining as between-subjects factors. For RI this revealed significant main effects ofStimulus, Block, and Training [Fs > 5.20, ps < .028], and a significant Stimulus*Awarenessinteraction [F(2,96) = 3.69, p = .029]. The interaction was followed by mixed ANOVA withStimulus, Block and Training as factors, separated by Awareness. In aware participantsthis found significant main effects of Stimulus and Block [Fs > 5.47, ps < .027], with post-hoc comparisons showing all Stimulus comparisons to differ (CS+ > S± > CS-; ps < .004). Inunaware participants there were significant main effects of Stimulus, Block, and Training[Fs > 4.51, ps < .046], and a significant Stimulus*Training interaction [F(2,42) = 4.74, p =.014]. This interaction in the unaware group was investigated by separate RM ANOVAs foreach training group, with Stimulus and Block as factors. Effects were non-significant forthe appetitive group [Fs < 2.21, ps > .160], but there was a main effect of Stimulus in theaversive group [F(2,14) = 5.08, p = .022], albeit explained by post-hoc comparisons asbeing due to a trend-level difference between CS+ and CS- [p = .062]. Figure 5.4.1.6
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contains mean RI separated by Awareness [left/right], Training [top/bottom], Stimulus,and Block.
Figure 5.4.1.6. Mean response initiation (%) according to stimulus type and block, aware
groups shown left, unaware groups shown right, appetitive training shown top, aversive
training shown bottom.
* = CS+ > CS- [p = .062], ** = CS+ > S± > CS- [ps < .004], ^ = block 1 > block 2 [p = .027]; CS+,
Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey squares from instrumental training; CS-, Pavlovian CS
predictive of winning nothing; error bars represent 95% CI.
5.4.1.4.2 Response rateThe pattern of RR data was similar to that of RI, though rates did not diminish over time(see Figure 5.4.1.7 for mean RR). The mixed ANOVA revealed main effects of Stimulus andTraining [Fs > 16.4, ps < .001], and a Stimulus*Training*Awareness interaction[F(1.50,72.1) = 6.98, p = .004]. The three-way interaction was investigated with furthermixed ANOVAs split by Awareness, with Stimulus and Training as factors. In the aware
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group this showed main effects of Stimulus and Training [Fs > 16.3, ps < .001], with post-hoc comparisons finding CS- to be significantly lower than CS+ or S±, which themselvesdid not differ significantly [ps < .002]. In the unaware group there were significant effectsof Stimulus and Stimulus*Training [Fs(2,42) > 5.12, ps < .011]. This interaction wasfollowed by separate RM ANOVAs for each training condition, which found a non-significant Stimulus effect in the appetitive condition [F < 1], compared to a trend-levelStimulus effect in the aversive condition [F(2,14) = 3.41, p = .062], driven by CS- RR beinglower than CS+, though non-significantly so after Bonferroni-corrected comparisons [p =.184].
Figure 5.4.1.7. Mean response rate (Hz) as a function of stimulus type and instrumental
training conditions, separately for aware [left] and unaware [right] groups.
Error bars represent 95%CI. * = CS- < CS+ [p = .184], ** = CS- < S± = CS+ [ps < .002], ^ = aversive
< appetitive [p < .001]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey squares from instrumental
training; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing.
5.4.1.5 Transfer expectancyThe aware group's expectancy of winning during transfer accurately ranked the rewardcontingencies of the three stimuli (CS+ > S± > CS-). The unaware group, despite theirclassification, reported higher reward expectancies for the CS+ than either S± or CS-.Figure 5.4.1.8 presents mean transfer expectancy ratings for each stimulus, separated byTraining and Awareness.
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Figure 5.4.1.8. Mean expectancy of winning during transfer according to stimulus, separated
by instrumental training conditions and awareness group. Error bars represent 95%CI. * CS+ >
S± = CS- [ps < .001], ** CS+ > S± > CS- [ps < .001]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey
squares from instrumental training; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothingA mixed ANOVA of transfer expectancy ratings with Stimulus, Awareness and Training asfactors found significant effects of Stimulus and Stimulus*Awareness [Fs(2,96) > 15.6, ps <.001]. The interaction was followed by separate RM ANOVAs for each awareness groupwith Stimulus as the only factor. These revealed a significant effect of Stimulus in theaware group [F(2,56) = 146, p < .001] due to all three levels differing significantly fromone another [ps < .001], compared to a significant effect of Stimulus in the unaware group[F(2,44) = 20.9, p < .001] due to CS+ differing from S± and CS- [ps < .001].
5.4.2 Role of personality in PIT
5.4.2.1 Awareness classificationLogistic regression analyses with the domains from the NEO or TCI were inputted aspredictors of awareness classification. Neither questionnaire model was significant [χs 2 <4.0, ps > .40].
5.4.2.2 Expectancy discriminationTreating awareness as a continuous variable, linear regressions were run with either theNEO or TCI domains as predictors and expectancy discrimination index as the outcome,for aware participants only. Neither model was significant [Fs < 1.04, ps > .42].
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5.4.2.3 Evaluative conditioningThe influence of personality on evaluative conditioning was measured by regressing CSemotional discrimination scores on NEO or TCI personality domains. Pleasantnessanalyses were separated by Awareness, due to the significant effects of Awareness insection 5.4.1.2 above, whereas anxiety analyses were conducted on the entire cohort. Foraware participants neither the NEO nor TCI models were significant [Fs < 1.33, ps > .33].Similarly for unaware participants, neither model was significant overall [Fs < 1.66, ps >.20], but E was a significant individual predictor of pleasantness discrimination within themain NEO model [β = .58, p = .018].
Although the unaware group showed a non-significant post-Pavlovian pleasantnessdiscrimination, their evaluative conditioning was manifest in a significant increase in CS+rating over time (see section 5.4.1.2 above). Thus the change in rating from pre- to post-Pavlovian conditioning was entered as the dependent variable in regressions using thetwo sets of personality domains as predictors, targeted only at unaware participants.However, neither model was significant [Fs < 1.8, ps > .17].
Models containing anxiety ratings were also non-significant [Fs < 1].
5.4.2.4 Transfer discriminationRegression models were computed separately for RI and RR discrimination index (CS+ -CS-), and split by Awareness and Training due to their significant effects at the group level(see section 5.4.1.4 above). No model was significant [Fs < 3.0, ps > .07].
However, due to the success of the VI10 schedule in producing a significant facilitation ofCS+ RI above S±, appetitive RI transfer-effect scores (CS+ - S±) were used as the dependentvariable in a further set of regression analyses. Models were again non-significant [Fs <1.3, ps > .35]. In contrast, comparable analyses using appetitive RR transfer-effect scoresfound, in aware appetitively trained participants, that a model containing the four TCIdomains was significant [R2 = .87, F(4,8) = 6.26, p = .014], after the removal of one outlier(std res > 2; model was non-significant before removal [F(4,9) = 1.97, p = .18]), with NS thesole significant contributor [β = -.70, p = .016]. Exploration of this result by regressingeither CS+ or S± RR on NS found neither model to be significant [Fs < 1].
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5.5 DiscussionThe primary aim of the current experiment was to test whether an appetitive stimuluscould increase a separately trained response, if the task engendered sufficiently low levelsof baseline responding, rather than simply allowing a non-appetitive stimulus to decreasethe response. Such a positive transfer effect was achieved, in that there was a significantincrease in the number of trials where a response was initiated in the presence of areward-predictive stimulus compared to a non-predictive stimulus. In the group ofparticipants aware of the CS-US contingency, this result was obtained regardless ofwhether the instrumental response was partially punished. In contrast, the unaware groupdisplayed positive transfer only when aversive training conditions had been experienced.To describe this effect as general transfer may, however, be premature, as the same groupof unaware participants also showed increased expectancy of winning under reward-predictive cue conditions, thus questioning their categorisation as unaware.
The experiment was also designed to scrutinise the evaluative conditioning effect seen inthe previous studies, by measuring stimulus valence prior to conditioning. EC was robustin the aware group, showing change over time as well as stimulus differences post-conditioning. Tentative support for EC in the unaware group was obtained, in that anincrease in CS+ rating was observed over time, but differences between the CS+ and theother CSs after conditioning was less strong than in the previous experiments.
The study also sought to replicate the positive relationship between Neuroticism andpropositional discriminative learning found in the previous two experiments. No evidencewas found for such a relationship in the current cohort. However, an exploratoryinvestigation discovered that Novelty-Seeking negatively predicted the facilitatorytransfer effect, albeit only in aware participants trained under appetitive conditions.
The success of the VI10 schedule in eliciting a positive transfer effect in aware participantsaccords with previous studies that have used similar interval schedules to similar effect(Colwill & Rescorla, 1988, 1990; Holland, 2004; Lovibond, 1983; Talmi et al., 2008; Tricket al., 2011). The finding that manipulation of a VR schedule had no effect on transfer alsoaccords with the unstable PIT effects demonstrated when using ratio schedules (Lovibond,1981, 1983). The lack of effect on PIT of aversive training also supplements an experimentby Lovibond (1981) that found a PIT effect despite the transfer phase being conductedunder signalled extinction. In the current experiment the transfer phase was conductedunder signalled punishment, for half the cohort, yet an appetitive PIT effect was still
80
observed. Thus despite potential response futility, as was the case for Lovibond, or risk, aswas the case here, an appetitive stimulus was still able to increase responding.
Such concordance lends support to the notion of the S having its effect on behaviour via anexpectation of the O (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth et al.,2007), in that an S carrying an expectancy of an appetitive O was able to override an Rengendering expectancies of a neutral or negative O. This interpretation is made morecomplicated by the similarity of results, in the aware group, for pleasantness ratings andresponse initiation, in that both follow a linear pattern through CS+, S±, CS-, thus anyattribution of behavioural results to expectancy could be confounded by emotion.However, the RI PIT effect demonstrated by the ostensibly unaware group experiencingaversive training is in better accord with their transfer expectancy ratings than their CSpleasantness ratings, in that there was a significant and marginal effect of S for RI andtransfer expectancy, respectively, yet a non-significant effect of CS for pleasantness. Thusthe overall pattern of data better support an explanation of appetitive PIT here in terms ofexpectancy than emotion. Such a summation is tentative, however, due to the quasi-experimental nature of these findings.
However, facilitatory PIT was confined to RI; only inhibitory PIT was seen in RR. Thisprovides an intriguing dissociation between the two assays. While the pattern of RIbehaviour better fits expectancy ratings, the pattern of RR is in better agreement withanxiety ratings, in that the CS- was rated as more anxiety-provoking than the other CSs,and provoked fewer responses per trial than the other CSs. Thus the anxiety-laden CS-elicited an avoidance response, manifested primarily in RR. The dissociation of these twobehavioural variables is corroborated by experiments that have explicitly parsed reward-seeking into distal and proximal responses by using an instrumental response chain,where pressing one lever gives rise to a second lever, and pressing this second lever givesrise to a reward (Balleine, 1992; Balleine, Garner, Gonzalez, & Dickinson, 1995; Corbit &Balleine, 2003). These studies showed that distal responses were sensitive to changes in Oexpectancy, whereas proximal responses were sensitive to changes in S value. To theextent that the variables of RI and RR used in the current experiment can be considereddistal and proximal to reward, their differential reactions to CSs may therefore beattributable to their differing sensitivity to O expectancy versus S emotional value.
Such an assertion would predict, however, that a facilitatory effect should be seen in RR aswell as RI, which was not the case here. On the one hand this may be due to the
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comparatively weak influence of evoked pleasantness, compared to anxiety, on behaviour,allowing only CS- anxiety to influence responding. Indeed, the purported general PITdescribed by Nadler et al (2011) was seen only when using aversive Ss, which the authorsattribute to the greater emotional significance attributed to aversive rather thanappetitive outcomes. Alternatively, participants may have tried to 'maximise', that is pressconsistently to ensure reward, rather than 'match', that is press in line with perceivedinstrumental contingencies (Hinson & Staddon, 1983; Wolford, Newman, Miller, & Wig,2004). Thus if participants had initiated a response to the S± they would execute thatresponse in the same manner as their response to the CS+, as such a strategy wouldmaximise the number of rewards gained.
If the emotional explanation is correct then introducing an objectively aversive element toPavlovian training may further encourage differential responding; if the maximisingexplanation is correct then ensuring that participants have sufficient experience of the50% instrumental contingency may encourage matching, as maximising is no moreoptimal than matching when contingency equals 50% (Wolford et al., 2004). This latterend may be better served by reverting to a purely appetitive instrumental contingency, asthe partially aversive contingency introduced here caused a reduction in transferexpectancy ratings to below 50%. Additionally, more participants were excluded from theaversive group than the appetitive group due to lack of reward during instrumentaltraining, thus the aversive manipulation should be removed from future studies.
The introduction of pre-conditioning evaluative ratings may also have been problematic.Differentiation between each CS was reduced in both aware and unaware groups,compared to Experiment 2, to the extent that the CS effect became non-significant in theunaware group. While this baseline rating session was intended to clarify unaware EC, itsinfluence on aware participants' ratings suggests that it may have confounded it instead.Presentation of the CSs prior to conditioning may have caused latent inhibition (Lubow &Moore, 1959), and although the two presentations of each CS would ordinarily be too lowto elicit such an effect (Lubow, 1973), the addition of the rating questions may havecaused each CS's emotional value to be consolidated at a neutral point. Whereas awareparticipants may be able to re-consolidate their judgements with propositional knowledgeof the CS→US association, unaware participants' EC may be insufficiently intense tomanipulate their ratings (Alberini, 2005). The fact that the unaware group showed achange in CS+ rating over time suggests that some degree of EC did occur, but that thebaseline rating phase changed the manner in which such EC was expressed. Moreover, the
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fact that the various CSs were rated as non-significantly different before conditioningsupports the demonstration of unaware EC in the previous two experiments by removingthe confound of pre-conditioning differences.
Less consistent across studies has been the association of Neuroticism with discriminativelearning; positive correlations in the first two experiments were not repeated in this thirdexperiment. This may also have been due to the baseline evaluative rating sessioninterfering with learning, but could also be explained as being due to the multifacetednature of the N factor. It may be that one of its six facets is primarily responsible for N'srelationship with learning, but that the facet's relationship with N has differed acrossdifferent cohorts. Indeed, the relationship between NEO factors and addiction containsnuanced information at the facet level that is lost at the factor level (Ruiz et al., 2003;Terracciano & Costa, 2004), thus future analysis at the lower-order level may elucidate theinfluence of N on discriminative learning. Further studies may also investigate theconsistency of the suppressive effect of Novelty-Seeking on cue-potentiated RR found inthe current study. The direction of the relationship runs contrary to that predicted byCloninger (1987; Cloninger et al., 1994), who attributes NS with a role in approach toreward cues, whereas the reduction in RR here is more in keeping with an avoidanceresponse.
Finally, although the current experiment finds again that expectancy awareness is
necessary for the control of behaviour by separately trained reward-paired cues, it doesnot attest to whether it is sufficient. It may be that knowledge of the O coupled with an ECRis required, alternatively an expectancy representation alone may be all that is needed toinfluence reward-seeking. Future research should attempt to isolate the sensory aspects ofan O by manipulating the level of emotional response elicited by an S in order to addressthese propositions.
In conclusion, it was found that a stimulus paired with reward was able to increase, and astimulus paired with non-reward was able to decrease, a separately trained instrumentalresponse. Effects of the stimuli on behaviour, whether facilitatory or inhibitory, onlyoccurred in groups showing an expectancy of the relevant outcome. Facilitation was onlyapparent in the frequency of response initiation, rather than response rate, which atteststo the dissociable effects of a cue's predictive versus emotional properties. Inter-individualvariation in the facilitation of response rate was negatively predicted by Novelty-Seeking,a result which runs contrary to the domain's theoretical grounding and so will require
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further investigation. The use of a partially aversive instrumental training schedule did notinfluence the stimulus effect on responding, but instead had a more general suppressiveeffect on response rate, to the extent that it reduced the number of rewards earned duringtraining. Subsequent investigation should attempt to experimentally manipulate CSemotional value to dissociate its effects on behaviour from outcome expectancy.
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6 Single-response PIT with counter-conditioning
6.1 Abstract
Background – Experiment three provided further support for the necessary status ofreward expectation in mediating PIT. But whether expectancy is sufficient, or whether itinteracts with emotion, requires experimental manipulation.
Aims - Thus the aim of this fourth experiment was to investigate whether reducing thehedonic value of a reward-paired cue would bring about changes in PIT. It also sought tounderstand the inconsistent effect of personality on aspects of the PIT paradigm bytargeting analyses at lower-order traits.
Methods – 68 participants completed a PIT task with a counter-conditioning procedure.The Pavlovian phase associated two visual CSs with either winning nothing or 50 pence,respectively. Then one group underwent a counter-conditioning manipulation where thereward-predictive cue was paired with unpleasant pictures, whereas another groupserved as control. An instrumental phase trained participants to make a single button-pressing response to win 50p. The transfer phase measured the change in instrumentalresponding after presentation of either CS, and whether any influence on responding wasimparted by the counter-conditioning phase.
Results – 28 participants developed expectancy awareness after Pavlovian training. Allgroups liked the 50p CS more than the other CSs after Pavlovian training, but counter-conditioning reduced this 50p CS liking. In transfer, the aware group experiencingaversive counter-conditioning showed an abolition of facilitatory PIT in the presence ofthe 50p CS, while the control group showed maintenance of such facilitatory PIT. Facet-level personality regression models found that negative-affect traits predicted levels ofexpectancy awareness, whereas positive-affect traits predicted the magnitude of CShedonic value attribution and reward-cue potentiation of response rate.
Conclusions – Both expectancy and emotion are necessary for cue-potentiatedinstrumental responding. Hedonic value of a reward-paired cue influences instrumentalresponses that are closest to reward delivery, but not those that are further away fromreward delivery. Predispositions to negative-affect facilitate the development of rewardexpectation, whereas predispositions to positive-affect facilitate hedonic reactions, whenencountering reward-paired cues.
6.2 IntroductionExperiment 3 confirmed that an expectation of reward is necessary for conditioned stimulito moderate a separately trained instrumental response. This is consistent with
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experiments 1 & 2, as well as a large body of extant literature arguing for the necessarystatus of such cognitive processes in reward-seeking (Bolles, 1972; de Wit & Dickinson,2009; Hogarth et al., 2007; Hogarth & Duka, 2006). However, complementary theories ofthe role of conditioned stimuli in reward-seeking propose that the emotional andmotivational responses elicited by such stimuli exert an additional influence on behaviour(Berridge, 2000; Bindra, 1974; Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Toates, 1986). In support, thepresent set of experiments has found indirect evidence for the moderation of cue-potentiated behaviour by emotional conditioned responses, but have been unable todissociate expectancy from emotion. The interactive effects of these two psychologicalprocesses on cue-potentiated reward-seeking therefore remain unclear.
The majority of investigations into the moderating role of conditioned responses onstimulus-elicited reward-seeking have manipulated the hedonic value of the reward itself,rather than that of its conditioned stimulus (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Hogarth, 2012;Holland, 2004). While changes in O value can be reflected in changes in S value (Berridge,2000; M. Field et al., 2004; Toates, 1986), different behavioural paradigms aredifferentially sensitive to such changes. For example, Dickinson & Dawson (1987) trainedrats to associate one S with sucrose and another S with pellets, before the rats learned thatpressing a single lever earned both sucrose and pellets. Following devaluation of pelletsthrough satiety the authors found that instrumental responding was reduced in thepresence of the pellet S compared to the sucrose S, arguing that such an effectdemonstrated sensitivity to the changed O value.
However, in a series of similar experiments, Holland (2004) showed that althoughbaseline instrumental responding was sensitive to O value, facilitation of the R byseparately trained Ss was unaffected by O devaluation. Holland also showed that as Ovalue became less influential on baseline responding, S effects became more influential,suggestive of a shift in behavioural control from O value to S value. Thus the disparatefindings of Dickinson & Dawson and Holland may be explained by their two paradigmsbeing differentially sensitive to S value.
Such a hypothesis may be tested by directly altering the hedonic value of the reward-paired S through the process of counter-conditioning (CC, Baeyens et al., 1989; Dickinson& Pearce, 1977). After pairing an initially neutral CS with an appetitive US, the CS is thenpaired with a US of opposite valence to the original. Although the initial appetitive pairingis successful in increasing the liking attributed to the CS, the subsequent aversive pairing
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is able to abolish or even reverse this emotional conditioned response (Hollands,Prestwich, & Marteau, 2011; Kerkhof, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2011; VanGucht et al., 2010). CC has a lasting effect on evaluative ratings of CSs (Kerkhof et al.,2011), and has been shown to reduce consumption of appetitive food (Hollands et al.,2011; Van Gucht et al., 2010).
However, the mediation of the effects of CC on behaviour by CS hedonic value may beconfounded by the effects of CC on US expectancy, in that CC studies so far either confirmthat US expectancy tracks CS emotional value (Van Gucht et al., 2010), or are unable tofalsify such a claim (Baeyens et al., 1989; Kerkhof et al., 2011). Thus a technique to deliverCC while dissociating its effects on expectancy from emotion is required. Such a techniquemay be informed by the finding that changes in context have dissociable effects on cue-elicited expectancy and emotion (Van Gucht et al., 2013). Using an ABA context shiftdesign, where appetitive conditioning occurred in context A, followed by CC in context B, itwas demonstrated that a return to context A renewed US expectancy but did not renew CSliking. Thus expectancy appears sensitive to contextual changes, whereas ECRs are lesssensitive to such shifts. Conducting any CC in a session distinct from that of the rest of anexperiment may therefore allow for changes in CS liking that are dissociated from changesin US expectancy.
While the context in which CC is conducted appears less influential on its success, thedirection of valence change may be more influential in whether changes in EC areexpressed. Greater consistency of effect has been shown when reversing an originallyappetitive CS compared to an originally aversive CS (Baeyens et al., 1989; Dickinson &Pearce, 1977; Stevenson, Boakes, & Wilson, 2000), thus attempting to reduce thepleasantness of a reward-predictive CS may be more effective than reducing the anxietyattributed to a reward-absence predictive CS. Additionally, indirect evidence suggests thatany behavioural effect of manipulating CS pleasantness may manifest itself in responsesproximal rather than distal to reward (Balleine, 1992; Balleine et al., 1995; Corbit &Balleine, 2003). Using instrumental response chains, where a series of separate responsesis required for reward, Balleine and colleagues showed that presentation of a reward-paired CS only influenced responses closer to the end of the instrumental chain. Thus CCeffects on instrumental responding would be expected to be detected in response ratemore than response initiation.
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Moreover, personality factors associated with addiction risk have been shown to have agreater effect on proximal rather than distal drug-seeking. A relationship betweenpositive-affective traits and substance misuse has been documented for multiple drugs(Cloninger, 1987; Ruiz et al., 2003; Terracciano & Costa, 2004). A possible explanation forthis association is provided by Hogarth (Hogarth, 2011) who finds that non-planningimpulsivity influences nicotine consumption, a proximal response, but does not alternicotine seeking, a distal response. This corroborates the finding of a relationship betweenNovelty-Seeking and cue-potentiated response rate in the previous experiment, as NScontains facets pertaining to aspects of impulsivity (Cloninger et al., 1994), warrantingdetailed examination of the influence of NS on cue-potentiated instrumental responding.
In light of these converging data, the present experiment was devised to test whetherreducing the positive emotional value of a reward-predictive stimulus would bring aboutconcomitant reductions in response rate under conditions of cue-potentiated instrumentalbehaviour. It also sought to replicate the association between Novelty-Seeking and cue-potentiated response rate found in the previous experiment, and to obtain a more detailedunderstanding of this relationship at the facet level.
6.3 Method
6.3.1 ParticipantsParticipants were 68 University of Sussex students (23 males and 45 females) with a meanage of 19.3 years (range 18-27). Other participant details were as General Methods.
6.3.2 MaterialsAll phases used the same materials as described in General Methods. The addition of theCC phase brought with it 12 aversive and 36 neutral images taken from the InternationalAffective Picture System Database (IAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). Pictures wereselected to ensure a balance of images depicting humans, due to the potential for humanscenes to elicit greater attention. Figure 6.3.2.1 displays exemplar images; list of full setcan be found in Appendices, section 10.1.2. According to the IAPS database, which ratedvalence (unpleasant – pleasant) and arousal (unarousing – arousing) on a 9-point Likertscale, the aversive set had a mean valence of 1.97 (SD = .034) and arousal of 5.83 (SD =0.82), whereas the neutral set had a mean valence of 5.01 (SD = .036) and arousal of 2.82(SD = 0.56). Aversive and neutral sets differed significantly on both valence and arousal[ps < .001].
Figure 6.3.2.1. Images used during counter
and neutral [right] exemplars.
Note that images were displayed in colour to participants.Images were displayed at the same size and resolution as Pavlovian CSs,resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixelstask used the left and right arrow keys, of a different keyboard from that used in Pavloviantraining, labelled yellow to highlight their activation.
6.3.3 Design & Procedure
6.3.3.1 Counter-conditioningAfter giving their postthey experienced theneutral or aversive conditions, though allocation was constrained to ensure genderbalance. The phase began wit
In this task you will see pairs of pictures. After each pair has been presented you will be askedto press an arrow key to indicate which picture you recognise. Press the left arrow if you haveseen the picture on the left beright before. You should respond as quickly as possible after the question has appeared. Pressthe spacebar to start.
Trials then started with a black fixation cross, positioned centrally onfollowed by a stimulus pair of duration 5s. One image was always a Pavlovian CS, the otherwas an IAPS picture. Stimuli were presented sidescreen, with a gap of 1cm between them.the Pavlovian phase were designed to emphasise the change in context from Pavlovian to
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-conditioning manipulation, showing aversive [left]
, as specified in General Methods. Responses during the CC
-Pavlovian emotion ratings, participants took a 1min break beforecounter-conditioning phase. They were randomly allocated to either
h the following instructions:
fore. Press the right arrow if you have seen the picture on the
-by-side, in the vertical centre of theThese differences in presentation compared to
10.2 cm2 at a
a grey screen, for 1s,
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CC. The question "Which picture have you seen before?" then appeared below the stimulifor 2.5s, during which time participants responded using the labelled arrow keys. Thisresponse requirement was designed to encourage participants to view both images, ratherthan avoiding any potentially aversive pictures. Trials ended with a grey screen ofduration 1s before the next began.
There were 36 trials in total, thus 12 trials each of CS+, CS±, CS- (the two CS± werepresented 6 times each). A different IAPS picture was used in each trial, though this wasnot communicated to participants. Order of presentation was random, horizontal positionof CS, and association of CS category (CS+, CS±, CS-) with specific neutral images, wascounterbalanced. Those assigned to the neutral condition saw all CSs paired with neutralphotographs, those in the aversive condition saw the CS+ paired with aversive images, yetthe other CSs were paired with neutral images.
Upon completion of the final trial participants took a further 1min break, beforecompleting a second evaluative rating session. This second session began with theinstruction:
In a moment you will perform a different task where you can win money. But first pleaseanswer some questions about the pictures you have seen. Press the spacebar to start.
The purpose of the break between CC and second rating session, and making reference towinning money, was to change the context again to better match the transfer phase, toensure that participants' responses were not specific to the CC context. The rest of therating session continued as had that of the first, described in General Methods.
6.3.4 Statistical analysesThe CC procedure was piloted in a small sample before use in the main study to test itseffectiveness. This pilot confirmed the method's suitability by showing a completeabolition of differential pleasantness ratings, between all CSs (see Appendices, section10.1.2 for details).
Data were collected until 32 participants displayed expectancy awareness, as per GeneralMethods, but analysis of the full 68 participants' instrumental training data found that 6failed to receive positive reinforcement in training. These 6 participants were excludedfrom all analyses.
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To quantify the effectiveness of the CC procedure a 'CC-effect' score was calculated as thechange in CS+ pleasantness rating from post-Pavlovian to post-CC (Pavlovian – CC). Thismeasure was used as the outcome variable in a regression model to investigate themoderating role of personality in the CC procedure.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Group-level analyses
6.4.1.1 Expectancy awarenessOf the remaining 62 participants, 28 (45%) were classified as aware (14 males andfemales), 19 (31%) unaware (5 males and 14 females), with 15 (24%) falling outsideeither category. These 15 non-classified participants were excluded from further analysis,leaving 47. Aware and unaware groups did not differ significantly in terms of age [t < 1] orgender [χ2(1) = 2.64, p = .104].
Both groups' expectancy data from the final block of Pavlovian training were in keepingwith their individual classifications. Mean expectancy rating from the final block of thePavlovian phase are presented in Figure 6.4.1.1.
Figure 6.4.1.1. Mean expectancy rating of winning 50p after presentation of each CS for aware
and unaware groups in the final block of the Pavlovian phase.
Line at 5 indicates rating of 'don't know'; error bars represent 95%CI; CS+, Pavlovian CS
predictive of 50p; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothingA mixed ANOVA of final block expectancy ratings with CS and Awareness as factorsshowed significant CS and CS*Awareness effects [Fs(1,45) > 849, ps < .001]. The
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interaction was followed with separate t-tests for each group, comparing each CS rating to5; the aware group's ratings differed significantly from 5 [ts(27) > 38.6, ps < .001] whilethe unaware group's did not [ts(18) < 1.93, ps > .069].
6.4.1.2 Evaluative conditioningAfter removing the 6 participants excluded for later non-reinforcement of instrumentalresponding, the neutral and aversive CC group contained 12 and 16 aware participants,respectively, with 10 and 9 unaware participants, respectively. These differences in groupnumbers were non-significant [χ2(1) = .434, p = .510].
While there was little effect on pleasantness ratings of neutral CC, aware participants inthe aversive CC group showed a reduction of CS+ ratings to levels comparable to the CS±.Figure 6.4.1.2 shows mean pleasantness ratings for each group at each time-point.
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Figure 6.4.1.2. Mean pleasantness rating for each Pavlovian CS according to valence of
counter-conditioning stimuli encountered, separated by timepoint [left/right] and awareness
[top/bottom].
Error bars represent 95%CI. * CS+ > CS± [ps < .039, uncorrected], ^ CS+ = CS± [p = .253,
uncorrected]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; CS±, Pavlovian CS non-predictive; CS-,
Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing.A mixed ANOVA of pleasantness ratings, with CS, Time (post-Pavlovian, post-CC),Awareness and CC (neutral, aversive) as factors, found only a main effect of CS [F(2,86) =22.8, p < .001], with post-hoc comparisons finding CS+ ratings to be significantly higherthan CS± and CS- ratings (CS+ > CS± = CS-; ps < .001).
However, to provide a more powerful analysis of the effects of CC, RM t-tests targeting thedifference between CS+ and CS± at each level of Awareness, CC, and Time were run. Post-Pavlovian CS+ ratings were significantly higher than CS± for aware groups regardless ofsubsequent CC allocation, and for the unaware group in the neutral CC allocation [ts > 2.72,
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ps < .018, uncorrected] (for the unaware group in the aversive CC allocation t(8) = 1.60, p =.149). In contrast, post-CC ratings were significantly higher for CS+ than CS± in unawaregroups regardless of CC experience, and for the aware group experiencing neutral CC [ts >2.47, ps < .038, uncorrected]. The aware group experiencing aversive CC was the onlygroup to show a non-significant difference between CS+ and CS± at this final rating session[t(15) = 1.19, p = .253].
Due to the aversive nature of the CC manipulation, CS anxiety ratings were scrutinised inthe same manner as pleasantness ratings. The ANOVA, with CS, Time, Awareness and CC asfactors, reported only an interaction between Time and CC [F(1,43) = 4.68, p = .036]. Thiswas followed by independent-groups t-tests on overall anxiety ratings (collapsing CS andAwareness) comparing each CC group, separately for each time-point. These revealed non-significant differences between CC groups at both timepoints [ts(45) < 1.24, ps > .22].When conducting the same targeted contrasts as per pleasantness ratings, comparing CS+to CS± anxiety rating, all tests were non-significant [ts < 1.05, ps > .324].
6.4.1.3 Instrumental trainingParticipants learned the instrumental response regardless of Awareness or CC allocation.
Figure 6.4.1.3. Number of wins and response initiation during instrumental training for aware
and unaware groups experiencing either neutral or aversive counter-conditioning.
Error bars represent 95%CI.Figure 6.4.1.3 & Figure 6.4.1.4 contain mean values of reinforcements, RI, and RR duringinstrumental training according to CC and Awareness groups.
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Figure 6.4.1.3. Number of wins and response initiation during instrumental training for aware
and unaware groups experiencing either neutral or aversive counter-conditioning.
Error bars represent 95%CI.A factorial ANOVA of number of reinforcements gained was conducted, with Awarenessand CC as factors, and found non-significant differences throughout [Fs < 1]. MixedANOVAs were run with Awareness, CC, and Block (1-4) as factors, separately for RI andRR. For RI these revealed non-significant effects [Fs < 1]. For RR there was again an effectof Block [F(2.03,87.1) = 107, p < .001] explained by block 1 having a lower RR than 2―4 [ps < .001]; no other effects attained statistical significance [Fs < 2.85, ps > .074].
Figure 6.4.1.4. Response rate for aware [left] and unaware [right] groups experiencing either
neutral or aversive counter-conditioning during each block of instrumental training.
* block 1 < blocks 2―4 [ps < .001]; error bars represent 95%CI. 
6.4.1.4 Transfer
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Transfer of conditioned responses from the Pavlovian stimuli onto the instrumentalresponse was seen only in the aware group. However, this transfer effect was reduced inthe RR of aware participants in the aversive CC group.
A series of mixed ANOVAs was run for RI and RR, with Awareness, CC, Stimulus (CS+, S±,CS-) and Block (1, 2) as factors.
6.4.1.4.1 Response initiationThe omnibus ANOVA revealed significant effects of Stimulus, Block, and theStimulus*Awareness interaction [Fs > 13.3, ps < .001]. The interaction was followed byseparate RM ANOVAs for each awareness group, with Stimulus and Block as factors. Theseshowed main effects of Stimulus and Block in the aware group [Fs > 8.58, ps < .007], withpost-hoc comparisons finding all levels of Stimulus to differ significantly (CS+ > S± > CS-,
ps < .007), and an effect of Block in the unaware group [F(1,18) = 7.74, p = .012]. SeeFigure 6.4.1.5 for mean RI. Planned contrasts of CS+ versus S± RI for each of the four grouppermutations, Block collapsed, confirmed significant differences for both aware groups [ts> 2.94, ps < .011], and non-significant differences for both unaware groups [ts < 1].
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Figure 6.4.1.5. Mean response initiation (%) during transfer for each stimulus, separated by
block, counter-conditioning group[left/right], and awareness[top/bottom].
* CS+ > S± > CS- [ps < .007]; ^ block 1 > block 2 [ps < .012]; CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±,
grey squares from instrumental training; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing;
error bars represent 95% CI.
6.4.1.4.2 Response rateThe omnibus ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Stimulus and Block, andinteractions of Stimulus*Awareness and CC*Awareness. The interactions were exploredwith mixed ANOVAs, containing CC, Stimulus and Block as factors, separately for eachawareness group. These revealed, in the aware group only, main effects of all three factors[Fs > 7.42, ps < .012], with post-hoc comparisons showing the Stimulus effect to be due toCS- RR being lower than CS+ and S± [ps < .024]. Figure 6.4.1.6 presents RR at each factorlevel.
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Figure 6.4.1.6. Mean response rate for each stimulus during transfer, shown separately for
counter-conditioning (CC) group, awareness [top/bottom] and block [left/right].
Error bars represent 95%CI. * CS+ > S± (block collapsed) [p = .038, one-tailed], ^ CS+ = S±
(block collapsed) [p = .212, one-tailed], £ neutral CC > aversive CC [p = .004], $ block 1 > block 2
[p = .011]. CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey squares from instrumental training; CS-,
Pavlovian CS predictive of winning nothing.Although the ANOVA in aware participants found no evidence for a differential effect of CCon PIT, i.e. there was no CC*Stimulus interaction, planned contrasts indicated that aversiveCC had suppressed CS+ PIT. 1 further participant in the neutral group was removed fromthis planned analysis due to them reporting anomalous transfer behaviour1. Similar to thecontrasts performed for pleasantness ratings (see Section 6.4.1.2), RM t-tests weretargeted at aware participants of each CC group, comparing CS+ to S± RR, Block collapsed.
1 This participant reported, during a debriefing session, that their strategy during the transferphase had been to "press less when the [CS+] appeared, because it meant you'd already won". Allother participants reported pressing more during CS+ trials, because it was more likely that theywould win. Removing this participant from the main analyses did not change the pattern of results.
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These confirmed a significant increase in CS+ RR within the neutral group [t(10) = 2.27, p= .047], yet a non-significant increase within the aversive group [t(15) = .820, p = .425].
6.4.1.5 Transfer expectancyA mixed ANOVA on expectancy of winning during transfer was conducted with Stimulus(CS+, S±, CS±, CS-), Awareness, and CC as factors. It revealed main effects of Stimulus andCC [Fs > 5.72, ps < .022], qualified by a Stimulus*Awareness interaction [F(3,129) = 11.4, p< .001]. The interaction was followed with separate ANOVAs for aware and unawaregroups, with Stimulus and CC as factors. In aware participants this found a main effect ofStimulus only [F(3, 78) = 44.6, p < .001], explained with post-hoc comparisons as due toCS+ > S± = CS± > CS- [ps < .011]. Effects were non-significant in unaware participants.Table 6.4.1.1 contains mean expectancy ratings during transfer.
Table 6.4.1.1. Mean (95%CI) expectancy of winning during transfer as a function of awareness,
counter-conditioning, and stimulus. StimulusCC CS+ S± CS± CS-Aware* Neutral 83.4(10.1) 42.9(13.9) 33.5(10.4) 17.1(10.2)Aversive 79.6(8.74) 33.1(12.1) 48.1(9.00) 27.8(8.85)Unaware Neutral 46.3(11.1) 38.8(15.3) 42.5(11.4) 31.2(11.2)Aversive 56.5(11.7) 52.5(16.1) 43.1(12.0) 45.3(11.8)
Note: * CS+ > S± = CS± > CS- [ps < .011]. CS+, Pavlovian CS predictive of 50p; S±, grey squares
from instrumental training; CS±, Pavlovian CS non-predictive; CS-, Pavlovian CS predictive of
winning nothing.
6.4.2 Role of personality in PIT
6.4.2.1 Awareness classificationTo investigate whether awareness categorisation could be predicted by personality,separate logistic regression analyses were run for the NEO and TCI with their respectivedomains as predictors and Awareness as the outcome. For the NEO, the model was non-significant [χ2(5) = 7.37, p = .195]. However, due to the relationship between N and speedof awareness, found in the previous studies, a second analysis was conducted targeted atthe six facets of N. This second model was a significant predictor of Awareness [χ2(6) =16.6, p = .011], correctly classifying 72% of participants, with Vulnerability the onlyvariable contributing significantly to the model [Exp(B) = 1.16, p = .014]. For the TCI, theinitial model incorporating its four domains was non-significant [χ2(4) = 3.70, p = .45].However, a second model including only the four facets of HA was significant [χ2(4) = 13.4,
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p = .010], correctly classifying 70% of participants, with Shyness and Anticipatory-Anxietythe only significant predictors [Exps(B) > 1.10, ps < .033].
Finally, to assess their relative contributions, the three significant facets from the NEO andTCI were combined within one model. The overall model was significant [χ2(3) = 13.3, p =.004], correctly classifying 70% of participants, but Vulnerability was the only significantpredictor [Exp(B) = 1.09, p = .035]. Table 6.4.2.1 contains parameter estimates for each ofthe three facets entered into the final regression equation.
Table 6.4.2.1. Parameter estimates (95%CI) of negative-affect facets predictive of Awareness
classification included in logistic regression model.Predictor B Exp(B) pVulnerability* 0.09(0.08) 1.09(0.08) .035Anticipatory-Anxiety 0.01(0.08) 1.01(0.08) .771Shyness 0.04(0.08) 1.04(0.09) .333Constant* -6.60(4.83) .007
Note: R2 = .21 (Hosmer Jr & Lemeshow, 2004), Model χ2(3) = 13.3, p = .004; * p < .05; awareness
coded higher.
6.4.2.2 Expectancy discriminationIn addition to their ability to dichotomise participants, personality domains were alsoentered into multiple regression analyses with CS expectancy discrimination as theoutcome to assess their moderating influence on awareness (in aware participants only).For the NEO, the equation containing all five factors was non-significant [F(5,22) = 1.34, p= .29]. However, a subsequent model focussing on facets of N was a significant predictor ofCS discrimination [R2 = .49, F(6,21) = 3.33, p = .018]. Of the six facets included, onlyHostility accounted for unique variance [β = .64, p = .004]. Similarly for the TCI, the modelcontaining its four domains was non-significant [F(4,23) = 0.97, p = .44]. But again, asecond model including only the four facets of HA was significant [R2 = .41, F(4,23) = 3.99,
p = .013], with Fear of Uncertainty and Fatigue contributing significantly to the model [β =.56, p = .040; β = -.50, p = .020, respectively].
Finally, the three uniquely contributing facets from the NEO and TCI were combined inone analysis, which provided a significant model [F(3,24) = 8.98, p < .001], with all threepredictors explaining unique variance in CS discrimination (Table 6.4.2.2 containsindividual coefficients).
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Table 6.4.2.2. Regression coefficients (95%CI) of personality facets predicting CS expectancy
discrimination.Predictor B β p Hostility* 0.07(0.05) .46 .006Fear of Uncertainty* 0.09(0.06) .52 .009Fatigue* -0.07(0.06) -.46 .014Constant 1.39(3.02) .353
Note: R2 = .53, p < .001; * ps < .05.
6.4.2.3 Evaluative conditioning
6.4.2.3.1 Appetitive conditioningSimilar to the expectancy discrimination analysis, regression models were created withthe factors of the NEO or TCI as predictors of pleasantness discrimination (CS+ - CS-) afterPavlovian conditioning. Data from both awareness groups were combined due to the non-significant effect of awareness on emotional ratings after Pavlovian training (see section6.4.1.2 above). Using the NEO, a model containing its five factors was significant [R2 = .23,
F(5,41) = 2.48, p = .047], with E and C being the only two significant predictors [βs > .40, ps< .014]. Table 6.4.2.3 displays equation coefficients for the five factors. To investigate thespecific contributions of these two factors, separate models for each were run with theirrespective six facets; both models were non-significant [Fs < 1.26, ps > .29]. For the TCI,neither a model containing its four domains, nor the four facets of NS, was significant [Fs <1.25, ps > .31].
Table 6.4.2.3. Regression coefficients (95%CI) of NEO factors predictive of CS pleasantness
rating discrimination after Pavlovian training.Predictor B β p Neuroticism 0.05(0.07) .19 .182Extraversion* 0.10(0.08) .40 .012Openness 0.03(0.08) .10 .548Agreeableness 0.02(0.10) .04 .781Conscientiousness* 0.12(0.10) .41 .014Constant -11.9(11.9) .051
Note: R2 = .23, p = .047; * p < .05. CS discrimination = CS+ - CS-.
6.4.2.3.2 Counter-conditioningDue to the relationship between post-CC pleasantness ratings and transfer RR (refer tosection Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found.), thepotential moderating role of personality on these two measures was assessed in a similar
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manner to Pavlovian phase CS discrimination (see section 6.4.2.4 below for transferdiscrimination). Post-CC CS pleasantness discrimination index was the outcome variable,with either the NEO or TCI main factors as predictors. This analysis was again targeted ataware participants assigned to neutral CC conditions. For the NEO the model was non-significant [F = 1.98, p = .22]. However, for the TCI, a model containing its four domainswas significant [R2 = .76, F(4,7) = 5.64, p = .024], with NS the only significant independentpredictor [β = .92, p = .006]. To explore this relationship further the four facets of NS wereentered as predictors, revealing a significant model [R2 = .79, F(4,7) = 6.71, p = .015] withImpulsiveness as the only significant contributor to the equation [β = .48, p = .046] (seeTable 6.4.2.4 for regression coefficients of all four facets).
Table 6.4.2.4. Regression coefficients of Novelty-Seeking facets predictive of CS pleasantness
discrimination post-counter-conditioning, for aware participants assigned to neutral counter-
conditioning.Predictor B β p Exploratory-Excitability 0.08(0.11) .31 .158Impulsiveness* 0.17(0.17) .48 .046Extravagance 0.02(0.12) .07 .764Disorderliness 0.13(0.18) .40 .141Constant -16.9(9.05) .003
Note: R2 = .79, p = .015; * p < .05. CS discrimination = CS+ - CS-.To identify individuals most susceptible to the counter-conditioning procedure, multiplerepression analyses were run with CC-effect (CS+ change) as the outcome variable and thefactors of the NEO or TCI as predictors. This analysis was targeted at aware participants inthe aversive CC condition as they were the only group to show any effect of the CCmanipulation. For the NEO, the model was non-significant [F < 1]. Exploratory analysestargeting the facets of either N (due to the aversive nature of CC) or E (due to itsrelationship with EC above) were similarly non-significant [Fs < 1.30, ps > .35]. In contrast,inputting the four domains of the TCI resulted in a significant overall model [R2 = .56,
F(4,11) = 3.48, p = .045], with NS the only significant individual predictor [β = .86, p =.004]. A subsequent model with the four facets of NS revealed that Extravagancecontributed most strongly to this relationship [β = .62, p = .018] (see Table 6.4.2.5 forequation coefficients of the four facets2).
2 This pattern of relationship was similar when inputting Pavlovian CS+ rating into the model, thusremoving the confound of regression to the mean.
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Table 6.4.2.5. Regression coefficients (95%CI) of Novelty-Seeking facets predictive of counter-
conditioning effect, for aware participants assigned to aversive counter-conditioning.Predictor B β p Exploratory-Excitability -0.02(0.10) -.09 .679Impulsiveness 0.06(0.10) .29 .214Extravagance* 0.13(0.10) .62 .018Disorderliness 0.01(0.11) .03 .875Constant -7.55(7.23) .042
Note: R2 = .56, p = .045; * p < .05. Counter-conditioning effect = CS+ pleasantness rating post-
Pavlovian - post-counter-conditioning.
6.4.2.4 Transfer discriminationExploration of the moderating role of personality on transfer behaviour was againfocussed on aware participants in the neutral CC group, due to there being no reliabletransfer effect in other groups. Moreover, RR was taken as the sole outcome measure, asopposed to RI, due to its significant correlation with emotional discrimination (refer tosection Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found.), andthe lack of relationship involving RI in the previous studies. Separate regressions were runwith the TCI and NEO super-factors as predictors, and RR transfer discrimination (CS+ -CS-) as the outcome variable. Neither questionnaire produced a significant model [Fs < 1].
However, due to the emphasis of the present study to appetitive responding, and Novelty-Seeking facets' relationship to appetitive emotion found above, their relationship with CS+facilitation, as opposed to CS discrimination, of RR was explored. Thus the cue-potentiation effect (CS+ - S±) was used as the outcome variable predicted by the four NSfacets. After removal of one participant who reported anomalous transfer behaviour (thesame participant removed in the behavioural analysis of section 6.4.1.4.2 above), thismodel approached significance [R2 = .66, F(4,6) = 3.42, p = .087], with Impulsiveness thesole significant contributor [β = .87, p = .016].
6.5 DiscussionThe current study was designed to test whether reward expectancy is sufficient forreward-paired cues to augment instrumental responding, or whether an emotionalresponse to the cue is also necessary. It employed a counter-conditioning procedure toreduce the emotional value of a reward-paired CS, while leaving its predictive valueunchanged, and measured whether such a manipulation would influence the ability of theCS to augment a separately trained instrumental response. Tentative evidence was
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obtained in support of the necessary status of CS-elicited emotion in cue-potentiatedbehaviour, in that the counter-conditioning procedure reduced liking of a reward cue,reduced responding in the presence of the cue, but did not affect the perceived predictivequality of the cue. These effects of counter-conditioning were statistically weak, however,and so require support from replication.
The study also set out to explain variation in the magnitude of cue-potentiated behaviourthrough its association with novelty-seeking traits. Tentative support was found forImpulsiveness to positively predict the rise in response rate above baseline uponpresentation of the reward-paired cue. Moreover, Impulsiveness, Extravagance, andExtraversion were associated with related measures of the subjective emotional responseto the cue, providing parallel evidence for the moderation of instrumental responding byaffective processes.
Additionally, targeting the relationship between negative-affect traits and propositionallearning of the CS-US associations revealed that multiple facets were able to predict levelsof awareness. This held for both the dichotomous classification of participants as eitherunaware or aware, explained by Vulnerability, as well as the degree to which eachpredictive CS was differentiated, associated with Hostility, Uncertainty, and [negatively]Fatigue.
While some theories have championed the sufficiency of such propositional discriminationin cue-potentiated reward seeking (Bolles, 1972; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009), and othershave emphasised the sufficiency of subjective responses to cues (Bindra, 1974; Robinson& Berridge, 1993), the finding here of an interaction between O expectation and CSemotion provides experimental evidence of the bridge between the two (Toates, 1986).The fact that participants with differential expectancies, yet non-differential emotions,showed minimal differential behaviour (aware aversive group), and participants with non-differential expectancies, yet differential emotions, also showed minimal differentialbehaviour (unaware groups), provides a double dissociation between the measures of CS-elicited expectancy and emotion. The fact that neither of these groups displayed cue-potentiated behaviour attests to the necessary status of both O expectancy and S emotionin the influence of reward-paired cues on reward-seeking.
The confirmation that the manipulation of cued emotion affected only the proximalbehaviour of RR, and did not influence the comparatively distal behaviour of RI, provides
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support for the findings that CSs have their greatest effect on responses closest to rewarddelivery (Balleine, 1992; Balleine et al., 1995; Corbit & Balleine, 2003). Furthermore, themanifest relationship here between trait Impulsiveness and cue-facilitation of RRcorroborates the greater influence of impulsivity on nicotine consumption compared tonicotine seeking, again, a proximal versus distal behaviour (Hogarth, 2011). Morespecifically, Balleine and colleagues find that proximal behaviours are sensitive toexperiencing an S but not an O, whereas the reverse holds for distal behaviours.Additionally, Hogarth finds that trait impulsivity reduces the influence of O value onproximal responding. Relatedly, the current experiment finds, indirectly, that the trait
increases the influence of S value on proximal responding. Although impulsivity is anebulous concept (Caswell, Morgan, & Duka, 2013b; Evenden, 1999), both the constructused here and that used by Hogarth concentrates on the aspect of the trait concerned withdisregard for future consequences, which may be reduced to insensitivity to O value. Whilethe differing foci of these experiments precludes definitive comparison, they allude to anexplanation of cue-potentiated reward-seeking in terms of its increased sensitivity to Semotional value, reduced sensitivity to O expected value, and mediation of the relativebalance between the two by impulsivity.
However, before the results of the present experiment are assimilated with this extantliterature, subtleties in the data should be noted. Firstly, cue-attributed pleasantnessdifferences between neutral and aversive CC groups were detected only through plannedcontrasts; the interaction between CC group and Stimulus was non-significant. Thus theeffect of CC, although statistically significant with the support of sensitive tests, wascomparatively weak. This may have been due to the comparatively low number of CCtrials, coupled with a reduction in the number of participants aware of the aversivecontingency operating in CC. Although the current design used a greater number of CCpairings than have been used previously (Baeyens et al., 1989; Kerkhof et al., 2011; VanGucht et al., 2013; Van Gucht et al., 2010), the proportion of CC trials relative to acquisitiontrials was considerably lower. It may have been, therefore, that the acquisition of CSemotional valence was comparatively well consolidated (Alberini, 2005), and that anychange in valence would have required a greater number of CC pairings. It may beprudent, therefore, for future studies to make use of CC that has already occurred in thenatural environment. An example of this may be found in the addition of health warningsto cigarette packets. Smokers will have experienced numerous acquisition pairings of thepacket itself with nicotine reward, but will more recently have had CC pairings of thepacket with unpleasant images. To the extent that smokers now find the packet less
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pleasant, or even unpleasant, they may present a germane population in which to applythe effects of CC.
Nevertheless, robust abolition of CS-potentiated RR was shown here in a non-dependentsample, thus while the subjective effects of CC could have been more pronounced, theobjective effects were well evidenced. However, this conclusion is made more tentative bythe inconsistent CS-potentiated RR shown by the neutral CC group, in that one participantwas excluded for expressing a transfer strategy that was at odds with all others. This needfor removal may have been compounded by the low number of participants in this groupreducing the power of the analysis, as four had to be excluded for non-reinforcement intraining. But while there may be circumstances under which CS emotion can beoverridden by 'higher-order' strategies, the general behaviour of aware participants in theneutral group was to display positive transfer.
The proposal that impulsivity moderates the relationship between cue-augmentedemotion and behaviour also requires expansion. CS pleasantness discrimination wasassociated with Impulsiveness, and Impulsiveness predicted CS+ RR-effect, but the directlink between CS pleasantness discrimination and CS+ RR-effect was non-significant, thusprecluding a direct test of the mediating effect of Impulsiveness on this relationship.However, there was a direct association between CS pleasantness discrimination and CSRR-discrimination, indicating a linear association between emotion and one measure ofresponding, with Impulsiveness being related to another measure of responding. Coupledwith the necessary status of emotion in responding found here, and the published reportsof impulsivity's relationship to drug-taking (Caswell, Morgan, & Duka, 2013a; Evenden,1999; Hogarth, 2011), the current data provide the basis for parallel research into theeffects of impulsivity on reward-seeking in terms of its influence on cued emotion.However, the direct effect of CS-elicited emotion in drug-seeking populations, such as thesmokers used by Hogarth, remains unclear, thus research should characterise the generalbehavioural processes before involving individual differences.
More robust is the association between Neuroticism and awareness. The first two studiesin this series were supportive of its facilitatory influence, whereas the third found noevidence. This fourth study finds that there is indeed a facilitatory effect of N, and explainsthe lack of effect from the previous experiment as due to its effect being located at thefacet level, rather than the factor level, which the last study did not delve into. The positiveresult from the first two studies may have been due to their factor level scores being more
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heavily influenced by relevant facets than the third study. Initially this may contradictprevious assertions that negative affect traits are negatively related to reward learning(Avila et al., 1999; Corr et al., 1995), but as the current task contained both rewarded andnon-rewarded trials it may have been that participants concentrated on the CS-, and soperceived the task as an aversive learning paradigm. The finding that Vulnerability wasthe only predictor of awareness classification has face validity, in that this facet assessesan individual's ability to concentrate under pressure, but the relationship betweenHostility and CS discrimination is less intuitive, and will require further study.
In summary, the current experiment finds tentative evidence that reducing the appetitiveemotional reaction to a reward-predictive cue causes a reduction in response rate whenthe cue is encountered in an instrumental situation, but only in participants who expect toreceive the reward. It therefore appears that both expectations of reward and appetitiveemotional responses are necessary for cues to potentiate reward-seeking behaviour. Suchprocesses may be applicable to nicotine seeking, where reward-predictive cues such ascigarette packets have become aversive due to their superposition with health warnings.Thus whether the current results generalise to such a naturalistic situation should beinvestigated.
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7 Naturalistic PITAn edited version of this chapter is in preparation for the journal Nicotine & TobaccoResearch
7.1 Abstract
Background – the preceding experiments culminated in showing that both expectancy andemotion are necessary to influence reward-seeking behaviour, but whether these resultstranslate to the pursuit of addictive drugs requires testing.
Aims – The current study was designed to parse the relative effects of cue-inducedemotion, motivation, and expectation, on cigarette-seeking behaviour, to assess whetherthe emotional connotations of cigarette cues could influence behaviour.
Methods – 16 smokers gave subjective emotional ratings of images of people smoking,cigarette health warnings, or control images. They then learned an instrumental bar-pressing response to receive cigarettes, before the effect of the various images oninstrumental responding was tested in extinction. Participants were asked to rate theircigarette craving before responding during test. After the extinction test, participantsrated their expectancy of winning cigarettes in the presence of each image.
Results – the smoker group rated health-warning images as less pleasant, more anxiety-provoking, less crave-inducing, but equally likely to predict cigarettes, compared to a non-cigarette-related image. Their response rate after viewing the smoking, warning, orcontrol images better resembled expectancy ratings than emotional or motivationalratings. Furthermore, expectancy ratings correlated positively with response rate forhealth-warning trials.Conclusions – cue-induced cigarette-seeking is controlled solely by an expectation ofreward, emotional and motivational responses do not play a role. Thus addiction may becharacterised by the usurping of drug-seeking by expectancy of reward, at the expense ofthe emotional or motivational properties of drug-predictive stimuli.
7.2 IntroductionThe previous experiment suggested that a positive emotional response to a cue wasnecessary for the cue to potentiate reward seeking. Similar effects have been reportedelsewhere (Hollands et al., 2011; Van Gucht et al., 2010), thus corroborating theimportance of emotional processes in reward seeking. However, these confirmatoryreports used either money or food as rewards, whereas theories of addiction question theimportance of affective reactions in cue-elicited behaviour directed towards drugs of
108
abuse (Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Robinson & Berridge, 1993). It therefore remains to bedemonstrated whether the necessary status of cue-induced emotion translates to theaddictive drug scene.
While these theories converge on the necessary status of the drug-paired cue in elicitingdrug-seeking (Berridge, 2000), they propose that the transition from drug use to drugabuse is characterised by a progressive decoupling of hedonic reactions from resultantbehaviour. Where they diverge from each other is in the involvement of any subjectiveresponse to a cue. On the one hand, Robinson & Berridge (1993) argue that addiction ischaracterised by the dissociation of motivational processes from emotional processes,with drug intake controlled by how much it is wanted, rather than how much it is liked. Onthe other, Everitt & Robbins (2005) propose that addiction is a pathological form of habitlearning, where the cue initiates a response directly, leaving no room for either subjectivemotivational or emotional processes.
Research on cigarette use opposes habit theory, and supports the dissociation of wantingand liking, in that smoking cues can induce subjective reactions of craving andpleasantness, but only craving correlates with subsequent nicotine seeking. Thus thedegree to which cues influence behaviour is explained by individual differences in nicotinevalue, represented by craving, which would not be predicted by habit theory (Brian L.Carter & Tiffany, 1999; Hogarth et al., 2010). However, while cigarette use may not beinfluenced by cue pleasantness, it may be influenced by cue aversiveness. For example,Volchan et al (Volchan et al., 2013) demonstrated that the health warning pictures foundon cigarette packets produced a cigarette avoidance response, manifested as a slowing inapproach to the pack, with the perceived aversiveness of the picture correlating withresponse times. Yet the direction of this effect is questioned by Bargh and colleagues(Earp, Dill, Harris, Ackerman, & Bargh, 2013; Harris, Pierce, & Bargh, in press) who reportthat no-smoking signs, which may be considered aversive by smokers due to themputatively being a CS-, speed reactions to cigarette stimuli, and that exposure to healthwarnings increases later cigarette use.
Thus while aversive nicotine cues have been demonstrated to have some effect, thedirection of effect is unclear, as is the mechanism of effect. Although Volchan et al findconfirmatory evidence for an emotional process mediating their results, they did notrecord cue-induced craving, and so are not able to rule out a greater influence of amotivational process. Indeed, the authors report greater aversive ratings in females, with
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other data showing females to be more susceptible to cue-induced craving (M. Field &Duka, 2004). Similarly, although Bargh and colleagues used ostensibly aversive stimuli,they did not measure their participants’ perceptions of the stimuli, thus they may not havebeen aversive at all. Indeed, the authors argue that the facilitation of smoking behaviourwas dependent on an ‘ironic process’ whereby the instructed suppression of cigarettethoughts in fact increased their accessibility, thus priming nicotine seeking (Newman,Duff, & Baumeister, 1997; Wegner, 1994). Such an explanation parallels expectancy-basedtheories of cue-potentiated drug seeking (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth et al., 2013),where an S activates the identity of its associated O, which in turn activates an R which isinstrumental in gaining the O. Thus the results of all three studies may be better explainedby the nicotine-paired cues eliciting [or not] an expectation of nicotine reward, with anyemotional process merely a corollary.
To pick apart these competing explanations, the current study was designed to parse therelative effects of cue-induced emotion, motivation, and expectation, on cigarette-seekingbehaviour. To combine the need for real-world applicability with experimental control, itused the health warnings currently used on British cigarette packets as stimuli, but trainedsmokers on a novel cigarette-seeking response. Furthermore, this new instrumentalresponse was trained in the absence of the stimuli, and the critical assay of cue-potentiated behaviour conducted in extinction, thus evoking conditions similar to the PITprocedure used in the current series. These methods ensured that any effect of the stimulion behaviour occurred via their influence on emotion, motivation, or expectation, whileprecluding an explanation in terms of habit (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Robert A. Rescorla& Solomon, 1967).
7.3 Method
7.3.1 ParticipantsParticipants were 16 University of Sussex students (8 males and females) who reportedsmoking at least 5 cigarettes per day. However, one female participant was excluded dueto her not receiving positive reinforcement during instrumental training. The remainingparticipants had a mean age of 21.7 (range 19 – 31); cohort smoking information isdisplayed in Table 7.3.1.1. A series of t-test on each of the smoking variables, comparingthe effect of Gender, were non-significant [ts < 1]. Other details were as General Methods.
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Table 7.3.1.1. Cohort smoking information. Mean SD Min MaxYears since smoking uptake 6.03 2.73 2 14Cigarettes per day 9.00 3.78 5 20Minutes since last cigarette 79.3 228 10 900FTND Total 3.13 1.73 0 6
Note: FTND, Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence; see Materials for further details of
questionnaire.
7.3.2 Materials
7.3.2.1 Behavioural tasksNine images were used in the experiment. Two depicted a person smoking (one male onefemale), two depicted a person holding a pen in their mouth (the same people as for thesmoking images), two were cigarette health warnings (lung cancer and throat cancer), twowere visually similar to the health warnings but were not smoking-related (two cups and ascarf), the final image was a grey rectangle (see Figure 7.3.2.1 for exemplars). Pen imageswere designed to be smoking control images, cup and scarf images were used as healthwarning control images. All images contained text to appear visually similar to UKcigarette packets. Number of syllables was matched between smoking or warning imagesand their respective controls. Smoking and pen pictures were taken from a set used byHogarth et al (2010), health warnings were taken from UK cigarette packets, healthwarning control pictures were custom made. All images were presented at a size of 84mmwide x 118mm high at a resolution of 320 x 410 pixels.
Figure 7.3.2.1. Examples of images used to measure naturalistic transfer.
Note that images were displayed in colour.All phases recorded responses using a QWERTY keyboard. Number keys and arrow keyswere labelled green and yellow, respectively, to highlight their use in the tasks.Throughout the experiment to the left and right of the keyboard was a metal box (height
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23 mm, width 190 mm, depth 90mm) with its lid open. Inside the left box were 20cigarettes of the participant's preferred brand. The right box was initially empty, but waslabelled with “Your cigarette box”.
7.3.2.2 Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence (FTND)The FTND (Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker, & Fagerstrom, 1991) is a self-rated six itemquestionnaire that asks raters about the situations in which they smoke. Possible scoresrange from 0-10, split into tertiles representing low (0-3), medium (4-6), or high (7-10)dependence. See Appendices, section 10.2 for full questionnaire.
7.3.3 Design & Procedure
7.3.3.1 Pavlovian trainingThere was no Pavlovian phase in this experiment as images had already been associatedwith cigarettes in the participants' daily lives.
7.3.3.2 Emotional evaluationsThe experiment began with evaluative ratings of the nine images. Emotional evaluationsasked the same questions of pleasantness and anxiety as detailed in General Methods.However, each picture was separated by a 30s countdown screen to ensure that anyextreme emotional response had decayed before presentation of the next image.
7.3.3.3 Instrumental trainingUpon completion of the evaluative ratings, participants were asked to call theexperimenter, who loaded the following instructions onto the screen:
In this session, by pressing the spacebar multiple times, you will sometimes win half acigarette and sometimes lose half a cigarette. Let the experimenter know when you are readyto begin.
After reading the instructions the participant began the first block of instrumental trainingwith the experimenter present. After the first block the experimenter re-iterated theinstructions before leaving the experimental cubicle. Details were identical to that ofGeneral Methods, save for the following alterations. Rather than winning moneyparticipants won half a cigarette. The VR2 schedule was changed to a win/loss with 50%contingency, to ensure that the grey rectangle was not associated with a net win of
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cigarettes. The VI10 schedule with 18.5s response window remained the same. The totalnumber of trials remained the same, with four blocks of ten trials.
7.3.3.4 Naturalistic transferOnce instrumental training had been completed participants saw the following instructionscreen:
Now you will continue to earn cigarettes as before, but you will only be told how many at theend of the session. Sometimes the pictures you saw earlier will be presented. After seeing eachpicture you will be asked how much of an urge you have for a cigarette. You should answerthis question as quickly and accurately as possible. You will then be able to earn cigarettes bypressing the spacebar as before. After this two digits will appear on the screen, one after theother. You will be asked whether the second digit was higher than, lower than, or the same as,the first. Press enter to continue.
Pressing 'enter' launched six trials that were designed to present a smooth transition intothe naturalistic transfer phase. These trials contained only grey images, and responseswere not recorded to allow for errors, but were otherwise identical to the ensuing fulltransfer phase.
The main transfer trials continued in a similar manner to that detailed in General Methods.However, images were displayed for 5s to allow extra time to read the accompanying text.A cigarette craving question, taken from Hogarth et al (2010), was inserted between imagedisplay and instrumental response opportunity, in the form: "How strong is your urge fora cigarette? Press a number key between 1 and 9 to indicate the strength of your urge. 1 =No urge 9 = Strong urge." This questioned remained on screen for 4s to ensure that thegap between image and response was identical across participants. The 18.5s responsewindow remained the same, after which a numerical distracter task was added to the endof each trial to allow any subjective effects of the images to decay before the next trial. Acentral fixation dot appeared for 1s, followed by a random single digit integer, a 0.5s blankscreen, and then another random single digit integer. Participants were then asked: "Wasthe second digit higher than, lower than, or the same as, the first? Press the 'up' arrow if itwas higher, Press the 'down' arrow if it was lower, Press the 'right' arrow if it was thesame." The transfer phase was divided into three blocks of twenty trials. Images from eachcategory, i.e. smoking, pen, warning, control, grey, were presented four times per block.
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7.3.3.5 Post-transfer outcome-expectancyPost-transfer expectancy ratings were as General Methods, presenting all nine imagesfrom the current collection.
7.3.3.6 FTNDThe session ended with participants completing the FTND.
7.3.4 Statistical analysesPreliminary analyses of the evaluative ratings of each picture confirmed that each wasconsistent [ps > .06] within its respective set – appetitive (smoking), control (bothsmoking control and health warning control), aversive (health warning) - therefore allsubsequent analyses contained the three picture sets plus the grey stimulus.
A power calculation, based on the RR transfer discrimination index (CS+ - CS-) displayedby the neutral group of the previous study, indicated that 11 participants would besufficient to find a stimulus effect in the current experiment. This n was derived usingG*Power statistical software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with parameters of
d = 0.97, α = .05, β = .8.
However, due to the ~10% rate of exclusion demonstrated in previous studies, caused byparticipants not learning the instrumental response, and the potential loss of powerresultant from including four levels of stimulus here, the number of participants wasincreased to 16. Additionally, planned contrasts of appetitive/aversive versus grey stimuliwere employed throughout subsequent analyses, to concentrate results on theoreticallymeaningful comparisons. Such contrasts were selected to represent cue-potentiatedeffects, with the grey stimulus level representing 'baseline' due to its non-predictiveassociation with reward.
To further define the relationships between the subjective and objective variablesrecorded, correlations were run between smoking experience variables (i.e. those in Table7.3.1.1) and the planned contrasts above (i.e. cue-potentiation effects, calculated asappetitive/aversive - grey). Additionally, correlations were run within these plannedcontrasts, between subjective cue-potentiation effects, i.e. pleasantness, anxiety, craving,expectancy, and behavioural cue-potentiation effects, i.e. RI, RR.
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Although gender was not the primary concern of the current experiment, due to thesignificant gender differences found in previous studies of cue-induced subjectiveresponses, ANOVAs included gender as an independent variable.
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7.4 Results
7.4.1 Group-level analyses
7.4.1.1 Evaluative ratingsThe pattern of pleasantness ratings for the pictorial cues accorded with their categoryassignment. A mixed ANOVA with Stimulus (appetitive, blank, control, aversive) and Time(pre-, post-experiment) as within-subjects factors, and Gender as the between-subjectsfactor, found only a main effect of Stimulus [F(3,42) = 41.7, p < .001]. Post-hoccomparisons revealed this effect as due to the aversive category being significantly lowerthan all others [ps < .001]. The planned contrast found appetitive ratings to be significantlyhigher than grey [F(1,13) = 5.39, p = .037].
Anxiety ratings also followed their respective categories. The mixed ANOVA revealed amain effect of Stimulus, and a Stimulus*Time interaction [Fs > 4.49, ps < .025]. Theinteraction was followed by separate RM ANOVAs for each time-point, with Stimulus asthe only factor. The main effect of Stimulus was significant at both time-points [Fs > 12.4,
ps < .001], with the aversive set evoking more anxiety than all others [ps < .036]. Theplanned contrast of appetitive versus grey (time collapsed) was non-significant [p = .14].Figure 7.4.1.1 displays mean emotional ratings for each stimulus category at each time.
Figure 7.4.1.1. Mean evaluative ratings of pictorial cues pre- and post-experiment.
App, appetitive image category; Av, aversive image category; Grey, grey square from
instrumental training; exp, experiment; * Av ≠ App/Grey/Control [ps < .036], ^ App > Grey [p =
.037]; error bars represent 95%CI.
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7.4.1.2 Instrumental trainingAll participants learned to press at a rate sufficient to receive reinforcement, both positiveand punishment. Mixed ANOVAs of both RI and RR were conducted with Block (1-4) andGender as factors. Effects were non-significant for RI [Fs < 1.33, ps > .28], while RR showeda main effect of Block [F(3,39) = 2.84, p = .050], due to block 1 being significantly lowerthan block 2 [p = .018]. A mixed ANOVA of reinforcement frequency with Reinforcement(positive, punishment) and Gender as factors showed no effects [Fs < 1]. Table 7.4.1.1contains means of RI, RR, and reinforcement frequency.
Table 7.4.1.1. Means (95%CI) of behavioural variables from instrumental training.Block1 2 3 4RI(%) 88.8(5.26) 91.3(6.85) 90.4(7.55) 90.2(6.75)RR(Hz) 1.96(0.50)* 2.58(0.51) 2.31(0.66) 2.26(0.67)Pos. reinforcement 10.8(2.46)Punishment 10.9(3.16)
Note: reinforcements are given as the mean total from the full training phase; * block 1 < block
2 [p = .018]; pos. reinforcement, positive reinforcement, RI, response initiation; RR, response
rate.
7.4.1.3 Transfer
7.4.1.3.1 Cue-induced cravingAnalysis of cue-induced craving during transfer revealed a main effect of cue, but one thatwas strongest in females (see Figure 7.4.1.2 for mean craving ratings divided by stimulusand gender, andTable 7.4.1.2 for ratings per block). A mixed ANOVA with Stimulus, Block (1-3) and Genderas factors found a main effect of Stimulus, qualified by a significant Stimulus*Genderinteraction [Fs(2.13, 27.7) > 4.04, ps < .027], and a main effect of Block [F(2,26) = 18.1, p <.001], explained through a significant linear contrast as due to a uniform increase [F(1,13)= 26.7, p < .001]. The Stimulus*Gender interaction was followed by separate RM ANOVAsfor each gender, with Stimulus as the only factor. In males, the effect was non-significant [F= 2.23, p = .12]. However, in females there was a significant main effect [F(3,18) = 11.8, p <.001], with post-hoc comparisons showing the aversive set to be significantly lower thanboth the appetitive and control set [ps < .035]. Furthermore, the planned contrasts ofappetitive/aversive versus grey (block and gender collapsed) were significant in bothcases [Fs(1,13) > 6.00, ps < .029].
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Figure 7.4.1.2. Mean cue-induced craving rating for males and females during transfer.
App, appetitive image category; Av, aversive image category; Grey, grey square from
instrumental training; * Av < App/Control [ps < .035], ^ App/Av ≠ Grey [ps < .029]; error bars 
represent 95%CI.
Table 7.4.1.2. Mean (95%CI) cue-induced craving rating at each block of transfer.Block*1 2 3Craving rating 5.02(1.22) 5.64(1.33) 6.02(1.32)
Note: * significant linear increase across blocks [p < .001].
7.4.1.3.2 Response initiationA mixed ANOVA with Stimulus, Block, and Gender as factors found no significant results[Fs < 1.63, ps > .15]. The planned contrasts were also non-significant [Fs(1,13) < 1.79, ps >.20]. Figure 7.4.1.3[left] displays mean RI for each stimulus category.
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Figure 7.4.1.3. Mean response initiation [left] and response rate [right] during transfer as a
function of stimulus.
App, appetitive image category; Av, aversive image category; Grey, grey square from
instrumental training; * App > Grey [p = .008]; error bars represent 95%CI.
7.4.1.3.3 Response rateA similar mixed ANOVA to that of RI was conducted with RR, with similarly non-significantresults [Fs < 1.19, ps > .31]. However, the planned contrasts indicated a significant increasefor appetitive versus grey trials [F(1,14) = 9.73, p = .008] (aversive versus grey was non-significant [F(1,14) = 1.46, p = .25]). See Figure 7.4.1.3[right] for RR means separated bystimulus.
7.4.1.3.4 Transfer expectancyA mixed ANOVA of expectancy ratings with Stimulus and Gender as factors revealed amain effect of Stimulus only [F(3,39) = 6.89, p = .001], with post-hoc comparisonsindicating that this effect was due to aversive ratings being significantly lower than bothappetitive and control ratings [ps < .050]. In addition, planned contrasts found a significantincrease in appetitive ratings over grey [F(1,13) = 7.14, p = .019], yet a non-significantdifference between aversive and grey [F(1,13) = 1.06, p = .32]. Figure 7.4.1.4 containsmean expectancy ratings for each stimulus.
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Figure 7.4.1.4. Mean expectancy rating of each stimulus set following transfer.
App, appetitive image category; Av, aversive image category; Grey, grey square from
instrumental training; * App > Grey [p = .019],^ Av < App/Control [ps < .050]; error bars
represent 95%CI.
7.4.2 Individual-level analyses
7.4.2.1 Role of smoking experience in PITThe only significant correlation between smoking experience scores (the variablesincluded in Table 7.3.1.1) and cue-potentiation variables (see section 7.3.4 above fordetails) was the negative relationship between FTND and the anxiety-effect of the aversivecue [r = -.69, p = .005] (see Figure 7.4.2.1 for scatterplot). Exploration of this result byrunning separate correlations between FTND and anxiety ratings of the aversive or greycues found only a significant negative relationship for the aversive cue [r = -.65, p = .009].
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Figure 7.4.2.1. Correlation between Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence Total score and
aversive cue-potentiated anxiety effect.
Linear trend-line represents r = -.69, p = .005.
7.4.2.2 Role of subjective experience in PITThe only significant correlation between the subjective and objective cue-potentiationeffects was for the aversive cue between its expectancy of winning and RR [r = .52, p =.048] (see Figure 7.4.2.2[left] for scatterplot). Exploration of this result with separatecorrelations between expectancy and RR for the aversive or grey cues found non-significant relationships [rs < .29, ps > .30].
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Figure 7.4.2.2. Correlations between aversive cue-potentiated expectancy-effect & response
rate-effect [left], and between grey trial craving & response initiation [right].
Linear trend-lines represent r = .52, p = .048 [left] and r = .68, p = .005 [right].Further exploratory analyses of the relationship between subjective and objectivemeasures, investigating appetitive, aversive, and grey cues separately, found only asignificant correlation between craving rating and RI elicited on grey stimulus trials [r =.68, p = .005] (see Figure 7.4.2.2[right] for scatterplot).
7.4.2.3 Role of personality in PIT
7.4.2.3.1 Evaluative ratingsThe five NEO factors were initially non-significant predictors of evaluative-effects(valenced cue minus grey) [Fs(5,9) < 1.3, ps > .33]. However, after the removal of oneoutlier (standardised residual > 2) a significant model predicting the pleasantness-effect ofthe aversive cue was found [R2 = .83, F(5,8) = 7.79, p = .006], with all factors except Ncontributing significantly [βs > .70, ps < .004] (see Table 7.4.2.1 for individual coefficients).To explore this result separate regressions were run with these four significant factors aspredictors of pleasantness rating of either the aversive or grey stimuli. The model for theaversive cue was non-significant [F < 1], as was that of the grey cue [F(4,9) = 2.8, p = .10].
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Table 7.4.2.1. Regression coefficients of NEO factors predicting aversive cue pleasantness-
effect.Predictor B β p Neuroticism -0.01(0.05) -0.04 .822Extraversion* 0.08(0.08) 0.77 .004Openness* 0.11(0.05) 0.87 .001Agreeableness* -0.09(0.04) -0.84 .002Conscientiousness* 0.06(0.03) 0.70 .003Constant* -9.90(4.70) .001
Note: R2 = .83, p = .006; pleasantness-effect = aversive – grey cue rating; * p < .004.
The four TCI domains were significant predictors of only the appetitive cue pleasantness-effect [R2 = .73, F(4,10) = 6.73, p = .007], with NS the only contributor [β = -.79, p = .001].This relationship was investigated with separate models regressing either appetitive orgrey cue pleasantness rating on NS; the appetitive cue model was significant [β = -.58, R2 =.33, F(1,13) = 6.52, p = .024], whereas the grey model was not [F < 1].
When using evaluative discrimination scores, the only significant model was thatregressing anxiety discrimination on NEO factors [R2 = .74, F(5,9) = 5.11, p = .017], with Nand O as significant predictors [β = .50, β = -.82, respectively, ps < .033]. This model wasexplored by separating the analyses of appetitive and aversive cue anxiety, with N and Oas predictors. Both models were significant [Rs2 > .64, Fs(2,12) > 4.23, ps < .041], althoughN was the sole significant predictor of aversive cue anxiety [β = .64, p = .016], whereas Owas the sole significant predictor of appetitive cue anxiety [β = .58, p = .020] (see Figure7.4.1.1 for scatterplots illustrating these two relationships)3.
3 A correlation was run between N and FTND, because of their common association with aversive-cue anxiety, but was non-significant [p = .70].
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Figure 7.4.2.3. Correlations between NEO personality factors and anxiety ratings of the
aversive [left] or appetitive stimulus sets [right].
Linear trend-lines represent r = .55, p = .035 [left] and r = .65, p = .009 [right].
7.4.2.3.2 Cue-potentiated cravingModels regressing the five NEO factors on craving were also non-significant for bothappetitive and aversive cues [Fs < 1.4, ps > .32]. However, after removing one outlier (stdres > 2) the model significantly predicted the appetitive cue craving-effect [R2 = .80, F(5,8)= 6.57, p = .010], with C the only significant contributor [β = .57, p = .011]. Follow-upanalyses with craving ratings of either the appetitive or grey cues regressed on C werenon-significant [Fs(1,12) < 1.1, ps > .32].
Both TCI models were initially non-significant as well. However, the removal of one outlier(std res > 2) revealed a significant model for aversive cue-potentiated craving [R2 = .70,
F(4,9) = 5.38, p = .017] explained by RD and P [βs < -.52, ps < .035] (seeTable 7.4.2.2 for full model coefficients). Subsequent models containing these twodomains as predictors of either aversive or grey cue trial craving were non-significant [Fs< 1].
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Table 7.4.2.2. Regression coefficients of TCI domains predictive of aversive cue craving-effect.Predictor B β p Novelty-Seeking -0.03(0.04) -.38 .079Harm-Avoidance -0.03(0.06) -.22 .298Reward-Dependence* -0.05(0.04) -.64 .007Persistence* -0.05(0.05) -.52 .035Constant* 7.64(5.71) .014
Note: R2 = .70, p = .017; craving-effect = aversive – grey cue rating; * p < .014.
Models predictive of craving discrimination were all non-significant [Fs < 2.0, ps > .18].
7.4.2.3.3 Cue-potentiated behaviourAgain, NEO models were not initially able to predict either RI or RR cue-effects [Fs(5,9) <2.6, ps > .10]. However, after the removal of one outlier (std res > 2) the model predictingappetitive cue-potentiation of RR was significant [R2 = .85, F(5,8) = 9.21, p = .004],comprising N, O, and C [βs > .55, ps < .011]. These three factors were taken into subsequentmodels predicting either appetitive or grey cue-related RR; neither was significant [Fs < 1].
Table 7.4.2.3. Regression coefficients of NEO factors predictive of appetitive cue response-rate-
effect.Predictor B β p Neuroticism* -0.03(0.01) -.92 .001Extraversion -0.00(0.01) -.14 .432Openness* 0.02(0.01) .55 .011Agreeableness 0.01(0.01) .21 .260Conscientiousness* 0.01(0.01) .57 .006Constant 0.17(1.17) .748
Note: R2 = .85, p = .004; response-rate-effect = appetitive – grey trial response rate; * p < .011.TCI models were non-significant for modulation effects [Fs < 1.3, ps > .34]. When analysingRR discrimination, both NEO and TCI equations were also initially non-significant [Fs < 2.3,
ps > .13]. However, the removal of one outlier (std res > 2) from the TCI model lead to asignificant effect [R2 = .67, F(4,9) = 4.62, p = .026], with HA the sole significant predictor [β= -.74, p = .006]. Follow-up analyses of this result with separate regressions including HAas the predictor of either appetitive or aversive trial RR were non-significant [Fs < 1].
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7.4.2.3.4 Expectancy ratingsNEO and TCI models were non-significant [Fs < 1].
7.5 DiscussionThe aim of the current investigation was to characterise the mechanism by which aversivesmoking-related cues influence smoking behaviour, by measuring smokers’ subjectivereactions of aversiveness, pleasantness, craving, and cigarette expectancy, as well as theirobjective reactions of cigarette-seeking, after viewing a range of naturalistic smokingstimuli. At the group level, subjective measures were broadly in line with the assignedcategory of each image. Images of people smoking were attributed higher pleasantness,craving, and expectancy ratings, whereas health-warning images were attributed higheranxiety, lower pleasantness and craving, though their expectancy ratings did not differ,compared to baseline. In contrast, behavioural measures showed only an increase inresponse rate under appetitive conditions; response initiation was unaffected by stimuluspresentation.
Further information was provided by the individual differences in smoking uptake andsubjective reactions. Fagerstrom dependence scores correlated negatively with anxietyratings of the aversive images, though only expectancy ratings predicted aversive cueresponse rate potentiation. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation betweencraving and response initiation for grey trials only. Analyses of personality traits foundthat higher Novelty-Seeking was associated with lower appetitive cue pleasantnessratings, whereas Neuroticism predicted higher aversive cue anxiety. Appetitive cueinduced craving was associated positively with Conscientiousness, whereas aversivecraving was correlated negatively with Persistence. Finally, Conscientiousness positivelypredicted appetitive cue potentiation of response rate, whereas the negative affect traits ofNeuroticism and Harm Avoidance negatively predicted response rate differences. Thepattern of data concerning personality provided further complexity, but due to theincreased potential for erroneous results stemming from the low number of participants(Maxwell, 2000) discussion shall be limited to those posited as most relevant by previousresearch.
The overall pattern of data indicates that cue-induced cigarette seeking is best explainedby the cue’s ability to elicit an expectation of reward, but not its ability to elicit emotionalreactions. If taking the appetitive cue in isolation, it is difficult to separate its effects ofpleasantness, craving, and expectancy on RR, as all show an increase, yet none are
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correlated with RR. However, concentrating on the aversive cue illuminates thedissociation of emotion and craving from cigarette seeking, and instead confirms thecoupling of expectancy with cigarette seeking. Despite evoking significantly lesspleasantness, more anxiety, and less craving, the aversive images did not significantlyinfluence behaviour. Instead, the non-significant effect on expectancy matched the non-significant effect on behaviour, and any variance in expectancy significantly explained thevariance in RR.
Such a synthesis corroborates the explanation, advocated by multiple researchers, ofaddiction as being pathologically mediated by drug expectation (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009;Hogarth et al., 2007; Hogarth & Duka, 2006). This stance argues that a drug-paired Sactivates the identity of its associated O, which necessarily activates its associated R, thusinducing drug-seeking. The value attributed to the O is represented separately, and so isnot argued to be necessary for an S→O→R process, supported here by the lack ofinfluence of cue-induced craving on RR. The present results add to this literature byfinding that the emotional value attributed to the S, as opposed to the O, is not necessaryto encourage responding either.
Thus as well as confirming expectancy-based hypotheses, the present data question themotivation-based hypothesis of incentive salience (Robinson & Berridge, 1993), as well asthe S→R-based hypothesis of habit theory (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). Incentive saliencemight predict that, if any subjective measure were to explain drug seeking, it would becraving, whereas habit theory would predict no influence at all due to the preclusion ofdirect S→R association.
However, the present results may still be aligned with existing theories of addiction. Forexample, Robinson and Berridge (1995) specify that the central mediating mechanismbetween cue and drug-seeking is unconscious wanting. Moreover, they argue that thisunconscious wanting becomes hyper-sensitised as addiction develops, and is decoupledfrom conscious representations of value such as craving. Therefore, the current data mayin fact provide partial support for this decoupling process, in that cue-potentiatedcigarette-seeking was greater than its concomitant cue-potentiated craving.
The present result that expectancy appeared sufficient to elicit cigarette seeking mayparadoxically also support unconscious drivers of addiction. Tiffany’s (1990) model ofautomatized drug-seeking proposes that the S→R association is mediated by ‘action
127
schemata’ – memory units coding reward-seeking motor sequences. These schemata runsubconsciously, and are independent of separate processes contributing to conscious drugurges. Nevertheless, they may still be sensitive to outcome expectancies. Cues signallingthe availability of cigarettes elicit faster cigarette-seeking than cues signalling non-availability (B. L. Carter & Tiffany, 2001; Juliano & Brandon, 1998). Thus cue-elicitedexpectancy of cigarettes may form an occasion-setter than primes the running of actionschemata, and so the tighter coupling of expectancy, compared to craving, with respondinghere may further support the assertion that drug seeking is controlled by automaticprocesses.
The present results also support the findings of Bargh and colleagues (Earp et al., 2013;Harris et al., in press), who showed that no-smoking signs and health warnings increasedsubsequent smoking-related behaviour. These authors explain their results in a mannerresembling expectancy theory, in that they propose that the smoking stimuli encouragedcigarette seeking by virtue of their ability to activate smoking thoughts, independent of theemotional valence of the thought-provoking stimulus. Their finding of response facilitationof health warnings, compared to the non-significant effect here, may have been due to thedifferent control conditions used. Whereas Bargh and colleagues used control stimuli thatbore no relation to smoking, thus setting a low baseline, the current experiment used agrey stimulus that may have been an occasion-setter for cigarette reward (Bouton &Swartzentruber, 1986; Holland, 1989), thus increasing ‘background’ responding. A similarexplanation may be used to compare the seemingly inhibitory effect of health warningsshown by Volchan et al (Volchan et al., 2013). This paper used no control condition at all,instead comparing brand logos with health warnings, thus it is uncertain whether reactiontimes were facilitated in one condition or inhibited in the other.
Such discordant results highlight the importance of appropriate control conditions.Whereas Bargh and colleagues’ data may apply to occasions where cigarette use is notordinarily encouraged, i.e. within a psychology experiment ostensibly not about smoking,the present findings may apply to situations where smoking-related behaviours arefacilitated (Bouton & Swartzentruber, 1986; Crombag et al., 2001). The unexpectedpattern of data obtained from the putative ‘control’ stimuli used here, resembling as it didthe appetitive condition more than the grey condition, may be similarly explained, in thatall contained elements of cigarette use, in the form of an object placed in a mouth, or a boxresembling a cigarette packet. Indeed, multiple studies report that smokers have anattentional bias to smoking relevant elements of a visual scene, with such bias manifested
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as approach of emotionally salient cues, and the degree of bias predicted by dependencestatus (Bradley, Mogg, Wright, & Field, 2003; M. Field et al., 2004; Hogarth & Duka, 2006).Thus the control stimuli may not have been appropriate for the purposes of the currentinvestigation.
Nevertheless, the grey condition appears to have filled the role of a baseline conditionsomewhat better, in that it was rated as an intermediary between appetitive and aversivestimuli in all subjective measures except anxiety, where floor effects dominated.Correlational analysis also found that grey trial craving positively predicted subsequentRI, suggesting that the value of the cigarette O impinged on the beginning of aninstrumental chain, where RI was the distal response, and RR the proximal. Such aninterpretation lends further support to the assertions of Balleine and colleagues (1992;Balleine et al., 1995; Corbit & Balleine, 2003), and Hogarth (2011), who suggest that distalresponses are more sensitive to O manipulation, whereas proximal responses are moresensitive to S manipulation. It also supports a similar dissociation of RI from RR in theprevious experiment. Where results diverge is in the mechanism through which an Sinteracts with a proximal response; the previous study found that emotional value isnecessary, whereas the current data indicate that O expectancy is sufficient. Suchdifferential findings lend support to the characterisation of addiction in terms of aprogressive loss of control of emotional factors in determining behaviour, and aconcomitant gain of control by expectancy processes (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarthet al., 2007; Hogarth & Duka, 2006).
While such a description may suggest that aversive images may become increasingly lesseffective as dependence takes hold, the reverse is that they may be more effective earlierin the addiction cycle. The finding here of a negative correlation between FTND andaversive cue anxiety attests to the possibility that those more heavily dependent were lessaffected by health warnings, but conversely that those less dependent were more affected.Although the general patterns of behavioural results was null for aversive cues within thecontext of the study, Harris et al (in press) argue that the long-term effects of healthmessages may be more apparent. Thus aversive images may have a greater effect outsidethe laboratory if targeted at those in the early stages of smoking uptake. Further targetingmay take into account individual differences in personality, with the correlations betweenN and either aversive cue anxiety, or appetitive cue RR increases, supporting previousreports of a greater effect of aversive Ss on neurotic individuals (Avila et al., 1999; Corr etal., 1995; McLaughlin & Eysenck, 1967).
129
In conclusion, the current experiment finds that the aversiveness of health warnings foundon cigarette packets does not exert a generalisable influence on cigarette-seeking. Instead,their effect may depend on their predictive relationship with cigarettes, such that thosewho associate the images with nicotine will seek cigarettes based on an expectation oftheir availability. However, those in the early stages of nicotine dependence, as well asthose with tendencies towards negative-affect, may be more susceptible to suppression ofresponding by aversive images, and so should be targeted by health campaigns.
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8 General discussion
8.1 Synopsis of results
8.1.1 Re-iteration of aimsResearch leading up to the current programme had made competing claims for the relativeroles of emotion and expectation in the control of human reward seeking. On the one hand,data supporting emotional responses to reward cues in the absence of expectancyawareness suggested that conditioned responses could occur without expectancy(Hofmann et al., 2010). One the other, studies had confirmed that instrumental responseswere only influenced by reward-paired cues if the cue elicited an expectation of reward(Hogarth et al., 2007; Hogarth & Duka, 2006). But these data supporting the necessarystatus of expectancy may have based their findings on methods that inadvertentlysuppressed emotional control of responding. Thus the current body of work was designedto facilitate the involvement of emotional processes, in order to investigate four aspects ofreward-seeking that required greater clarity:
1. The ability of the hedonic value of reward-paired cues to influence reward-seeking2. The involvement of reward expectation in the effects of reward-paired cues onreward-seeking3. The moderating role of personality in the influence of cue-elicited emotion or outcomeexpectation on reward-seeking.4. The potential changes to reward-seeking processes that occur as a result of addiction.
8.1.2 Behavioural resultsThe most consistent finding throughout the current series was the necessary status ofreward expectation in controlling cue-elicited reward seeking. Experiments 1-4 found thatdifferential instrumental responding in the presence of different conditioned-stimuli wasonly demonstrated by participants reporting expectancy awareness. Results fromExperiment 3, i.e. the display of transfer in a group originally classified as unaware, at firstappeared to question the necessary status of expectancy (refer to section 5.4.1.4). But thefact that this group held differential expectancies of winning money in the presence ofdifferent cues, as assessed immediately after the transfer phase (see section 5.4.1.5),instead supports an expectancy account of behaviour.
Less consistent, but culminating in Experiment 4, was the role of cue-induced hedonicvalue in moderating cue-elicited reward-seeking. Experiment 1 showed no evidence for
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the involvement of CS hedonic value during transfer, with responding uninfluenced by thepresence of CSs with higher or lower hedonic value relative to each other. The single-response design of experiments 2 and 3 was used to encourage transfer in unawareparticipants, where responding based on expectancy could be discounted, and so anybehavioural effects in aware participants confounded emotion with expectation. Buthaving confirmed that expectancy awareness was necessary for transfer performance,Experiment 4 manipulated the hedonic value of a CS so that the effects of emotion andexpectation could be dissociated in aware participants. This hedonic value reduction via acounter-conditioning phase brought about a stochastic response rate reduction in thetransfer phase. However, the success of the counter-conditioning manipulation wasstatistically weak, and so any conclusions drawn about the necessary status of CS hedonicvalue are suggestive rather than definitive. Thus, while reward expectation appearsnecessary for reward seeking, it may not be sufficient in all situations, with CS hedonicvalue having potential necessary status, at least under the circumstances created byExperiment 4.
But Experiment 5 limits the circumstances under which CS hedonic value may play a rolein reward-seeking. The results from this smoker population indicated that expectancy wassufficient to control cigarette-seeking. Expectancy of gaining cigarettes correlated withresponse rate during the transfer phase, and a cue that was rated as less pleasant, andmore aversive, than a non-smoking cue did not suppress responding. Therefore theinfluence of CS hedonic value appears not to extend to addiction-related behaviours,highlighting emotional processes as a candidate for identifying those functions which arepathological in addiction.
8.1.3 Personality resultsThe parallel investigation of personality moderation of the associative learning tasks usedin the current programme underlines the relevance of Extraversion and Neuroticism forreward-seeking. Extraversion was related to the evaluative discrimination of Pavloviancues in all experiments except Experiment 2, and so presents itself as a potentialmoderator of behaviour controlled by CS hedonic value. Neuroticism predictedpropositional discrimination of the Pavlovian cues in all experiments except Experiment 3,and so may impinge on a system controlling behaviour via reward expectation. Anyinfluence of these traits on behaviour appears indirect, from the current results, as thesefactors did not predict measures of transfer behaviour. Nonetheless, by providing adetailed analysis of personality traits at the facet level, Experiment 4 uncovered tentative
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evidence that Impulsiveness was a predictor of reward-cue potentiation of transferresponse rate.
Although this result involving Impulsiveness came from an exploratory analysis, thusrequiring replication under more statistically rigorous conditions, the validity andapplicability of the main findings from the series are supported by comparison with thewider reward-seeking literature.
8.2 Integration with extant literature
8.2.1 Implications for normal reward seekingThe necessary status of reward expectation in mediating cue-induced reward-seekingconcurs with a growing body of literature (Bolles, 1972; Brandon et al., 2004; Hogarth etal., 2007; Hogarth & Duka, 2006; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). Using both specific and single-response PIT designs, it was shown that expectancy awareness mediates the effects ofcues on behaviour. This result is in agreement with a number of human PIT studies thathave explicitly assessed awareness (Bray et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 2007; Talmi et al.,2008), and suggests that results from those where awareness was not explicitly assessedwere also dependent on such awareness (Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Nadler et al., 2011;Prévost et al., 2012).
But whether expectancy awareness is sufficient for PIT is questioned by the current series.In support of the sufficiency of awareness, Experiment 1 showed that an aware group ofparticipants responded equally to 10p and 50p CSs, despite attributing higher hedonicvalue to the 50p CS. This implies that CS hedonic value had no influence on behaviour,leaving only reward expectation to explain the response pattern. Relatedly, studies thathave contrasted reward value, rather than CS value, have shown similar responding forrewards that are differentially valued, but equally expected (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988;Corbit et al., 2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011).
But in opposition, Experiment 4 may have demonstrated that PIT could be abolished bymanipulation of CS hedonic value, rather than manipulation of reward hedonic value,implying that both expectancy and value representations are necessary for PIT. This CS-value-sensitive PIT result adds to the previous reports of outcome-value-sensitive PIT(Corbit et al., 2007; Dickinson & Dawson, 1987) by widening the targets amenable torevaluation from US to CS. The apparent discrepancy, either between Experiment 1 and 4
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reported here, or the devaluation insensitive versus sensitive studies reported elsewhere,is attributed to the different methodological versions of PIT used (Corbit & Balleine, 2005;de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Holland, 2004). The inclusion of multiple rewards andresponses, where a CS can cue a specific response, has been shown to be insensitive tooutcome revaluation (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Corbit et al., 2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth& Chase, 2011). In contrast, the inclusion of a single response (Dickinson & Dawson,1987), or a CS that cannot cue a specific response (Corbit et al., 2007), appears toengender outcome value sensitivity.
More specifically, it may be that single response paradigms engender sensitivity to currentoutcome value, whereas multiple response paradigms rely on learned outcome value. Forinstance, if the performing animal is allowed access to a devalued reward in the presenceof a Pavlovian cue, then instrumental responding in the presence of the cue regainssensitivity to current outcome value (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994). Thus, even in situationswhere expectancy appears sufficient for transfer, such as in Experiment 1 here, thisexpectancy may still be bound to some representation of value. Over repeated training, theanimal may shift its reliance from resource-costly goal-directed processes towardsresource-light automatic processes (Tiffany, 1990). Thus rather than re-iterativelycomputing the value of a particular outcome, if the cost of responding and benefit of theoutcome remain relatively constant, then it may be more efficient to rely on learned
associations between S→O and R→O. Contexts affording multiple responses may be especially demanding of cognitive resources, and so shift responding towards learnedvalue representations at an earlier stage in training.
It may be, therefore, that the apparent sufficiency of expectancy awareness in the displayof PIT is dependent on the test conditions. Those conditions that encourage decisionalprocesses, e.g. in the selection of possible responses, engender an S→O→R architecturewhere the sensory properties of an outcome are sufficient to prime a specific response (deWit & Dickinson, 2009; Hommel et al., 2001). The results of Experiment 1 add to thisliterature by indicating that such discriminative priming can occur in the presence ofrelatively few discriminatory signals, in that two monetary outcomes sharing a largenumber of sensory properties were able to prime specific responses.
But to suggest that expectancy is sufficient for PIT requires ‘expectancy’ to be qualified.Although it may initially be interpreted as a ‘cold’ cognitive representation, it may in factcomprise multiple dissociable aspects. As stated above, expectancy may occur in parallel
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with learned value representations. Therefore, what is necessary may be a combination ofoutcome sensory representations and [learned] outcome value representations. Reports ofthe insensitivity of specific PIT to devaluation do not necessarily mean insensitivity to
value, but rather current value. Indeed, Colwill & Rescorla (1990) reports that devaluing afood stimulus to the point that it becomes aversive does impact transfer. Therefore, atleast some aspect of hedonic value may be represented, if only the valence of reward. Thismay accord with the results of Experiment 1, where seeking of two positively valencedrewards was equally controlled by their respective CSs.
It may be, therefore, that the choice of response is governed by the sensory expectation ofan outcome, but that response execution requires facilitation by some form of outcomevalue representation. Expectancy’s role in instrumental performance may therefore bemultifaceted, coding both for the sensory target of action, and also the utility of action. The
sensory properties may prime a specific set of motor programmes, akin to the S→O→ 
stages of an S→O→R process (Hommel et al., 2001). But in order for the sequence to be completed with an ‘R’, the value component of expectancy may be required to providesufficient impetus to any primed response units for activation to occur. This suggestion issimilar that the Associative-Cyberkinetic (A-C) model put forward by de Wit & Dickinson(2009), although it adds that value components may also recruit memory systems, ratherthan relying solely on current value representations. Thus, ‘expectancy’ may be a globalterm that can be dissociated into the sensory and value components of an outcome, whichwould itself comprise aspects of response cost, and outcome benefit (Hogarth et al., 2014;Redish, 2007).
In contrast, conditions where response decisions are reduced may allow S[R→O]processes to be recruited that require expectation and CS hedonic activation. UnderS[R→O] circumstances the initial decision to respond may be governed by the identity ofthe outcome (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), i.e. sensory expectancy, but the ensuingresponse requires augmentation by the hedonic CS in order to be completed. Thusresponding is again primed by sensory expectations, similar to the A-C model, but nowadds that motor units are activated by value stemming directly from the S, rather than theO (Cabanac, 1979). This interpretation is supported by results from Experiment 4, whichdemonstrated that response initiation was unaffected by the reduction of CS hedonicvalue, but that the ensuing response rate was diminished.
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But such an explanation of single-response studies as amenable to an S[R→O] mechanismwould predict that expectancy awareness is not necessary to show a transfer effect.Although knowledge of the R→O contingency would be required to initiate aninstrumental response (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), knowledge of the S→O contingency isnot required to elicit a conditioned hedonic response (Hofmann et al., 2010). Thereforeexpectancy awareness should not affect the ability of the stimulus to augment responding.Yet unaware participants in the current series consistently failed to demonstrate transfer.They developed a conditioned hedonic response to reward-predictive stimuli, andacquired knowledge of the causal association between response and reward. Yet theirresponses in the presence of the hedonic CS were no different to those in its absence, i.e.their S[R→O] was no different to their R→O.
It may have been that the contrived nature of the experimental task inhibited hedonicreactions during transfer in unaware participants. An anecdotal observation was that anumber of unaware participants reported that the transfer phase was frustrating,confusing, or boring, whereas aware participants did not report these feelings nearly asmuch. The task may therefore have suppressed any positive emotions in unawareparticipants, more so than aware participants, and so rendered the previously hedoniceffects of the reward-paired CS null. Such a suggestion should be tested by making transfertests more stimulating.
The facilitation of positive emotion may be further enhanced by recruiting participantsscoring highly on Extraversion. In the studies which showed an effect of personality onevaluative discrimination, Extraversion was the most consistent predictor. This resultaccords with previous findings of Extraversion, and related traits of positive affect, as apredictor of appetitive responses to positively-valenced stimuli (Brunelle et al., 2004;Canli et al., 2001). This may present highly extraverted individuals as suitable candidatesfor the display of S[R→O] mediated behaviour, in that their increased hedonic response toa reward-predictive CS may encourage more consistent potentiation of responding. Such asuggestion will require further research, however, as Extraversion did not predict transferbehaviour in the current series.
Instead, the related trait of Novelty-Seeking, specifically its Impulsiveness facet, wasshown in Experiment 4 to predict cue-potentiated responding during transfer. Althoughthe predictive ability of Impulsiveness in Experiment 4 was statistically tenuous, thevalidity of the relationship is supported by its theoretical underpinning as a proxy for a
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reward-approach system (Cloninger et al., 1994), and the demonstration that traitimpulsivity interacts with instrumental responding for reward in a prior report (Hogarth,2011). Furthermore, the Excitement-Seeking facet of Extraversion has been associatedwith increased engagement in reward-seeking activities, e.g. cigarette use, alcohol use andgambling (Bagby et al., 2007; Ruiz et al., 2003; Terracciano & Costa, 2004), thushighlighting this constellation of positive-affect traits as potential moderators of behaviourcontrolled by hedonic cues.
Although the present set of results strengthen the existence of a relationship betweenExtraversion and emotion, they do not necessarily strengthen any explanation behind therelationship. At a mundane level, the finding that Extraversion predicts positive emotionmay simply support the existing definition of Extraversion as representing positiveemotion (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Although the present experimental design adds a degreeof specificity to the Extraversion definition, in that emotions were directed towardsconditioned stimuli, this cue-specific effect is already predicted by Cloninger andcolleagues (1994). Where the present set of data may add to the literature onExtraversion, and its effect on reward learning, is in the fact that awareness had littleimpact on the predictive validity of Extraversion in evaluative conditioning. This maysuggest that Extraversion has a direct effect on emotion, rather than an indirect one viapropositional processes. Previously, it could have been said that the trait imbued a greaterability to represent positive outcome expectancies. But a lack of expectancy awareness didnot ameliorate the effect of Extraversion. Thus, the trait may have its effects on reward-seeking through augmenting the value of CSs themselves, rather than the outcomes thatthey predict. Extraversion, and it’s related Novelty-Seeking traits, may therefore berelevant to the sign-tracking versus goal-tracking literature, to the extent that such adichotomy represents a propensity to attribute value to a CS versus an outcome (Flagel etal., 2009; Saunders, O'Donnell, Aurbach, & Robinson, 2014; Saunders & Robinson, 2013).
In contrast, behaviour controlled by outcome expectation may be moderated byNeuroticism and its related negative-affect traits. Neuroticism predicted the rate at whichparticipants developed propositional knowledge of the different CS contingencies, and somay facilitate expectancy-based modes of reward-seeking. This enhancement ofexpectancy awareness was consistent across the majority of experiments in the presentseries, and is supported by the extant literature (Corr et al., 1995). A direct effect ofNeuroticism on transfer behaviour was not found, though this may have been because therelationship between expectancy awareness and PIT takes a binary form, i.e.
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present/absent, thus precluding correlational analysis. But a linear effect exists betweenNeuroticism and reward-seeking in the extant literature, in the form of Neuroticism’srelationship to addiction (Bagby et al., 2007; Piedmont, 2001; Piedmont & Ciarrocchi,1999; Terracciano & Costa, 2004). Therefore Neuroticism’s prediction of expectancyawareness here may provide a mediating mechanism for the Neuroticism→addictionassociation.
Although a tentative suggestion, the involvement of Neuroticism in expectancy awareness,and so outcome prediction, suggests that its role in learning may be via prediction error(Robert A Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Due to thepropensity of Neuroticism to facilitate negative emotions (Costa & McCrae, 1992), yetcorrect predictions in a reward learning task, it may have been that higher Neuroticismelicited more negative expectancies in the early stages of Pavlovian conditioning. Thesenegative expectancies would create a larger prediction error on receipt of reward, and sofacilitate learning. Indeed, higher negative expectancies of drug outcomes are associatedwith higher drug use (Kirchner & Sayette, 2007; Lopez-Vergara et al., 2012; Martens &Gilbert, 2008). Although the most apparent explanation for this relationship is that higherdrug use offers more opportunity to experience their negative effects, it remains possiblethat negative expectancies precede drug use escalation. Future research may thereforebenefit from longitudinal analyses that follow adolescents with negative expectanciestowards drugs, and compare their rates of drug uptake with peers exhibiting less negativeattitudes prior to drug use.
But the current personality data is questionable on the grounds of its weak reliabilitythroughout the different experiments. Although the majority of experiments were inaccord with one another, Experiment 2 reported a null result for Extraversion on emotion,and Experiment 3 reported a null result for Neuroticism on awareness. Additionally, theTCI was a weaker predictor than the NEO across the range of experimental measures. Itmay be, therefore, that the context-dependent nature of personality (Munafò & Flint, 2011;Rushton, Brainerd, & Pressley, 1983; Uziel, 2015), and the poor psychometric propertiesof the questionnaires (Draycott & Kline, 1995; Gana & Trouillet, 2003; Miettunen,Lauronen, Kantojärvi, Veijola, & Joukamaa, 2008; Saggino, 2000), hampered consistentresults. To ameliorate such difficulties of reliability, it may be prudent in future to meta-analyse small studies. Relatedly, a ‘fixed-effects’ analysis was conducted on the presentdata, where each individual experiment was combined into one large dataset, whichsupported the general pattern of the individual experiments. Extraversion remained the
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only higher-order predictor of CS hedonic value, although Harm-Avoidance was added toNeuroticism in predicting expectancy awareness.
8.2.2 Implications for addictionExperiment 5 indicated that cigarette-seeking in smokers was controlled by theexpectation of cigarettes, but was not affected by the hedonic properties of a cigarette-paired CS. This hedonic insensitivity presents a contrast to Experiment 4, where a non-smoker sample was putatively sensitive to CS hedonic value, and so may represent abehavioural process that forms part of the pathology of addiction.
The control of nicotine-seeking by expectancy is corroborated elsewhere, with the findingthat cued tobacco seeking and consumption is insensitive to the devaluation of nicotine(Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth et al., 2010). The current data furthers the extant literature byadding that cued tobacco seeking is also insensitive to the hedonic value of the cue. Bargh& colleagues (Earp et al., 2013; Harris et al., in press) come to a similar expectancy-dominant conclusion with their results that no-smoking signs and health-warningadvertisements increase smoking behaviours, despite being considered aversive bysmokers.
Due to this insensitivity to emotional processes of reward-seeking, smokers may be biasedaway from S[R→O] control of behaviour, and instead towards S→O→R. They wouldtherefore be more sensitive to the contingencies that exist between smoking stimuli andnicotine than the emotional valence of the stimuli (Dickinson & Charnock, 1985; Trick etal., 2011). The fact that Experiment 5 used the health warnings currently in use on UKcigarette packets attests to the applicability of this result. If smokers see these imagessimply as CSs for nicotine, then placing these images in the wider environment may have acounter-productive effect and actually increase rates of smoking.
However, the negative correlation between Fagerstrom dependence scores and anxietyratings of the health warnings may suggest that these aversive images have an impact atthe onset of addiction, in that participants with lower dependence rated the warnings asmore aversive. Indeed, Bargh & colleagues (Earp et al., 2013; Harris et al., in press) suggestthat although the acute effect of smoking cues may be to encourage smoking, the long-term effect of health warnings may be to discourage cigarette uptake. It would beinformative to compare a group of recent smokers to more experienced smokers on tests
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of cue-induced cigarette-seeking to determine the validity of Bargh & colleagues’prediction.
Just as Experiment 5 suggested that cue-induced cigarette-seeking was insensitive to CSvalue, the experiment also suggested that cigarette-seeking was insensitive to US value, inthat cue-induced craving did not relate to instrumental responding. Craving has beenshown to track outcome value (M. Field et al., 2004; Hogarth et al., 2010), thus the lack ofrelationship between craving and seeking in Experiment 5 provides further support toprevious studies finding insensitivity to outcome devaluation in cued smoking (Hogarth,2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011).
It also questions the involvement of cue-induced motivational processes in cigaretteaddiction, thus potentially opposing Incentive Sensitisation theory (Robinson & Berridge,1993). However, rather than presenting a complete rebuttal of Incentive Sensitisation, thepresent data hint at an expansion of the theory. A central tenet of much addiction researchis that nucleus accumbens (NAc) dopamine (DA) is largely responsible for allowing cues togain salience. Combined with extant neuroscientific literature, the importance of outcomeexpectancy may extend DA’s remit in addiction to pre-frontal regions responsible foroutcome representations (Naneix, Marchand, Di Scala, Pape, & Coutureau, 2012;Takahashi et al., 2011; Winter, Dieckmann, & Schwabe, 2009). Whereas DA in theaccumbens may be critical for imbuing the CS itself with value (Wyvell & Berridge, 2000,2001), DA in the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) may be necessary for imbuing the outcomewith value (Valentin, Dickinson, & O'Doherty, 2007)}(Winter et al., 2009). Outcomedevaluation studies ascribe a central role of the OFC, in combination with amygdala nuclei(Corbit & Balleine, 2005), to integrating the sensory and value components of an outcome.Thus the OFC may provide a candidate location for coding outcome expectancies.
But rather than the NAc and OFC networks representing competing systems, one drivingbehaviour by immediate appreciation of CS salience, the other driving behaviour afterdeliberation of an action’s consequences, recent evidence suggests that the two may actsynergistically. For example, manipulating the uncertainty of reward magnitude predictedby a CS, which might be argued to rely on OFC (Takahashi et al., 2011; Tobler, O'Doherty,Dolan, & Schultz, 2007), has a corollary effect on CS value (Anselme, Robinson, & Berridge,2013): as uncertainty increases, sign-tracking also increases. It may be that as the abilityto represent outcome value is impeded, as would be the case with uncertain rewards,behaviour comes under control from CSs themselves, rather than a representation of their
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outcome. Conversely, if expectancy is facilitated, as was the case with participants scoringhighly on Neuroticism, then outcome representations may guide responding. The availableevidence relevant to addiction suggests that this latter, outcome expectancy, process iscompromised in some way. Addicts appear pre-occupied with drug CSs, and theirbehaviour is seemingly insensitive to outcome representations (Hogarth et al., 2010; Mileset al., 2003). Indeed, Robinson & Berridge (1993) argue that NAc DA is sensitised overrepeated drug exposure (Wyvell & Berridge, 2001), suggesting a progressive increase incontrol by CS value. But whether such sensitisation occurs in OFC DA release has receivedless attention. The source neurons of NAc DA, stemming from the VTA, form a networkincluding the OFC (Vázquez-Borsetti, Cortés, & Artigas, 2009). Thus OFC activity may beinvolved in NAc sensitisation, and may be sensitised itself in a feed-forward mechanism.This OFC DA sensitisation may manifest itself as an excessive incentive value beingattributed to an outcome, i.e. an excessive positive outcome expectancy, and so explain theapparent loss of value sensitivity in drug users when presented with drug cues (Hogarth,2012; Hogarth, Attwood, Bate, & Munafó, 2012). Thus reward expectancy itself may not bea problem, but rather the excessive reward expectancy that may result from chronic drugexposure. Targeting these aberrant expectancies may therefore prove useful in relapseprevention (Witkiewitz & Marlatt, 2004).
But in contrast, the present experiment did reveal a correlation between grey trial cravingand subsequent cigarette-seeking. The grey stimulus was non-predictive of cigarettereward (Robert A. Rescorla, 1967), having been equally associated with winning andlosing cigarettes, and so represented a baseline condition in the transfer phase. Previousreports corroborate the relationship between craving and cigarette-seeking under free-choice conditions (Hogarth, 2011; Hogarth et al., 2010). Therefore, the correlationbetween craving and response initiation on grey trials suggests that nicotine-seeking inthe absence of CSs is goal-directed. This may represent another avenue for preventionusing health warnings, which have been shown to devalue nicotine (Hogarth & Chase,2011), with aversive messages acting on potential smokers both to devalue nicotine anddevalue the hedonic properties of nicotine cues.
But whether the role of craving shown in Experiment 5 differs from its potential role inexperiments 1-4, i.e. whether craving effects are unique to addicts or apply to non-addictpopulations, cannot be directly addressed in the current series.
8.3 Methodological issues
141
While the inclusion of subjective ratings of craving in the earlier studies may have beeninformative, it would not be predicted to glean much additional information (Berridge,2000; M. Field et al., 2004; Toates, 1986), and may even hamper the validity of othersubjective measures (Van Gucht, Vansteenwegen, Van den Bergh, & Beckers, 2008). Innon-addict populations, ratings of CS-induced craving and pleasantness are highly coupled(Van Gucht et al., 2013; Van Gucht et al., 2010), such that changes in one are reflected bychanges in the other. Thus it is unlikely that the addition of craving ratings would haveprovided different information to pleasantness ratings. Moreover, Van Gucht & colleagues(Van Gucht et al., 2008) report that the concurrent measurement of both craving andpleasantness can interfere with the reliability of each measure, thus suggesting that one orother should be used. As experiments 1-4 were concerned with CS value, more thanreward value, it was more appropriate to measure pleasantness than craving.
An additional assumption throughout the series was that the grey stimulus encounteredduring instrumental training represented ‘baseline’ trials, and so was used in a similarmanner to inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) periods more often seen in non-human research(e.g. Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Corbit et al., 2007; Lovibond, 1981). Within the currentseries this grey stimulus generated intermediate levels of reward expectancy, similar tothe non-predictive CS from Pavlovian training, and in between the winning and non-winning CSs from Pavlovian training. Thus its use as a control for CS-potentiatedexpectancy appears justified. However, pleasantness ratings were not taken for the greystimulus, thus its suitability for CS-potentiated hedonic value may be questioned.Nonetheless, using a similar set of images, Trick & colleagues (Trick et al., 2011) show thattransfer-phase responding in the presence of the non-predictive Pavlovian CS was similarto responding in the presence of the grey stimulus. Thus although the inclusion of non-predictive Pavlovian CS trials would provide an additional control condition, results fromthis Pavlovian control condition would not be expected to differ from the grey stimuluscontrol condition.
Additional comparison to non-human paradigms provides another methodological detailthat may have influenced the present results, in the form of the temporal contiguitybetween CS and either US, in Pavlovian training, or response, in transfer. The currentseries used a trace procedure, where the CS terminated prior to the delivery of reward, oropportunity to press. This is in contrast to the delay procedure used more often in otherstudies (e.g. Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Corbit & Balleine, 2005; Crombag et al., 2008),where CS and US or response are presented concurrently. This may have the effect of
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encouraging a propositional representation of reward on presentation of the CS, at theexpense of an emotive representation (Konorski, 1967), therefore reducing the capacity ofCS hedonic value to influence behaviour. Indeed, Lovibond (1981) reports that a traceconditioning procedure with a fixed ISI was less influential in producing PIT than a traceprocedure with a variable ISI. Lovibond explains this effect as being due to the terminationof CS being a reliable predictor of reward in the fixed condition, but less so in the variablecondition. Also relevant is a study by Crombag & colleagues (Crombag et al., 2008) thatshowed a greater PIT effect when the temporal overlap of CS and US was madeincreasingly variable.
While such alterations to Pavlovian training may not have a great effect, becauseconsistent emotional responses to reward-predictive stimuli was demonstrated, using adelay procedure in the transfer phase may create suitable conditions for unawareparticipants to display transfer. Aware groups may be able to sustain the hedonic traceelicited by the CS into the transfer response window, due to them being able to activateemotional processes via US representations as well as CS presentations. But unawaregroups have only the CS presentations to elicit a hedonic response, after which the hedonictrace may fade, and so be less able to augment responding. Further study is thereforerequired to test the role of CS hedonic value on instrumental responding under delayconditions.
8.4 Future directionsWhile the current studies find that remotely trained hedonic CSs do not influence unawareparticipants' behaviour others indicate that proximally trained stimuli do impart suchinfluence (Pessiglione et al., 2008; Pessiglione et al., 2007). Pessiglione & colleagues(Pessiglione et al., 2008; Pessiglione et al., 2007) used subliminal stimulus presentation toprevent expectancy of the available outcome, and used discriminative instrumentalparadigms where the stimulus signalled the utility of a response in gaining the outcome.Thus their design allowed a direct S→R association to form, whereas the currentexperiments’ PIT design precluded such direct association. Similar to the present resultsan emotional conditioned response to the reward-paired stimulus was shown, but incontrast to the present data greater instrumental responding was also shown. Thushedonic responses in unaware individuals may influence behaviour if the stimulus hasgained direct access to the response.
143
These subliminal techniques should be converted into a PIT paradigm to measure whetherexperimental manipulation of expectancy, rather than the quasi-experimental separationused presently, will also show the lack of PIT seen in unaware participant throughout thecurrent series. Moreover, if the Pavlovian phase is conducted liminally, thus allowingexpectancy to form, whereas the transfer phase is conducted sub-liminally, thus ‘knocking-down’ expectancy, it will be possible to test the stage at which expectancy is necessary fortransfer. Robinson & Berridge (1993) argue that unconscious motivational processes drivecue-potentiated drug-seeking, thus the absence of PIT under subliminal conditions wouldtest this unconscious assertion.
If a PIT effect is seen under subliminal conditions, then this may imply that vulnerability torelapse in addicts may be amplified by being unaware of the stimulus triggering drug-seeking. Whereas those possessing knowledge of their drug-seeking triggers may be ableto use cue-exposure treatment to extinguish their effects (Conklin & Tiffany, 2002), thoseunable to identify the cause of their behaviour may be unable to implement suchstrategies. This would put them at greater risk of relapse. This may present a paradoxicalsituation, however, with an appreciation of relevant cues potentially encouragingexpectancy driven drug-procurement. Further study will be required to understand themost effective treatment strategy.
It may in fact be that unconscious versus conscious mechanisms of drug seeking areequally liable to elicit relapse. For example, work on sign-trackers versus goal trackers,putative models for addicts controlled by CS value versus US expectancy, respectively,suggests that drug seeking may be equally intractable in both populations (Flagel et al.,2009; Saunders et al., 2014). While sign trackers may be more sensitive to the primingeffects of discrete cues, goal trackers may be more sensitive to contextual cues (Saunderset al., 2014). To the extent that sign-trackers direct motivational value to the stimulus,whereas goal trackers direct motivational value to the outcome, the unaware/awaredichotomy of the current thesis may have relevance to sign- versus goal-trackers, and inturn their relevance to addiction. Unaware participants attributed emotional value to theCS+, which would in turn predict an attentional bias to the CS+ (Austin & Duka, 2010), andso may represent sign-tracking. Aware participants, on the other hand, displayed‘approach’ behaviour to the outcome, in the form of increased instrumental responding,which may constitute goal-tracking. The experimental set-up of the current seriesprecludes more specific analogies at present, but future work may wish to investigate thepotential for unaware/aware participants to provide human populations analogous to
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sign- versus goal-tracking rats. It may be that unaware individuals are more susceptible tothe relapse priming effect of discrete cues which they have imbued with incentive salience.Aware individuals, on the other hand, may be more liable to relapse in the face ofcontextual cues which provoke an expectation of drug availability.
In order to test the relevance of unaware participants to sign-tracking, it will be necessaryto better understand the mechanisms leading to unaware evaluative conditioning. Oneexplanation may be that evaluative knowledge precedes declarative knowledge. Thusunaware participants may simply be ‘slow learners’. This accords with one theory ofconsciousness which asserts that meta-cognitive processes determine consciousawareness (Cleeremans, 2014). This meta-cognitive theory proposes that animals developunconscious Pavlovian and instrumental associations, and are able to use theseassociations in limited situations, but do not become conscious of these associations untilmeta-cognitive processes are recruited to manipulate the low-level associations. Appliedto unaware participants, it may be that they develop the implicit association between CS+and reward, and so respond autonomically, but do not habitually recruit meta-cognition ofthe implicit evaluative knowledge, and so cannot respond declaratively.
However, the description of unaware participants as ‘slow learners’ is questioned by datashowing a facilitatory effect of autonomic arousal on declarative learning (Garfinkel, Seth,Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, in press; Katkin, Wiens, & Öhman, 2001; Raes & Raedt, 2011).Katkin and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that participants who show increasedsensitivity to CS-elicited autonomic arousal were better able to predict the occurrence ofshock. Moreover, Raes & Raedt (2011) showed that experimentally increasing sensitivityto interoceptive states increased learning rate. Thus, it may follow that unawareparticipants should be able to use their autonomic reactions during Pavlovianconditioning to facilitate their expectations of reward. However, the ability to accuratelysense one’s arousal, the predisposition to attend to one’s arousal, and the metacognitiveawareness of the causes of one’s arousal, have been shown to be dissociable (Garfinkel etal, in press). Unaware participants may possess accuracy, in that they ‘correctly’ attributedgreater hedonic reactions to the CS+, but again lack metacognition concerning the causes oftheir hedonic judgement. But the parallels between ‘interoceptive awareness’ andexpectancy awareness have not received attention. Therefore, further research isrequired to understand whether expectancy unaware participants are more prone to sign-tracking, whether this potential sign-tracking puts them at greater risk of relapse fromdiscrete drug-paired cues, and whether facilitating interoceptive awareness might
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facilitate expectancy awareness, which may in turn facilitate goal tracking and control bycontextual cues.
Aside from addiction, it may also be interesting to test the effects of expectancy awarenessin other clinical populations. Due to the overlapping symptoms of drug withdrawal anddepression (Harrison, Liem, & Markou, 2001), disorders characterised by a lack ofmotivation may benefit from exactly the processes that cause a problem in addicts.Whereas addiction may be controlled by excessive positive outcome expectancies(Hendershot et al., 2011), depression may be ameliorated by such expectancies. Peopleexperiencing depression demonstrate blunted anticipation of reward (Brinkmann &Franzen, 2013), and so may lack the motivation to perform many behavioural routines. Yetthe presentation of a reward-paired cue appears to elicit a response regardless of explicitvalue representations under PIT conditions (Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004). If thesame processes that encourage responding in drug seekers could be harnessed indepression, then therapies with a behavioural component may be improved. PIT has beenshown to be insensitive to serotonin manipulation in non-humans (Sanders, Hussain, Hen,& Zhuang, 2007), suggesting that SSRI’s may not prove effective in cue-potentiatedresponding. But with the discussion of cue-potentiated behaviour centred around the roleof DA, it may be prudent to understand how other pharmacological agents such as DA mayhelp depression.
8.5 ConclusionsThe current series of experiments aimed to explicate the seemingly contradictory dataconcerning the roles played in reward seeking by conditioned-stimulus-elicited emotionand outcome expectation. Reward-seeking processes were characterised in non-dependent samples, before comparing their contribution in smokers. Further data suggesta role of personality in reward-seeking behaviours, thus personality was assessed inparallel as a moderator of reward-seeking. It was shown that outcome expectation, andpotentially cue-elicited emotion, were necessary for cue-potentiated monetary-rewardseeking, yet in smokers cigarette outcome expectation was sufficient for cue-potentiatedcigarette-reward seeking; the emotional value of the conditioned-stimuli did not play arole. Moderating influences of Extraversion and Neuroticism were found for cue-elicitedemotion and outcome expectation, respectively. It is therefore proposed that theemotional properties of reward-predictive stimuli may be important for reward seeking inthe absence of addiction, whereas when addiction to reward is present control of rewardseeking can occur via reward expectation only. Furthermore, control of behaviour by
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emotion may be facilitated by Extraversion, due to its propensity towards emotionalprocesses, whereas control by expectation may be facilitated by Neuroticism, due to itsinclination towards predictive learning. Future research should test the ability of reward-predictive cues to influence reward-seeking subliminally, to test whether a cue can act onbehaviour outside of conscious awareness.
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10 Appendices
10.1 Pilot studies
10.1.1 Instrumental schedulesDue to the potential ceiling effects on transfer phase responding in Experiment 2, a pilotstudy was conducted to ascertain the most effective instrumental schedule to lowerbaseline levels of responding. Inspection of the methods used in non-human studiessuggested that the VR2 and VI2.75 schedules used in Experiment 2 were considerablylower than elsewhere in the literature (Corbit & Balleine, 2005; Crombag et al., 2008;Lovibond, 1981, 1983; Wyvell & Berridge, 2000, 2001), thus the pilot study increased bothto contrast their effects on behaviour within a human population. It also introduced anaversive outcome to instrumental responding, as such a protocol has face validity inmodels of addictive behaviour, yet has not been extensively used in a PIT paradigm.
10.1.1.1 MethodThis pilot study concentrated on an instrumental training phase. However, to ensurecircumstances representative of a PIT paradigm, it began with a Pavlovian conditioningphase similar to that detailed in General Methods. Participants were 40 undergraduatestudents (9 male, mean age 20.7) attending an international summer school at SussexUniversity. Pavlovian conditioning was as General Methods, though with only 4 blocksrather than 8 to expedite data collection.
Participants were then randomly allocated to one of five instrumental training conditions– VR2 VI2.75 (control), VR2 VI10 (VI increase), VR2 VI10 with variable response window(VI window), VR2 VI2.75 with partial aversive outcome (VR aversive), and VR4 VI2.75 (VRincrease). All schedules followed the general protocol specified in General Methods, savefor their respective response requirements. In addition, all groups except those in the VRincrease condition had only two blocks of training, both to expedite data collection and tobalance the number of rewards gained between groups. Those in the VI window conditionhad a variable response window that was on average 10s, range 1.5-18.5, rather than thefixed windows of the other conditions. This was used to represent the variable onset ofreward delivery used in other studies. The VR aversive condition replaced "You winnothing" trials with "You lose 50p", thus there was a 50% chance of either win or loss.
The entire session lasted between 30mins (for control) and 40mins (for VI increase). Thispilot study also introduced the question-mark into the "Press the button?" prompt, as well
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the blank screen upon responses initiation, as detailed in General Methods but absentfrom experiments 1&2, to emphasise to participants that responding was not mandatory.
Data were analysed separately for RI and RR using one-way ANOVAs with five levels. Thesole IV was Schedule; Block was not entered due to the different numbers between groups.Thus the DV was mean RI or RR from the entire session.
10.1.1.2 Results and conclusionAnalyses indicated that the VR aversive condition was most effective in reducing RI,whereas VI increase was most suited to lowering RR. Figure 10.1.1.1 displays mean RI[top] and RR [bottom].
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Figure 10.1.1.1. Mean response initiation [top] and response rate [bottom] as a function of
instrumental training schedule used in pilot study.
* VR aversive < all others, ps < .022.The effect of Schedule was significant for RI [F(4,35) = 5.65, p = .001], with post-hoccomparisons specifying this difference as between VR aversive and all other levels [ps <.022]. Effects were non-significant for RR [F < 1].
The aversive manipulation was demonstrably successful in lowering the number of trialswhere a response had been made, confirming its suitability for further investigations.While differences in RR were non-significant, the lowest absolute value, and smallestvariance, came from the VI increase, suggesting that this condition would prove mostsuccessful in lowering baseline responding in future studies.
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10.1.2 Counter-conditioningBecause the translation of counter-conditioning (CC) methodology (Baeyens et al., 1989;Tunstall et al., 2012; Van Gucht et al., 2010), from that used in the literature to thePavlovian protocol used in the current series, required making a number of changes, theeffectiveness of the new method in reducing pleasantness ratings of a reward-predictivecue was tested in a pilot sample.
10.1.2.1 MethodA full list of the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) images used in the CC phaseis contained in Table 10.1.2.1.
Table 10.1.2.1. List of IAPS images used during counter-conditioning.Category Name IAPS numberAversive CryingBoy 2800CryingBoy 2900MafiaHit 3010BurnVictim 3053Mutilation 3062PizzaRoaches 7380Cemetery 9220Child 9040Dirty 9300SlicedHand 9405DeadMan 9433CarAccident 9911Neutral NeutFace 2200ElderlyMan 2520Chess 2580Chess 2840Tourist 2850Shadow 2880Door/flowers 5731RollingPin 7000Basket 7010SquareBlock 7185
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ClothesRack 7217Chair 7235NeutFace 2210MaleJudge 2221OldMan 2570Woman 2620TwinMen 2890Stool 7025DustPan 7040Fork 7080Umbrella 7150Lamp 7175Office 7550Kleenex 7950ElderlyMan 2480Bulimic 2702BoyOnCar 2870Plant&soil 5740Spoon 7004Bowl 7006Mug 7035HairDryer 7050Book 7090Truck 7130Golfer 8311Boy 9070
A power calculation based on the data of Van Gught et al (2010) indicated that 12participants would be sufficient to detect an effect. Because of the concentration of theensuing Experiment 4 on differential outcome expectancy, the pilot study was run until 12
aware participants (9 female; mean age = 20.92, range 18 – 30) had been recruited. Thisinvolved testing 21 participants in total; data from the 9 unaware participants was notanalysed due to low power.
Other methodological details were as described in Experiment 4, though participants didnot complete any personality questionnaires or instrumental phases. Only the aversive
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version was used, as the non-significant effects of neutral counter-conditioning have beenestablished in previous reports.
10.1.2.2 Results and conclusionParticipants developed differential evaluative-conditioning after the Pavlovian phase, butany differences were successfully abolished by the CC manipulation. Figure 10.1.2.1displays mean pleasantness ratings of each CS at each time-point.
Figure 10.1.2.1. Mean pleasantness rating of reward-predictive stimuli after Pavlovian
training or counter-conditioning.
Pav, Pavlovian training; CC, counter-conditioning; * CS+ > CS± > CS- [ps < .025]; error bars
represent 95%CI.An RM ANOVA of pleasantness ratings with Time-point (post-Pavlovian, post-CC) andStimulus as factors confirmed a significant effect of Stimulus and a significantStimulus*Time-point interaction [Fs(2,22) > 6.41, ps < .006]. The interaction was followedby separate RM ANOVAs for each time-point, with Stimulus as the only factor; the effectwas significant after Pavlovian training [F(2,22) = 31.3, p < .001], with CS+ > CS± > CS- [ps< .025], but non-significant after CC [F(1.14,12.6) = 2.82, p = .12].
The CC protocol was demonstrated to be successful in reducing the pleasantnessattributed to the CS+, and transferred some effect to the CS-, to the extent that any stimulusdifferences were abolished. The current method is therefore confirmed as suitable for acomplete study of the effects of CC on PIT.
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10.2 Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence Point(s)1. How many cigarettes do you smoke per day?a) 10 or less 0b) 11 – 20 1c) 21 – 30 2d) 31 or more 32. How soon after you wake up do you smoke your first cigarette?a) 0 – 5 min 3b) 30 min 2c) 31 – 60 min 1d) After 60 min 03. Do you find it difficult to refrain from smoking in places wheresmoking is not allowed (e.g. hospitals, government offices, cinemas,libraries etc)?a) Yes 1b) No 04. Do you smoke more during the first hours after waking than during therest of the day?a) Yes 1b) No 05. Which cigarette would you be the most unwilling to give up?a) First in the morning 1b) Any of the others 06. Do you smoke even when you are very ill?a) Yes 1b) No 0
